Media Defamation July, 2008

[>Watani<]

All the bad articles written, in July 2008, by International and Local media insulting the Free Patriotic Movement & other lebanese parties, will be posted in this thread.
They should have a reliable source: "an operating link or a reliable reference".

[Qwiw]

Insistance aveugle à classer le CPL dans l'alliance fantôme du "8 mars"...

Source: Al Oufok
Le nouveau gouvernement libanais : tout le monde a gagné sauf le Liban

Date: 14-07-2008

Le nouveau gouvernement libanais : tout le monde a gagné sauf le Liban


A la veille de la photo traditionnelle du premier gouvernement formé durant la présidence du général Michel Souleiman, le paysage politique libanais est enveloppé de rose et d'azur... Tout baigne dans l'huile ; et, les antagonistes d'hier, qui se lançaient des invectives à longueur de journée et de soirée, se retrouvent comme si de rien n'était et que les problèmes que les uns et les autres avaient posés, à la suite de l'agression israélienne de l'été 2006, avaient trouvé la solution adéquate...

Sur les différentes chaînes de télévision, les images des leaders vociférants et menaçants ont fait place à des embrassades ou, tout simplement, des accolades amicales accompagnées de larges sourires durant les cérémonies de passation des commandes dans les divers ministères.

Tout le monde a gagné ! Bravo !

Les forces de l'alliance entre la bourgeoisie et les restes du féodalisme politique au pouvoir ont, toute, eu leur part du nouveau gâteau. Celles de la majorité, mieux connues sous le nom du « 14 mars », et, surtout, celles de l'opposition, dites « formation du 8 mars ». Tout cela dans le cadre du nouvel accord signé, vers la fin du mois de mai, 2008 à Doha et dont les clauses préconisaient, en plus de l'élection du nouveau président de la République, la formation d'un gouvernement d'unité nationale et le retour à la loi électorale de 1960 qui divise le Liban en petite circonscriptions sur des bases confessionnelles pures.

Comment est partagé le nouveau gâteau gouvernemental de la pseudo unité nationale entre les différentes forces politiques ? Chacun a-t-il eu la part qu'il voulait et la balance a-t-elle bien pesé les parts pour ne pas faire des jaloux dans l'un ou l'autre camp et l'Accord de

La première réponse est affirmative puisque, selon les dires de tous, la majorité (l'alliance du 14 mars) a eu ses 16 ministères, tandis que les 14 autres sont partagés entre l'opposition, qui a eu 11 ministres (donc, la possibilité de blocage), et le président, qui n'en a eu que trois.

Commençons, d'abord, par les 16 ministres de la majorité, chapeautés par Fouad Sanioura, l'ami des Etats-Unis qui n'ont pas lésiné sur les moyens, militaires et politiques, pour le remettre à la tête du nouveau gouvernement et pour lequel, ils ont aligné devant la côte libanaise 6 bâtiments de guerre : cinq appartiennent à Sanioura, trois se partageant entre les « Forces libanaises » pro israéliennes et le parti phalangiste dont elles sont issues, deux au leader socialiste Walid Joumblat, trois reviennent à Saad Hariri et son « Mouvement du futur » et les trois restant proviennent de groupuscules faisant partie de l'alliance.

Il y a, ensuite, les ministres de « l'alliance du 8 mars », dominés par les cinq ministres cédés de plein gré à Michel Aoun, en plus des trois ministres du mouvement Amal, de l'unique ministre affilié au Hezbollah et de deux autres « amis ».

Enfin, le président de la République a désigné, disent les mauvaises langues, trois ministres qui ne sont pas à lui.

Dans cette toile inextricable, nous pouvons déceler les éléments suivants :

1. Les amis des Etats-Unis sont nombreux, très nombreux. Certains parlent de presque la moitié du gouvernement, sans oublier le Premier ministre. La nécessité d'avoir ce nombre relève, dit-on, du fait qu'à la suite de la libération des derniers détenus libanais par Israël, les prochains mois seraient ceux de la préparation de l'entrée libanaise, à la suite de la Syrie, sur la scène des négociations avec Tel Aviv ; ce qui ne manquera pas de poser la question des armes du Hezbollah et de la résistance en général.

2.Les deux grosses parts accordées à Michel Aoun (Courant patriotique libre, ami du Hezbollah) et Samir Geagea (Forces libanaises) viennent du fait que la bataille électorale la plus acharnée prévue, à partir de l'application de la loi de 1960, se fera dans les rangs des députés « Chrétiens ». Ce sont ces députés qui trancheront en ce qui concerne la nouvelle majorité ; d'où la nécessité pour les rassemblements du « 8 mars » et du « 14 mars » de renforcer les chances de leurs alliés chrétiens, en leur accordant des ministères qui peuvent les aider à « rendre des services » aux électeurs afin de gagner les voix nécessaires.

3. Dans cet objectif aussi, deux ministres arméniens furent choisis pour la première fois dans l'histoire politique du Liban et à un moment où l'émigration arménienne vers les Etats-Unis a atteint son paroxysme. Ce choix, dont l'un est pour la majorité et l'autre pour l'opposition, vise à gagner, de part et d'autre, la majorité des voix arméniennes restantes et qui pourraient faire une différence notoire dans la circonscription du Metn (6 députés) et dans deux des trois circonscriptions de Beyrouth (9 députés).

En attendant les élections (déjà presque toutes faites) dans dix mois et desquelles, une fois de plus, sont éloignées les forces non confessionnelles, la crise reste, quoi qu'on dise, entière. Surtout sur le plan économique et social où la cherté de la vie a atteint des niveaux alarmants. Les prix s'envolent si rapidement qu'ils ont déjà englouti la hausse (encore théorique) votée par le gouvernement précédent de Fouad Sanioura ; et le nouveau gouvernement, qui ne manquera pas d'avoir la majorité écrasante des voix du parlement n'a ni le temps ni la volonté de remédier à ce problème grave.

Toute cette situation nous pousse à dire : tout le monde a gagné sauf le Liban !

Marie NASSIF-DEBS

[>Watani<]

Lebanon's Militia Wars

Global Politicians - NY

Tony Badran - 17/07/2008

Lebanon's civil war was a complex, multisided battle whose implications still shape the country's politics today. This article analyzes the forces involved domestically and the course of the war, drawing lessons that apply to the contemporary situation in Lebanon.

Lebanon's civil war has been one of the most complex, multifaceted wars of modern times due to its hybrid nature, multiple participants (both state and non-state actors), and its impact on regional, and even global balances of power.

The goal of this article is to identify the principal combatants during the various stages of the war, their equipment, and tactics, with an emphasis on urban warfare and military operations in built-up areas. In this context, the focus is on the Lebanese participants and not the regular, state armies involved: the Syrian Arab Army and the Israel Defense Forces. However, Syria and Israel were intimately involved in the war, and Syria in particular cannot be separated from various key battles that took place on its orders and/or through its direct intervention either with its regular armed forces or proxies.

In addition, since Palestinian military capabilities and preparedness have been covered far more than their Lebanese counterparts, they will not be addressed in extensive detail here.[1]

Finally, the 2008 Hizballah military operation in Beirut and the Shuf Mountains will be examined and compared with the civil war to see what lessons can be drawn today, especially in light of this crucial development.

THE NATURE AND COURSE OF THE WAR

The causes of the war remain a matter of contention in Lebanon scholarship. Was it a war of "others" merely fought in Lebanon, using the Lebanese as tools and proxies, as Lebanese publisher and veteran diplomat Ghassan Tueni put it,[2] or was it a "Lebanese civil war" that drew in external players?

It was both. The non-Lebanese factor was central, even determinant, especially in the way the autonomous Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon strained the Lebanese system to the breaking point,[3] but also in the simple fact that the sustainability of the war effort--namely the supply of arms and ammunition--was completely dependent on foreign sources, which patronized factions that advanced their regional interests. Certain factors within the overall course of the Lebanon War were primarily regional--Israeli-Palestinian, Syrian-Palestinian, and Syrian/Iranian-Iraqi--even if they involved Lebanese proxies and/or allies.

By the same token, Lebanese parties also had the ability to torpedo unfavorable resolutions and to create situations that further involved the regional actors. The crisis was so intricately tied to regional and international dynamics that it was virtually impossible to disentangle them. Further, as the power of the militias grew and animosities deepened, the war took a life of its own, whereby even low-ranking militiamen could break a ceasefire out of sheer boredom.[4]

From a military standpoint, a defining feature of the war was that the Lebanese combatants were unable on their own to overrun each other and no single group was able to score a decisive victory over the other.[5] In order to achieve a decisive military triumph, one camp had to overtake, control, and hold the other camp's enclave. With the exception of the fights in Beirut itself, that never happened in the main sectarian enclaves throughout the war due both to domestic and regional (especially Syrian and Israeli) constraints.

Therefore, as Paul Jureidini, R.D. McLaurin, and James Price noted about the war's earliest phases, "[t]he period of April 1975 through March 1976 was in essence one of static and positional warfare."[6] This also applied to the mid-1980s, after sectarian consolidation created what became known as "cantons" not penetrable by opponents.

The increase in intensity, fighters, and weapons did not change that basic fact. Echoing this conclusion, Samir Kassir noted that during the build-up in fighters and arms, which took place during the long ceasefire in the summer of 1975, "[n]either the introduction of new arms nor the mobilization of a growing number of combatants substantially modified" the war's static nature.[7]

In many ways, this characterization serves to describe much of the war in general, not counting of course the advances and territory seizures by regular militaries--Syrian and Israeli.

Since enemy enclaves could not be overrun and taken over, artillery and rocket bombardment of enemy areas was never followed by effective infantry deployment and was thus limited to inflicting damage. It did not alter the overall military balance.[8] This was one of the major, and enduring, lessons of the Lebanese war.

The examples are numerous, but perhaps the most dramatic was the attempt by the Lebanese Forces to move into and establish a military presence in the Shuf Mountains in 1983-1984, after the Israeli invasion. Despite its significant capabilities (and its alliance with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at the time), the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia was not able to hold its positions in the Shuf. One year later, it was also defeated in eastern Sidon, where it had attempted to establish a presence.[9]

Fighting over and control of supply, access, and strategic routes was a prominent feature of the war, and particularly significant in terms of the sectarian/political geography of Lebanon. Strategic routes were at the heart of a number of battles: the attacks on the Dbayya and Tal al-Za'tar Palestinian camps and the Quarantina shantytown, the spring 1976 mountain offensive against the conservative Christian parties (especially the battles over Kahhala and Bologna, the gateway to Kisirwan), the Palestinian attack on the Christian coastal village of Damur, the battle of Zahla, and so on. Control of checkpoints on such roads, such as the infamous Barbara checkpoint held by the Lebanese Forces would play a major role in the internal coup within the Lebanese Forces in 1985 that saw the rise of Samir Geagea to the command of the militia.

Directly related to this securing of strategic roads was the consolidation of areas of influence (mainly along sectarian lines), whereby potential or actual enemy pockets would be eliminated.

All these factors shaped the balances of power on the ground, which went through several phases; this cannot be isolated from the broader regional interventions, especially by the Syrians both in the second half of the 1970s and after 1984, and the Israelis in 1982. Still, it can be said that by the mid-1980s, the situation outside of Beirut had consolidated into sectarian "cantons" next to areas dominated by the Syrians in the east and the north, and Israel's security zone in the south. This status quo would remain until the Syrian invasion of the Christian enclave in 1989, ending the war and completing the military occupation of Lebanon--which lasted until April 26, 2005, when the Syrians withdrew their troops. The Israelis had completed their withdrawal five years earlier, in May 2000.

THE MAIN COMBATANTS

When the war broke out, the three main groupings on the scene were the conservative or status quo parties--often dubbed "rightist" or "rightist-Christian"--and the revisionist camp--often dubbed "leftist" or "leftist-Muslim"--along with the various Palestinian forces, who aligned themselves with the later camp and helped train, arm, and even man its various militias.

The exact number of fighters in each camp is difficult to ascertain given the significant divergence in available sources. This is compounded by the fact that many of the fighters were not full-time soldiers, and some left the fighting--or even the country--or even switched sides at different junctures during the war.

The Conservative Coalition

The conservative Christian parties consolidated under the banner of the "Lebanese Front," which was presided over by former President Camille Chamoun. This political coalition gave birth to a joint command for the front's respective militias. The united military body was called the "Lebanese Forces" and was comprised of the Phalangists, the "Tigers" of the National Liberals Party, al-Tanzim(the "organization"), and the Guardians of the Cedars.

The Phalangists made up the military backbone of the Lebanese Forces, and although each militia had two representatives in the joint command, the Lebanese Forces were clearly dominated by Bashir Jumayyil, son of Phalangist leader Pierre Jumayyil. By August 1980, the integration of fighting forces was complete.[10]

The largest and most organized of the Lebanese Christian parties were the Phalanges. They were also the primary and most fearsome fighting force of the conservative camp. Formed in 1936 by Pierre Jumayyil, a pharmacist by profession, their sphere of influence was Jumayyil's hometown of Bikfayya in the northern Matn region of Mount Lebanon.[11]

Fiercely nationalist, the Phalanges' mobilization and street action capabilities were its hallmark. It fought alongside President Camille Chamoun in the 1958 civil war and its influence grew markedly in the 1960s, as did its national reach (though only among Christians). Around 1969-1970,[12] especially after the 1969 Cairo Accord[13] and the 1970-1971 influx of Palestinian fighters expelled from Jordan, it began training paramilitary units to confront the increased armed Palestinian presence, which the state was not able to contain and which clashed with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

This fear was sharpened especially after the clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinians in 1973, which intensified the Phalanges' preparation for the inevitable showdown with the Palestinians.[14]

The estimated number of Phalangist fighters varies from source to source. A July 1975 Lebanese Army intelligence report cited by Farid el-Khazen lists 8,000 militia men, all armed with personal weapons.[15] It is unclear how many of these members actually participated in the fighting and represented the fighting core of the militia. For instance, during the Battle of the Hotels, buildings could be defended by a small number of fighters, and no more than 60 fighters would participate on any given day.[16]

The party's military wing was commanded by "The War Council" (al-majlis al-harbi) first headed by William Hawi, who was killed during the Tal al-Za'tar offensive, which he supervised. He was succeeded by Bashir Jumayyil. Hawi had been in charge of setting up and supervising training camps and oversaw the party's Regulatory Forces, which he had created.

The second major party was the National Liberals Party (NLP), formed by former President Camille Chamoun in 1959. Its immediate zone of influence was in the Shuf (Chamoun's birthplace was the Shuf town of Dayr al-Qamar) and southern Mount Lebanon (south and east of Beirut).[17]

Smaller and less organized than the Phalanges, the NLP nevertheless benefited from Chamoun's impressive charisma, wealth, and connections. It played a very important role in the early years of the war, especially in the battle of Tal al-Za'tar, and was the Phalanges' principal ally (though at times competitor) in the fighting.

Like the Phalanges, though lacking their paramilitary history, the NLP began training around 1970. In archival footage used by al-Jazeera's war documentary, Chamoun commented on the training of his followers to a Western reporter:

The presence of the [Palestinian] Fida'iyyin is something we don't want to have here in this country. As far as we are concerned, we are training because we don't have any military experience. And since we lack this experience, we have to handle that, because our youth has turned soft and needs training, physical as well as intellectual. That's the idea behind the military training and that's what we're doing now.[18]

The NLP's militia, the "Tigers" (al-numur), was named after Chamoun's father, Nimr (Tiger), and was led by his son Danny. Again, the exact numbers of fighters is difficult to ascertain. The same Lebanese Army intelligence report cited by El-Khazen lists 4,000 fighters, all armed with personal weapons. However, the core fighting force was most probably much smaller, as was perhaps evident from the total of fighters amassed for the Tal al-Za'tar battle.

The Tigers and Danny Chamoun took the lead in launching the Tal al-Za'tar offensive although it's been reported that the irregulars under his command were the least disciplined.[19]

On July 7, 1980, members of the Tigers militia were attacked and slaughtered by the Phalanges after Danny Chamoun resisted Bashir Jumayyil's drive to unify the conservative Christian militias under his command in the Lebanese Forces and after attempts to find a middle ground failed to satisfy Jumayyil. Danny was rushed to exile, while Camille accepted the reality of Jumayyil's military leadership and integrated the Tigers into the Lebanese Forces under Jumayyil's command. The Tigers tried to revive their militia after Jumayyil's assassination, but by that time they could no longer compete with the Lebanese Forces.

The Tanzim, while much smaller than both the Phalanges and the NLP, was an interesting, initially secret, organization, founded in 1969 after the first major clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinians. Lewis Snider had the following to say about its inception:

It originated as a splinter group from the Katā'ib after its founders failed to persuade the Katā'ib leadership to support large-scale military training of Lebanese citizens in response to the expansion of Palestinian power in Lebanon and to Arab League pressure on the Lebanese government to neutralize Lebanese law in its application to the Palestinians. Therefore, the founding members decided to build a paramilitary organization to defend Lebanon and support the Lebanese Army....[20]

Since the Lebanese Army was against independent military preparations by private organizations, the Tanzim began secret military training programs in camps in the mountains. The rudimentary beginnings of this effort are suggested by the fact that wooden dummy rifles were used in the early stages of the program.

This military training program, which began in April 1969, was open to all Lebanese civilians who pledged to keep the source of their training a secret and to be ready to defend Lebanon in times of crisis, as the army could not do it alone. The Tanzim made its first "public appearance" in May 1973 during the prolonged clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerillas. The army indirectly called on the Tanzim for help when it announced over the radio for the Lebanese population to stop any "foreigners" from entering army-controlled areas. The "foreigners" in question were Palestinian guerrillas. From 1969 to 1975 the Tanzim claims to have trained 14,000 Lebanese. It did not become a truly separate and distinct organization until 1975.

With this background in mind, it is easy to see how Tanzim, Kata'ib, and NLP militia leaders could develop a close working relationship.[21]

The Tanzim was headed by the president of the Medical Association, Dr. Fu'ad Shimali, who was also a member of the executive board of the Maronite League and a founding member of the Lebanese Front (first known as the Front for Liberty and Man in Lebanon), which also included the head of the Maronite League, Shakir Abu Sulayman. There was speculation that the Maronite League financed the Tanzim.[22] Although small, the Tanzim was well-organized.

There is seemingly more to the organization, perhaps further explaining its secrecy. Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price explain: "Although small in number, the Tanzim... was the secret creation of high-ranking Christian Lebanese Army officers and represents the beginning of the disintegration of the Lebanese Army."[23]

The 1975 Lebanese Army Intelligence report cited by El-Khazen does not list the Tanzim or the number of its fighters. The Tanzim's numbers are hard to determine also because they trained both local volunteers as well as affiliates of other parties. Some of its fighters, especially at the fighting in Tal al-Za'tar, were army regulars in disguise.[24] They, however, counted in the hundreds, not thousands. At the Tal al-Za'tar battle, they reportedly contributed 200 fighters.[25]

The Guardians of the Cedars were another smaller militia that was integrated into the Lebanese Forces in August 1976. Formed in 1974 and headed by prominent Lebanese poet and writer Sa'id Aql, its militia was under the command of a former General Security (al-amn al-am) officer, Etienne Saqr (aka. "Abu Arz"), who recruited a small number of highly motivated ultra-nationalists.[26] An early and enduring ally of Israel, Saqr and his militia were vehemently anti-Palestinian.

The Guardians' fighters are often numbered at around 750-1,000. However, like all the militias, the actual fighting force is more difficult to assess. They contributed 100 fighters to the combined assault on Tal al-Za'tar in the summer of 1976.[27] Like the Tanzim, and unlike the Phalanges, the NLP, and other local militias, they were not tied to a particular region where they wielded political influence. Rather, as Mordechai Nisan notes, "they fought where they were needed."[28]

Notable among the small local groups was The Marada Brigade, which essentially was the private militia of the Franjiyya clan in the northern region of Zgharta, and its parochialism was evident in its original name, "Zgharta Liberation Army." The militia was commanded by President Sulayman Franjiyya's son, Tony, and it was said that President Franjiyya supplied it from the stocks of the LAF. In June 1978, after growing differences between Franjiyya and Bashir Jumayyil, the latter sent a Phalangist squad that murdered Tony Franjiyya in his home along with his wife and daughter. That was also the end of Franjiyya's alliance with the Lebanese Front.

As noted above, the LF was first born as the joint command for the aforementioned militias (excluding the Marada) under the command of Bashir Jumayyil. In 1979, as part of Bashir's ambitious rise, he formed a military force under his direct control that integrated military units independent of any of the parties and militias. The following year, all the militias were absorbed into the integrated units after Bashir attacked Chamoun's Tigers in July 1980 and incorporated their remnants.

After Bashir's assassination, the LF continued to grow and build on his legacy, becoming an impressive, sizeable, and very well-equipped fighting force (with an engineers corps, a mountain unit, an Israeli-trained special operations unit, a small navy, an artillery unit, an armored unit, counter-intelligence and security, etc.). It had a complex organizational structure (though without the use of traditional military ranks), diverse sources of income, and multiple functions in the areas under its control-- where it essentially took on the functions of a state authority.[29]

However, Bashir's assassination created a vacuum in leadership, which also led to an attempt by Bashir's brother, President Amin Jumayyil, to seize control of the powerful militia, but to no avail. Instead, a coup resulted in a joint command under Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika. Hobeika then decided to enter the Syrian orbit with the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Agreement, leading to yet another coup by Geagea ousting Hobeika, torpedoing the Tripartite Agreement and consolidating his command over the LF.

The LF was attacked by Army Commander Gen. Michel Aoun in the last two years of the war, severely weakening the Christian enclave (the last one outside Syrian control) and paving the way for the Syrian takeover in 1990.
The LF finally supported the Ta'if Accord that ended the war, and subsequently abided by its precepts concerning disarmament of all militias, handing over their arsenal to the army and the state in 1992. However, by 1994 the Syrians moved against Geagea and he was thrown in jail for crimes committed during the civil war, despite the existence of an amnesty law. The Syrians proceeded to tighten the noose on the LF, attempting several times to coopt it, without any success.

After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Parliament passed an amnesty freeing Geagea, who returned to the command of the LF, which is once again an active political force in Lebanon.

The Revisionist Alliance and the Palestinians

Grouping the revisionist camp with the Palestinians is due not only to the fact that they were allied until the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) expulsion from Lebanon, but because of the intricate political-ideological (including the common roots in the Arab Nationalist Movement) and military relationship that joined them. In fact, some of the groups in the revisionist camp were essentially Palestinian creations and mere Lebanese fronts for Palestinian activity. The best example is the short-lived Army of Arab Lebanon (jaysh lubnan al-arabi). The effect of the Palestinian Resistance Movement on Lebanese political life, especially on the power of the traditional Muslim leaders and their ability to control their constituents, was deep.

In 1972, the revisionists (also known as "the leftist and progressive forces") formed a front, which became known as The National Movement, under the leadership of Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP).

Although representing the small Druze sect in Lebanon (even while managing to attract some non-Druze followers), the PSP was without doubt the backbone of the revisionists, due to the towering figure of its founder. Jumblatt's charisma was the driving force behind the revisionist alliance, and he was its unquestioned leader.

Jumblatt founded the party in 1949, and the party revolved around his powerful personality. Based in the Druze enclave in southern Mount Lebanon and the Druze quarter of Beirut, the party participated in the fighting in 1958 against President Camille Chamoun. Jumblatt was a strong supporter of the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon and called for massive reforms in the Lebanese sectarian system. In 1970, as interior minister, Jumblatt legalized three parties which would become part of the National Movement: the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party.

The PSP fielded a small but potent militia, which would go on to play a major role in the civil war. The exact number of its fighting force is unclear, with some placing it at 3,000 fighters,[30] while others go as high as 5,000.[31] It is likely that the core fighting force was smaller.

The National Movement received a severe blow with Kamal Jumblatt's assassination on March 16, 1977, after his conflict with Syria's President Hafiz al-Assad had crossed the point of no return, leading the latter to liquidate him. The mantle of leadership was passed on to his son Walid, who still heads the party and the Druze community.

The second major party in the National Movement was the Lebanese Communist Party. The party traced its roots back to 1924 and had its first congress in 1943. It had a wide appeal due to its secularism and its attraction of the intelligentsia, but its popularity suffered in the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, especially when it maintained an unsympathetic attitude toward Arab nationalism. It underwent a significant shift in ideology at its second congress in 1968, when it decided to back the Palestinian Resistance Movement.[32] Its secretary general, George Hawi (who was assassinated in Beirut in June 2005), was a dominant figure in the war and a staunch ally of the Palestinians and of Kamal Jumblatt.

The LCP were part of the "Joint Forces" (al-quwwat al-mushtaraka), joining Palestinian and National Movement fighters in an attempt to achieve better command and control, a problem that was even more acute among the revisionists than among the conservative Christian forces.

The LCP would maintain joint forces with the PSP. Hawi explained that at one point, "[w]e were almost a unified force, meaning each battalion would have two companies from the Communist Party and two companies from the [Progressive] Socialist Party, especially in Beirut."[33] It fought on most fronts, but the actual number of its fighters is uncertain, with some listing the total number of militiamen at 5,000,[34] while others place the number of armed fighters at 1,000.[35]

Another important Communist group was the Organization for Communist Action (OCA), led by Muhsin Ibrahim, also a close ally of Jumblatt. The OCA's roots are in the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the Socialist Lebanon Organization and had close ties with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which had common roots in the ANM. The OCA drew support from intellectuals, students, and workers and together with the LCP was able to appeal widely to the Shi'a.[36] It had a small militia of about 100 fighters.[37]

The main Sunni militia in the National Movement was the Murabitun militia of the Independent Nasserites Movement led by Ibrahim Qulaylat. Qulaylat, a typical neighborhood enforcer (qabaday), began organizing the militia in his Mahallat Abu Shakir quarter in Beirut; he had allied himself with Jumblatt from the late 1960's, and like Jumblatt was against the Syrian intervention in 1976. The militia drew support from lower middle-class urban Sunnis. The militia participated in many battles during the war, especially in the Battle of the Hotels in 1975-1976.

The Murabitun were trained by the Palestinians and financed by Libya.[38] A former Sunni militiaman confirmed that the role of the Palestinians in the Murabitun couldn't be overstated.[39] In fact, he noted, that many a time, operations would be conducted by units led and manned by Palestinians, and supplemented by Lebanese elements for cover. This seems to be corroborated by the support the Murabitun received from Palestinian factions (Fatah, PFLP, and Sa'iqa) and Ahmad Khatib's Army of Arab Lebanon, a Palestinian-supported faction.[40]

The number of Murabitunfighters varies from source to source, but seems to have been in the low hundreds. The former Sunni militiaman expressed his conviction that, at most, the Murabitun had 100-150 fighters. This number seems to fit more or less with a Lebanese Army intelligence report quoted by El-Khazen, which lists them at 200.[41]

Though allied in the National Movement, the Murabitun clashed with the SSNP in 1981 over control of certain neighborhoods in Beirut. This was a common phenomenon in west Beirut, which highlighted the multi-polarity of the National Movement.

More significantly, however, was the termination of the Murabitun alliance with the PSP in 1985, which effectively ended its role in the war and in Lebanese politics. This was the result of Syria's drive to prevent a return of Yasir Arafat's influence to Lebanon. Syria used proxies and allies--in this case the Shi'i Amal militia--to attack Palestinian camps, positions, and assets--including deciding to eliminate the Murabitun in Beirut (and the Islamist harakat al-tawhid al-islami militia in Tripoli), using the SSNP and Alawite proxies.

However, reflecting a typical reality of the war, Amal proved incapable of routing the Murabitun on its own. In fact, Hawi noted that the balance on the field had been shifting against Amal. Hawi was contacted by Walid Jumblatt and he expected that Jumblatt would give the order for the PSP's and LCP's "Joint Forces" to enter the fray on the side of the Murabitun. To his surprise, Jumblatt's decision was to support the retreating Amal and defeat Qulaylat's Murabitun. "It was our and the [Progressive] Socialist Party's forces that decided the battle, and not Amal's forces," Hawi said.[42]

Qulaylat left Lebanon into exile and the Murabitun faded. There was a plethora of other small Nasserist, Arab nationalist, and socialist organizations--and their ubiquitous splinter movements--whose patronage was divided among the various radical states (Syria, Libya, and Iraq). Those included factions of the Ba'th Party (pro-Iraqi, based largely in Tripoli, and pro-Syrian), the Union of the Forces of the Working People (pro-Syrian), the Arab Socialist Action Party (formed by Palestinian leader George Habash), and the Arab Socialist Union (later split in two)--which was formed in the early 1970s and recruited from the poor quarters and operated in Ras Beirut, Ayn al-Mraysa and Basta. These militias were essentially neighborhood gangs whose control was over certain streets and quarters.

Another local group was the Sidon-based Populist Nasserist Organization led by Sidon figure Mustafa Sa'd, whose father, Ma'ruf, was a former MP and leading Nasserist activist in the Sidon region who was shot and killed at a public demonstration in Sidon in February 1975.[43]

Like the Murabitun, with which it was allied, Sa'd's militia was trained and supported by the PLO and financed by Libya. It played a somewhat significant role in the attack against the Christian coastal town of Damur (just north of Sidon on the coastal road) and was involved in the fighting in Jizzin and certain battles in Mount Lebanon. Sidon's importance was a port for supplies to the National Movement. Indeed, later in the war--during the mid-1980s--battles between Amal and the forces of the PSP and LCP, Sidon's port, and Sa'd's fishing boats were used to circumvent Amal's blockage of the Uza'i land supply route, transferring men and ammunition from Khalda to the waterfront Ayn al-Mraysa sector of Beirut.[44]

One last actor worth mentioning is the Army of Arab Lebanon (AAL, sometimes also referred to as Lebanon's Arab Army). The formation of the AAL was the result of a mutiny within the ranks of the LAF instigated by Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib in January 1976, and which drew strong support among units in the LAF. Khatib was first sought by the Syrians to join their own ill-fated splinter faction in the LAF known as "the Vanguard of the Army of Arab Lebanon," but they were not successful. Instead, Khatib was won over by the PLO (especially Ali Hassan Salama and Abu Jihad) and the Libyans.[45] The AAL participated in the spring offensive against Mount Lebanon in 1976 and attacked President Franjiyya's residential quarters in the Presidential palace in Ba'bda, forcing him to leave it for the rest of his term.

The formation of the AAL was in large part an element of the Syrian-Palestinian war in Lebanon, and the Syrians eventually arrested Khatib a year later in January 1977. He was subsequently released, withdrawing from all activity, and the AAL's role was finished. At its peak, El-Khazen estimates that the AAL commanded around 3,000 to 4,000 fighters. Yet by the end of 1976, he adds, it had dropped to a few hundred.[46]

Last, another important member of the National Movement was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), formed in 1932 by Antun Sa'ada, a Greek Orthodox ideologue executed in 1949 for conspiring to stage a coup. The party was to attempt another failed coup in 1961 against President Fu'ad Shihab. Its hostility to Arab nationalism in the 1950s led it to fight alongside President Camille Chamoun in the 1958 war. After 1967, the party's orientation shifted, giving full support to the Palestinians. It was legalized in 1970 by then Interior Minister Kamal Jumblatt and joined the National Movement he formed in 1972.

The party suffered a split, but the main faction ultimately became a Syrian proxy militia, attacking targets of the Syrian regime (especially in the war against the Palestinians and their allies in 1983-1985) with Syrian officers involved directly in training, supplying, and supervising it.[47]

Its core area of influence was the Kura region in northern Lebanon, as well as the northern Matn, certain quarters in Beirut, and the south. The size of the fighting force is unclear, with the LAF intelligence report cited by El-Khazen placing the total number of militiamen at 4,000, and anonymous Israeli intelligence sources quoted by Ehud Ya'ari citing "a few thousand fighters, some of whom are reservists called up only in emergencies."[48] Ya'ari's observation about reservists is accurate and is reflected in Yussef Bazzi's account (the reservists were called "end of the month comrades" by the regulars[49]).

A former Sunni militiaman speculated that they counted in the hundreds but acknowledged that they could mobilize reservists from the northern Matn region (Dhur al-Shwayr). Indeed, Bazzi notes that in the fighting against the Murabitun in Beirut in 1981, the SSNP would amass about 200 fighters.[50] Bazzi also describes a "general mobilization" in 1986, which included calling on "reservists" to gather at a meeting point in order to head for Tripoli, for the battle with the Tawhid movement.[51]

As for the Palestinians, much has been written about them, and so they will not be covered in detail here. Briefly, the Palestinians in Lebanon consisted mainly of Yasir Arafat's Fatah, the largest and most important faction; the pro-Syrian Sa'iqa, led by Zuhayr Muhsin; and the so-called Rejectionist Front, which included radical Marxist factions, namely George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and a breakaway faction, Nayif Hawatma's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The PFLP had another splinter faction, the PFLP-General Command, headed by Ahmad Jibril, and was first under Libyan patronage, but then became a full-fledged Syrian proxy and remains so to this day. The decisions and participation in the war varied between Fatah on one hand, and the Rejectionist Front on the other.

Aside from the PFLP-GC, other Palestinian organizations were also proxies for Arab regimes, like the Arab Liberation Front, which was pro-Iraqi. Arab regime interests were also reflected in the various brigades of the Palestine Liberation Army, which was supposed to be the PLO's regular military arm. However, the PLO never had an overall command over the different PLA brigades. Instead, these units were under the command of the respective Arab armies in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The Syrians, for example, used their units in the Lebanon War to serve their own interests.

In terms of numbers of Palestinian armed fighters, estimates vary widely. Sayigh estimates that there were probably no more than 2,000 PLO regulars in Beirut at the time of the Israeli invasion in 1982, with a part-time force of 4,000 to 5,000. Elsewhere in Tripoli and the Biqa', the number did not exceed 1,000 regulars and 2,000 part-timers, according to Sayigh, with another 2,000 regulars in the south.[52]

The biggest fighting force was Fatah followed by Sa'iqa and the DFLP and PFLP.

The Shi'i Militias

Shi'a militias per sewere relatively late in joining the fray. Shi'i youths had joined the various leftist and Palestinian groups, and received training from the Palestinians like everyone else in the revisionist front. Hizballah commander Imad Mughniya himself had started off his career in Fatah's Force 17.

Yet the Shi'a were stuck in the middle of a dangerous triangle, between the Palestinians and the Israelis on one side, and the Palestinian-leftist front and the conservative alliance on the other. The Shi'i cleric Musa Sadr, the most towering figure in the Lebanese Shi'i community at the time, secretly began training a militia for his Movement of the Deprived. The militia's existence was discovered in 1975 due to an explosion in its Biqa' training camp, and was revealed as Amal, the acronym of afwaj al-muqawama al-lubnaniyya (the detachments of the Lebanese resistance).[53]

The militia was weak in the early years, and in 1976, when Amal supported the Syrian intervention, the National Movement and the PLO easily routed it from areas it controlled in Beirut. Sadr's ties with the Syrians and his deteriorating relationship with the Palestinians and the leftist groups are likely the reason for his disappearance (and presumably his death) during a 1978 trip to Libya, which was allied with Sadr's Palestinian enemies, including the PLO. He was succeeded first by Husayn Husayni then by Nabih Berri, who remains the party's leader to this day.

Amal remained Syria's ally throughout the war and indeed became its main proxy. However, Amal wasn't particularly well-organized and effective in battles against the Palestinians in the "war of the camps" and against their Arab nationalist allies as noted above, or against the PSP-LCP joint forces, or later against its Shi'i rival Hizballah in the final years of the war; it needed to be bailed out by the Syrians, from whom it also received weapons and training.[54]

Berri did, however, have an ally in the predominantly Shi'i 6th brigade of the LAF, together with which Amal rebelled against the authority of the U.S.-backed President Amin Jumayyil in the so-called intifada of February 1984, with Syrian backing. The army collapsed once again.

This period, starting in 1983, saw attacks against the U.S. and multinational forces deployed in Beirut, resulting in their pullout. It also saw the beginning of the infamous Western hostage crisis that continued throughout the 1980s.

The factions responsible for these acts--using the suicide bomber, a tactic that Shi'i militants would proceed to hone for the next two decades--were clandestine radical Shi'i Islamist groups with ties to Iran and under Syria's protection. These groups began to emerge in the Shi'i milieu due in part to disillusionment with Amal. A breakaway faction, Islamic Amal, headed by Husayn Musawi, had already split from Amal in 1982. Aside from the religious element, there was also a regional and clannish element at play in the split,[55] and Islamic Amal was based in the Biqa'. There it was soon joined by Iranian Revolutionary Guards dispatched via Syria. They set up base there after seizing an army barracks and created a zone of control in its vicinity in the Biqa'. The new Islamist organization was named Hizballah, "the Party of God."

Hizballah was and remains a militant Khomeinist Islamist movement that adheres to Khomeini's doctrine of velayet-e-faqih, rule by a cleric in an Islamist state. Its ties to Iran are organic, multifaceted, and complex. The exact number of Hizballah's fighting force, the Islamic Resistance, is not known with certainty. In 1997 one source[56] placed it at 5,000 while another gave estimates between 500-600 core fighters and a reservist force of about 1,000.[57] The number during the civil war was probably in the low hundreds. It did, however, attract defectors, including military commanders from Amal who were disillusioned with that party.

During the inter-Shi'i war that began in 1987, Hizballah was able to overrun most of Amal's positions in Beirut, as Amal pleaded with the Syrians to interfere. Finally a deal was reached between the Syrians and the Iranians and the inter-Shi'i war ended with the deployment of the Syrians in west Beirut, but with Hizballah's assets safeguarded.

As a result of another Iranian-Syrian agreement after the Ta'if Accord ended the Lebanese war, Hizballah was the only militia to be excluded from handing over its weapons under the pretext that it was a "resistance movement" fighting Israeli occupation. Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, and more so after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the fate of Hizballah's armed status (which has grown massively and developed doctrinally, ironically, after the Israeli withdrawal) is the central issue in Lebanon today.

WEAPONS AND PROCUREMENT

Writing in 1979, Lawrence Whetten observed that both camps possessed essentially the same type of weapons, which only added to the overall stalemate of the war and its ultimately pointless destructiveness: "The war is likely to be classified as a war fought by the wrong people for the wrong reasons. No indigenous faction had an advantage in weaponry, all were equally dependent upon foreign sources."[58]

In the lead-up to the war and during its earliest weeks, many of the weapons used were mainly light, but also obsolete. A former Sunni militiaman noted that early on, the main weapons in their possession were the Simonov SKS semi-automatic carbine and the Degtyarev light machinegun.

The summer truce of 1975, as Samir Kassir pointed out, was used to procure more and better weapons and ammunition, with obsolete equipment being discarded.[59] During the period between 1973 and 1975, the main light weapons that would become the hallmark of the subsequent fighting were acquired from both the Eastern bloc and from Western sources.[60] These included Soviet AK-47s, U.S. M-16s, Belgian FN FALs (acquired with the help of sympathizers in the army),[61] West German G-3s, 50mm machineguns and DU 12.7s, RPG-6 and -7s, and light 81 and 82mm mortars.[62]

Phalangist official Karim Pakraduni described his party's initial weapons procurement and distribution process as follows:

The decision was the following: to propose that every household in our areas own a rifle, and we secured through some Eastern European countries... the purchase of weapons from Bulgaria. Each Kalashnikov rifle, arriving into Beirut with its ammunition, cost 200 Lebanese Pounds. We would distribute it for 300 Lebanese Pounds, and so, with the difference of 100 Pounds it meant that with the distribution of three rifles we would secure another rifle for the party."[63]

On November 6, 1975, a freighter was discovered delivering ammunition and weapons to the Phalanges at the Aqua Marina port in Juniya in preparation for another round of fighting even as a (twelfth) ceasefire had been declared barely five days earlier. Prime Minister Rashid Karami at the time asked Army Commander Hanna Said to confiscate the weapons and the ship, but the army did not take any action, leading Karami to threaten to resign.

Conservative Christian parties made use of the help of sympathetic Army officers in receiving weapons arriving at the port and airport listed as intended for the LAF.[64] Moreover, the role of the army, especially after its disintegration, was crucial in significantly upgrading the fighters' capabilities, know-how, personnel, and equipment--including armored vehicles (Panhards, AMXs, and Staghounds) and personnel carriers (M-113), as well as communications gear (including the army's telephone system), from which the conservative Christian camp benefited more.[65] The collapse of the army also escalated heavy weapons procurement.[66]

Ahmad Khatib's rebellion and his takeover of several LAF barracks also added heavy weaponry, including armor and artillery, to Fatah's bounty.[67] Meanwhile, the barracks in Fayyadiya (under the command of Colonel Antoine Barakat, a supporter of the Christian militias) and Sarba supported the Lebanese Front.

As noted earlier with the Tanzim, sympathetic Army officers had clandestinely helped train militia volunteers, and in the case of the final assault on the Tal al-Za'tar Palestinian camp--which was an in fact an army operation--supplied armored vehicles, communications and artillery support, and even provided disguised regulars.[68]

Once the Phalanges party established contacts with Israel, it began to receive shipments of weapons by boat at ports it controlled in east Beirut (the Aqua Marina in Juniya).[69] Phalangist official Joseph Abu Khalil describes his initial trip to Israel in 1976 as having come as a result of setbacks in the fighting in the commercial district in downtown Beirut, a shortage in ammunition, and advances by the National Movement forces--which had expanded the fighting into Mount Lebanon and the Matn (the "spring offensive"). Certain probing contacts had already been made and came back with positive results, relaying a willingness by Israel to supply weapons and ammunition. Those, according to Abu Khalil, were mainly from the stocks captured during Arab-Israeli wars.[70]

Chamoun had in fact preceded the Phalanges in reaching out to Israel, at first indirectly, for support, and became more and more dependent on it.[71] In 1976 Chamoun met secretly with then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin agreed to rush supplies of anti-tank weaponry and communications equipment.[72] He also agreed to provide Christian militiamen with training in Israel--something which would continue into the following decade with the Lebanese Forces. "Enlarged programs" were developed for training the Christian fighters--men and women--who reportedly impressed their trainers.[73]

Bavly and Salpeter noted that the rivalry between Chamoun and the Jumayyils complicated things for the Israelis who had to distribute the shipments, and the working manuals, evenly between the two.[74]

Bashir Jumayyil was not pleased with this state of affairs--what he dubbed the multiple "shops" of coordination with the Israelis. He moved to monopolize all contacts with the Israelis and made his move against Chamoun on July 7, 1980, and consolidated his control over the military forces of the conservative coalition.

The various groups in the revisionist camp relied on the Soviet bloc, the Palestinians, Syrians, Libyans, and Iraqis for weapons. The LCP's George Hawi summed up the procurement process:

[Arafat] sometimes used to handle transferring arms that would come to the National Movement, sometimes bought by Kamal Jumblatt's and our supporters; they used to pay for it. We would buy it from Bulgaria and Romania and it would be transferred, and Arafat would handle transferring it from Damascus, and he would sometimes delay its delivery and sometimes the delivered weapons would be old.[75]

The Libyans financed and supported a number of the Nasserist groups, most notably the Murabitun and the short-lived Army of Arab Lebanon. The Libyan role receded by the mid-1980s, and the Syrians and their Shi'i allies moved to neutralize the Iraqi assets as well. It was in the last phase of the war, after the end of the war with Iran, that Iraq began sending weapons to the forces under Gen. Michel Aoun's command as well as to the LF--both of whom were fighting the Syrians at the time.

The Palestinians had access to Arab money and weapons and had good ties with the Soviet bloc from which they received their weapons. Bavly and Salpeter list the inventory captured by the IDF as of October 13, 1982: 1,320 armored combat vehicles, including several hundred T-34, T-55, and T-62 tanks--some damaged; 82 field artillery pieces, 122mm, 130mm, 155mm, and 25-pound guns; 62 Katyusha rocket launchers; 215 mortars, 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 120mm, and 150mm; 196 anti-aircraft weapons, including 43 AA machine guns and 153 AA guns, 20mm, 23 mm, 30mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, and 100mm; 1,352 antitank weapons, including 1,099 personal weapons, 27 anti-tank missile launchers, 138 recoilless rifles, and 88 antitank guns; and 33,303 small arms. "Thousands of pieces of communications and optical equipment were captured as well."[76]

During the Israeli invasion, the Palestinians opened their caches and shared them with the leftist and Muslim militias.[77] The Palestinians had received training from Jordanian regulars, although they suffered from a number of the same problems that plagued the Lebanese militias--such as lack of proper doctrine as well as other conceptual and technical problems.[78]

After their evacuation from Jordan, the Palestinians handled the training of the revisionist militias, and the Palestinian camps themselves became the main training ground for the leftist and Muslim militias. A former Sunni militiaman related to me how before the breakout of the war in 1975, Fatah officers would hold yearly summer training camps for as many as 300 youths. This militiaman's own training was in the Sabra and Shatila camp. He, along with about 150 others, was trained for three months in light weapons use, as well as RPGs, explosives (including mines), mortars, and recoilless rifles.

Later, as the war intensified, time for training became sparse, and so, as the militiaman explained, training was restricted to quick familiarization with light weapons and RPGs. Quick on-the-spot training in specific weapons systems also sometimes took place.[79] Moreover, as Yussef Bazzi's account shows, training rounds for pro-Syrian proxies took place in secure areas (under direct Syrian control). These included training in field artillery.[80]

BATTLEFIELD TACTICS AND USE OF WEAPONS

Much of the war was urban warfare, involving fighting at close distance in built-up areas from one quarter to the next or even from building to building.

The basic fire-teams were small infantry units of four to six fighters. The unit leaders were often simply the most imposing and prominent persons in the group, who could command respect and maintain discipline. A former Sunni militiaman noted how it was mainly these leaders who took charge in "storming" operations (iqtiham)[81] against target buildings (often depending on the availability of ammunition).[82] These leaders did not have any formal rank. Discipline and command and control were weak points among all the militias.[83]

The former Sunni militiaman explained how especially early on, before the upgrade in weapons procurement, each small unit would have only one AK-47. This then evolved when AK-47s became the standard personal weapon, which also helped unify and integrate ammunition (tawhid al-dhakhira). The unit then also came to include an RPG launcher.

Eventually, the small units became roughly standardized, equipped with assault rifles (mainly AK-47 but also M-16), backed by a medium machine gun (FN MAG, Kalashnikov PKM, or M-60), along with a rocket launcher (mainly RPG 7 but sometimes also shoulder-held recoilless rifles).

Mechanized support was also added, whereby a unit would sometimes be backed by a jeep or pickup truck mounted with either recoilless rifles (106mm, M40 or B-10) or medium or heavy machineguns (Gorjunov SGM, DShKM 12.7 "Dushka"). Sometimes instead of a jeep or truck, a medium tank (Super Sherman) or light armored car (Panhard, AMX, Staghound) was used, which proved quite effective in urban warfare due to its maneuverability,[84] including in anti-tank operations, especially against Syrian armor.

Adaptability and conversion were hallmarks of weapons use during the war, given the limited means and access. For example, all combatants relied extensively on anti-aircraft guns converted for ground-support and direct ground fire roles.[85] The high rate and high caliber of the fire made the anti-aircraft gun a very effective and fearsome weapon, both defensively--in stopping infantry advances--as well as offensively--especially against fixed positions, where the damage inflicted would render the position virtually indefensible.[86]

Vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft guns were also very common. There were even ad hoc innovations to increase accuracy over longer ranges. The Phalangists, for example, added cameras and small monitors to their ZU anti-aircraft guns, which proved most effective and was used both in urban and rural settings in Mount Lebanon.[87]

Another innovation was the conversion of the air-to-ground Sneb rockets to surface-to-surface rockets. This proved another highly effective anti-tank weapon especially during the 1978 battles in east Beirut between the Phalanges and the Syrian Arab Army. Fired from a pipe that had been cut in half vertically, with 28-volt batteries, it was used for direct fire at distances of about 350 meters.[88] Along with other anti-tank weapons (jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles, B-10, anti-tank 76mm guns, and also HEAT and TOW rounds), this allowed the Phalanges to maintain control of key towns in east Beirut and to prevent the Syrians from penetrating them.

Like the anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank systems were also converted for direct ground fire roles, especially for breaching defensive positions.[89] They were particularly effective when mounted on jeeps/trucks and mobile platforms as they were able to deliver fire and quickly take cover. Rocket launchers were similarly effective, only not in direct fire roles but for their ability to be mounted on mobile platforms and to deliver heavy and rapid concentration of fire.

Field artillery also played a role in the war and was mainly used for suppressive effects as well as for its destructive power--especially against reinforced concrete defensive positions in buildings immune to light mortars.[90] It was also used for random shelling of enemy civilian areas for maximum destruction and psychological effect.[91]

It was a central weapon in the mountain battles (during the 1976 "spring offensive"), especially on the Farayya-Uyun al-Siman front, along with heavy mortars.[92] Together with rocket fire (Grad and Katyusha), it was also used in assault operations--providing cover and softening targets (from positions on hills overseeing the target area) for advancing and/or retreating infantry units.[93]

A tactic often seen throughout the war involved small infantry units taking cover behind corners of buildings, sometimes two parallel buildings on opposite sides of the street with the adversaries doing the same further down the street from inside or behind buildings.

The unit would take cover behind the corner of the building with the machine gunners taking turns running out to deliver rounds of suppressive fire and taking cover again. The soldiers armed with rocket launchers would take turns coming out, firing at the target (the opposing building or barricade), and then quickly return to cover. Similarly, the armed vehicle would emerge from behind the building (often on a cross street), fire, and proceed to take cover behind the parallel building. The tank or armored car would similarly emerge from behind the corner of the building, fire, and roll back for cover.

The corner of the buildings could be extended with sandbags, sand-filled barrels, and/or concrete fortification. Or sometimes the street could be blocked entirely with landfill and/or sandbags allowing the fighters to take cover behind it, standing up occasionally to fire over the barricade. Trenches could be dug behind the barricades to allow safe movement of troops and light supplies. Tunneling--including inside the Palestinian camps and inside buildings--was a standard practice during the war, especially in situations of siege and when exposed to sniper fire.[94]

This tactic was seen in particular early on in the war between the Phalangists and the National Movement forces; it was recurrent all throughout, including in the mid-1980s between rival factions of the Lebanese Forces. This was toward the end of the war in 1988--during the inter-Shi'i wars between Amal and Hizballah in Beirut and south Lebanon--after Elie Hobeika had signed the Syrian-sponsored Tripartite Agreement and was overrun by Samir Geagea.

HIZBALLAH'S ASSAULT AND THE CURRENT SITUATION

Almost 40 years after the Cairo Accord and 33 years after the start of the civil war, Lebanon continues to face the basic problem of having a revolutionary militia with regional extensions operating independently as a state beyond the state, in pursuit of armed conflict with Israel, sparking similar tensions among the various Lebanese communities.

In this case, the militia in question is Hizballah, which--unlike the Palestinians--draws its rank and file from one of the main Lebanese communities but simultaneously represents a regional dimension and poses a direct threat to the state thus causing a fundamental imbalance in the Lebanese system.

In May 2008, this contradiction, which had been building up especially since the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, reached its peak--or perhaps inevitable conclusion--when Hizballah and the other communities clashed militarily.

The episode carries a number of avenues for comparison with the civil war era to see what, if anything, has changed about the dynamics of war in Lebanon, and what lessons from that war remain valid today.

On May 7, Hizballah launched a military assault on west Beirut from its Shi'i neighborhoods mainly in the southern parts of the city. Hizballah--aided by its allied Shi'i militia Amal and the SSNP pro-Syrian militia--quickly took over west Beirut without organized military resistance to its encroachment. This was the result of a political decision made by Sunni leader Sa'd Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt not to contest the advance in an area, which they did not control.

Hizballah then decided to expand its operations to the Druze Shuf Mountains. What ensued allows us to draw a number of lessons in comparison with the military situation during the civil war.

During their assault on Beirut, Hizballah and its allies used standard civil war-era tactics and types of weaponry, namely assault rifles (AK-47s and M4A1s) and rocket propelled grenades (RPG-7s).

In the months before the assault, reports about armament and Hizballah-provided training in the pro-Syrian camp abounded. Raids by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces confiscated weapons caches and shipments. One such example was the raid against the SSNP which uncovered a large cache of civil war-era weaponry and explosives (suspected to be intended for assassinations).[95] Unverified statements by March 14 politicians constantly claimed that weapons for urban warfare (especially mortars and RPGs) were being smuggled to the pro-Syrian groups.

Similarly, intercepted shipments--intended for Hizballah--revealed the same type of urban-warfare weaponry, which only increased the suspicion of the governing March 14th movement that the pro-Syrian camp was preparing for an assault. One truck shipment intercepted in February 2007 contained forty-eight 60mm mortars, sixty 120mm mortars, 52 Grad rockets, and 118 cases of mortar shells.[96]

While a pro-Hizballah paper claimed that the battle plan was drawn by the slain Hizballah military commander (killed in February 2008), Imad Mughniya,[97] the offensive tactically mirrored the preferred strategy for built-up areas detailed above: small units with assault rifles and RPGs tag-teaming from behind building corners. The fighters with the rifles spring out first and deliver cover fire to be followed by the RPG launcher.[98]

Communication between the fighters was carried mainly through cellular phones and short-range walkie-talkies. On one occasion during the Beirut offensive, Hizballah used supportive mortar fire in the Nuwayri neighborhood, indicating perhaps a stiffer resistance than elsewhere.

Another standard civil war feature of urban warfare was the extensive use of snipers on both sides. Sniping is an effective defensive measure, as a single sniper can cripple an offensive advance within his area of control.

On the other hand, support sniper fire was also used by the attacking Hizballah-Amal militias against defenders in residential buildings in the Sunni neighborhoods. One incident involved a sniper on the fifteenth floor of an unfinished building (owned by a business partner of Amal's leader, Nabih Berri) on the Ayn al-Tina corniche, who had a line of fire against several Sunni defensive positions in residential buildings.

Kidnappings, another grim hallmark of the civil war, also quickly resurfaced as both sides took hostages. The release of some was secured after a series of contacts between the leaderships, but others were not so lucky, either being tortured or slaughtered.

However, it was the situation in the Shuf Mountains that was of most interest for comparative analysis.

Hizballah launched an assault on the Druze stronghold from multiple fronts: Shwayfat from the west on the coast, right above the Beirut airport, Baysur from the south, and the Baruk hill from the east, as well as from the two Shi'i towns Kayfun and Qmatiya, south of Alay.

As was the case in the civil war--indeed in any war--controlling strategic and access roads is crucial. Thus, in scenes very reminiscent of the civil war, rubble and sand barricades littered the streets of Beirut as Hizballah proceeded to surround Sa'd Hariri's headquarters and the Beirut residence of Walid Jumblatt and to cut off all roads surrounding the prime minister's headquarters in the Grand Serail.

Similarly, Hizballah was trying to link the Shi'i towns of Kayfun and Qmatiya to the base of operation in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Dahiya) through the road which links the Dahiya to Shwayfat-Aramun-Dawha-Dayr Qubil-Aytat and Kayfun, and Qmatiya, so that it could establish a pocket supported by access routes and prevent the Druze from surrounding the two Shi'i towns.

The very use of these Shi'i towns to launch operations seemed to confirm suspicions and fears that Hizballah was attempting to create demographic bridges--indirectly buying land or building residential apartments--in order to link up its non-contiguous areas. This was much in the same fashion as with its fiber optic telecommunications network, which was at the heart of the May 2008 controversy, and which penetrated non-Shi'i areas in order to link up Hizballah positions in the south, Beirut, and the Biqa'.

However, the attempt in the Shuf failed. In drastic contrast to the situation in Beirut, Hizballah's infantry units were not capable of penetrating the Shuf villages. As a result, we saw the use by Hizballah of mechanized units--the civil war hallmarks: trucks mounted with heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, and anti-tank guns--as well as mortar and rocket fire. Yet it was to no avail, as this support did not facilitate ground infiltration, and a number of Hizballah's vehicles were successfully destroyed, and both infantry and mechanized units were ambushed.[99] The Druze villages also used mortars in their successful defense. Of note were the extensive reports that fighters loyal to the Hizballah's Druze ally, Talal Arslan, had joined the other Druze and Jumblatt's PSP in their defense against Hizballah, including in Shwayfat.

It is unclear, however, what the ammunition situation was and how long the Druze could have maintained this defense. This may have been one reason why Jumblatt moved, after the Druze made their point, to absorb and neutralize the attack by inviting the army to move into the Shuf and secure it. This would have placed Hizballah in the face of the army. Should Hizballah have decided to persist in its attempts at storming the Shuf, the army would either have had to respond or splinter. Already there were reports that 40 senior officers (many of whom were Sunnis) had threatened to resign in protest of the army command's handling of the situation.[100]

Hizballah's failure to enter Alay--specifically the Ras al-Jabal hill overlooking the airport and the Dahiya--and to take the Baruk and the strategic "three 8s" hills, meant that Hizballah, in an all-out war situation would leave its positions in the Dahiya and the Biqa' as well as the south exposed to artillery, mortar and rocket fire. Moreover, it means that the PSP, along with Sunni allies on the coast and in the middle and western Biqa', can effectively cut off access between the non-contiguous Hizballah areas-- something that was seen back in January 2007, during Hizballah's riots, when PSP supporters and Sunni allies cut off the Na'ma coastal roads, in an unambiguous message to Hizballah.

Hizballah's control of the airport road, as well as its de facto control of the airport, which lies in its zone of influence, is of significance. It led to a government decision to rehabilitate the Juniya port, as well as to the resurgence of calls to habilitate properly the Ren? Mu'awwad airport in Qlay'at, in order to have options not under Hizballah's direct threat.

Source

[>Watani<]

Lebanon deal eases tensions

ISN International Relations and Security Network
18/07/2008


Tensions ease over Lebanon, but the Doha agreement is a truce, not a comprehensive solution.

By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch (18/07/08)

The Lebanese political settlement has eased tensions both domestically and in the wider Middle East, promoting movement on a number of diplomatic fronts while contributing to prospects for a potential regional realignment.
With the makeup of Lebanese Premier Fuad Siniora's cabinet finally decided following weeks of wrangling, a ministerial committee met Thursday to formulate a limited government program, which, it is hoped, will carry the cobbled-together unity administration through to elections expected in spring 2009.
Lebanon's 18-month political stalemate brought the consociational Lebanese governance system to the brink of collapse, ending in victory for the opposition in Qatar in May.
Truce

May's Doha agreement was a major diplomatic coup for the Qatari hosts, whose peripatetic foreign policy initiatives have reportedly caused considerable consternation in the US.
The deal has also been rightly presented as a major blow to US and Saudi interests in Lebanon and to the allied majority 14 March coalition, which had held out for so long in the face of opposition demands for a veto over government decisions - which Hizbollah and allies enjoy in the new cabinet.
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the impact of the agreement on the alignment of international interests in Lebanon, which remains largely the same.
"The Doha agreement was a truce, it did not provide for a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Lebanon […] it simply prevented the Lebanese system from totally collapsing," Dr Hilal Khashan from the American University of Beirut told ISN Security Watch in a telephone interview.

Opposition predominance continued in the grinding coalition formation process, with Hizbollah ally Michel Aoun compensated for his failure to secure the presidency with prominent cabinet posts. In "the formation of the cabinet, the March 14 majority had to make unpleasant concessions," Khashan confirmed.

The Qatari deal signaled the new-found pre-eminence of the pro-Syrian opposition, confirming the results of sharp armed clashes earlier in the month. It remains to be seen what the long-term impact of this rise in power will be given the fractured state of the Lebanese body politic and rapid warming of Franco-Syrian relations.
Speaking to ISN Security Watch, the International Crisis Group's Peter Harling was hopeful: "I think the impact [of Doha] has been extremely significant.
"Unless violence takes over again this conflict will now play out within the framework of Lebanon's institutions, in particular, through the parliamentary elections in 2009 rather than on the streets through armed conflict as was the trend increasingly in the past couple of years."

Sealing de-escalation

The Lebanese political deal has arguably played a significant role in facilitating German-mediated Hizbollah-Israeli negotiations on this week's prisoner exchange and Syrian-Israeli talks on the Golan.
It was no accident that news of ongoing Turkish-mediated talks on the Golan was broken by the Syrians around the time of the Doha summit and that the worsening Lebanese political crisis coincided with the February assassination of Hizbollah military chief Imad Mughniyah in Damascus.
Wednesday's prisoner and body swap on the Lebanese-Israeli border was presented by Hizbollah as a major victory. However, a more sober assessment reveals that the deal may in fact be good for both sides, bringing down the curtain on the July-August 2006 conflict and lessening the chances for a resumption in hostilities.
Israel says it is no longer holding Lebanese prisoners. Hizbollah doubts this but, if demonstrated, this means that the primary motivation for Hizbollah cross-border kidnap operations no longer exists. Israel's June negotiations offer to Lebanon also eases tensions despite Beirut's rejection.
It is no coincidence that Hizbollah's agreement to the prisoner/body swap, which reportedly saw the Shia movement drop its demand for the inclusion of a large number of Palestinian prisoners in the deal, was only achieved in the wake of the Doha agreement and coincided with the formation of the Lebanese unity government.
Doha also allowed Israel, previously concerned with the impact of the exchange on the 14 March coalition, a freer hand in negotiations despite stated concerns regarding alleged UNIFIL (UN Mission in Lebanon) failures to curb Hizbollah activities in southern Lebanon.
"Hizbollah's concerns now are domestic […] and Israel knows that," Khashan said, adding, "The release of the hostages and swap of the prisoners means that Israel does not want to focus on Hizbollah right now. Israel wants to focus on the Iranian nuclear project."
"I don't think that the swap makes much of a difference because Hizbollah doesn't want to take the initiative of a new round of confrontation with Israel at this point," Harling said.
Saudi quiescence

Saudi Arabia's primary ally in Lebanon, Saad al-Hariri's Future Movement, was specifically targeted by Hizbollah in its May strikes and is under threat of being outflanked by Sunni Islamist movements, a Beirut analyst told ISN Security Watch recently.
"The Syrian perspective on this is that there is a real conflict of interests between Syria and Saudi Arabia which is made worse by personal issues," Harling said. In a controversial televised August 2006 address Syrian President Bashar al-Assad called Arab leaders "half-men" for failing to support Hizbollah during the group's conflict with Israel war.
"The Doha agreement is perceived by the Saudis as a defeat," Harling said, adding, "It doesn't think it makes the relations between the two countries [Syria/Saudi Arabia] any better." He added that Syria appeared to be seeking a normalization of relations with the Saudis but that the understanding in Damascus was that "this will be difficult and take time."
Egypt has reportedly been seeking a mediating role between the Saudis and Syrians, with no ostensible signs of progress.
Khashan believes that "Syria has been making an effort so that the moderate Arab states will rehabilitate Syria in the Arab world. Syria would not part from Iran if she did not expect to improve her relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt."

Embracing Syria

Last weekend's inaugural Mediterranean Union meeting in Paris constituted something of a coming out party for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after years of isolation.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has led moves to rapidly rehabilitate bilateral ties with Syria. France played a key role in failed mediation efforts between Lebanese factions.
"The Doha agreement has had a very spectacular impact on French policy," Harling said. "The French have initiated a phase of all-out normalization with Syria."
The French post-Doha reversal is significant as Paris suspended diplomatic ties with Damascus in late December at the height of the Lebanese political crisis, accusing Damascus of blocking the election of a new Lebanese president.
"The French are dealing with the Syrians on the basis of a green light from the Americans otherwise they wouldn't have gone that far in communicating with the Syrians," Khashan said.
French President Nicholas Sarkozy reportedly told Lebanese President Michel Suleiman in Paris that he had "placed bets on trusting Bashar [al-Assad]," but that ongoing French support for the normalization process was attendant on the Syrian leader delivering on his commitments.
These commitments include the swapping of ambassadors and demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border, important symbolic moves of limited practical significance.

Divorce?

Iran, which has sought to tighten economic and diplomatic relations with Damascus in recent years, is increasingly showing signs of concern that Syria could be on the verge of shifting foreign policy positions in a manner that would damage Iranian regional interests.
An advisor to Iranian Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei warned this weekthat "fundamental consequences and changes" would occur in bilateral Iranian-Syrian relations should it sign a peace deal with and recognize Israel.
Khashan believes that "a divorce is underway between Iran and Hizbollah on one hand and the Syrians on the other. It is a quiet divorce and the two sides are keeping up appearances and claiming nothing is wrong.
"Iran right now is trying to ensure that Hizbollah will continue to exist as a military force without using Syria as a conduit for supplying aid to Hizbollah," he said.
Asked whether the Iranian-Syrian alliance was at risk, Harling said, "It is a very pragmatic relationship. It is not deeply ideological. […]. Iranian and Syrian interests are not identical in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Palestine, so tensions arise on a regular basis but I think that is part of the mode of this relationship.
"The coordination between the two countries is deep enough for these tensions to be leveled out," he concluded.

Awaiting Washington

Syria hopes that the post-Doha French embrace and gradual warming of relations with other major European states will establish the basis for the resumption of ties with the US.
Israel's decision to push ahead with Turkish-mediated talks on the future of the Golan Heights places pressure on Washington to relent and engage directly as Syria has made it clear that it will not agree to direct negotiations with Israel without direct US involvement.
Al-Assad gave a clear message to both the US and Iran of his willingness to engage at the Paris talks and Bastille Day festivities. While avoiding direct interaction with Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert, he reportedly allowed messages to be passed via Turkish President Recep Erdogan and a photo-op on the Bastille Day podium with Olmert standing only meters away.
A US-Syrian rapprochement is required to cement the gains made through the establishment of the Lebanese unity government but looks unlikely to occur ahead of the inauguration of a new US president next January; with Israeli political ructions also easing pressure for an immediate US policy shift.
Harling argues that the US "focus is very much Iraq and Iran, and Syria is not seen by the current administration as anything more than a spoiler and an irritant. I don't think there is any appetite there for engagement and I don't think there is much time anyway to achieve anything."
"Under the next administration, to me there is no doubt that […] engagement with Syria will take place, if only over Iraq," he said.
"The Syrians want American approval and recognition," Khashan said. He believes that after the new US administration takes office and Syrian-Israeli talks pick up pace, "the Syrians will insist on US involvement and that will definitely come."

Source

[>Watani<]

ميشال عون جنّده السوريون عام 75 وكاد الاسرائيليون يعيّنونه مكان سعد حداد عام 83

الشراع
18/07/2008

بعد ان اكتشف الاسرائيليون اصابة سعد حداد بسرطان الرئة، وتأكدوا من موته المحتم سريعاً، اثر ادخاله مستشفى ((رامبام)) في حيفا وخضوعه لفحوصات شاملة، قررت القيادة العسكرية الاسرائيلية المكلفة متابعة شؤون لبنان تشكيل هيئة او لجنة لاختيار ضابط لبناني ليحل مكان سعد حداد في قيادة ما يسمى بجيش لبنان الجنوبي

توجهت هذه اللجنة الى لبنان برئاسة الضابط آسا ياركوني وهو جنرال من اصل بولندي تسلم مهمة رئاسة الاستخبارات الخارجية للموساد، وكان معه جهاز عسكري كبير ضمنه اشاي ساغي

وهنا يجب التنبه الى ان الاسماء المعروفة التي تخرج الى الاعلام ليست هي صاحبة الرأي في الاستخبارات، بل هناك عناصر مدنية هي التي تقرر وهي التي تتخذ قرارات الاغتيال، وتحرك الاسماء البارزة.. وهذا يعني انه عند بروز أي اسم للاعلام فهذا يعني ان هناك من يحركه.. انظر مثلاً حالة اوري لوبراني الذي كان منسقاً لشؤون لبنان.. وهو كان خاضعاً لقيادات في الموساد غير معروفة، هي التي تحركه، وهذه المجموعات هي التي تحرك الاوضاع

اللجنة جاءت الى لبنان قرب ضبية وتتحرك بثياب مدنية وهي تحت حماية صهيونية ولكنها كانت تتحرك ايضاً بحراسات القوات اللبنانية وعناصر من الجيش اللبناني، وكانت صلاحياتها مطلقة. عقدوا اجتماعات مع ضباط عديدين في الجيش اللبناني منهم العقيد خليل والعقيد ابو رزق.. ركزوا على العقداء في الجيش اللبناني شرط ان يكونوا مسيحيين موارنة، متجاوزين نظرية موسى شاريت السابقة التي كانت تقضي بالبحث عن ضابط مسيحي ماروني برتبة رائد للتعاون معهم.. لكن هؤلاء العقداء الذين قابلوهم رفضوا التعاون مع الاسرائيليين

لم تتغير فقط رتبة الضابط الذي يريد الاسرائيليون التعاون معه، بل ايضاً مهماته العسكرية والسياسية تغيرت

كانت اسرائيل تريد من سعد حداد مواجهة سيطرة حركة فتح والمنظمات الفلسطينية على الحدود مع لبنان في ((فتح لاند)) بعد ان شعرت بأن سيطرة هذه المنظمات على كل القرى اللبنانية المتاخمة للحدود معها الغى عملياً المنطقة الفاصلة بينها وبين لبنان، اذ اصبحت المنظمات الفلسطينية المسلحة على الحدود مباشرة مع فلسطين المحتلة (الكيان الصهيوني) بما يشكل خطراً عليها

كانت مهمة سعد حداد اقرار واقع حال في القرى اللبنانية بحيث يقنع المزارعين اللبنانيين ان يظلوا في قراهم.. فترسل لهم جرارات زراعية لحرث اراضيهم وتستقطب عمالاً زراعيين لبنانيين للعمل في بساتين المستعمرات على الحدود ثم يعودون الى قراهم ليظلوا فيها ولا يتركونها للمنظمات الفلسطينية، وان تستقطب الشباب اللبناني بأي شكل من الاشكال، حتى لا يقاتلها في صفوف المنظمات الفلسطينية، وانشأت معامل صغيرة ومستوصفات في معظم القرى لاستقطاب الشيعي اكثر من المسيحي، لأن الشيعي يظل في قريته بينما المسيحي لا يفكر الا بالهجرة

ولم تكن اسرائيل تمانع بوجود قطع اسلحة فردية في منازل سكان القرى اللبنانية حتى لو كان صاحبه من حركة امل، لأنها كانت تراهن على التناقض الذي كان يتصاعد بين ابناء المنطقة وبين المنظمات الفلسطينية، دون ان يعني هذا وجود تعاون بينها وبين ابناء القرى اللبنانية حتى اذا حصل الاجتياح الصهيوني للبنان بدءاً من جنوبه وجدت اسرائيل من يرحب بها في هذه القرى ويرش عليها الارز ويوزع الحلوى ويتقاطر الاطفال للحصول على معلبات او حلوى او مرطبات من الجنود الصهاينة

اما في عهد انطوان لحد فإنهم بحثوا عن قائد عملاني محترف، وبعكس سعد حداد الذي لم يكن له أي مهمة عسكرية، فإن لحد كلف بمهمات عسكرية – تشكيل قوة مساندة والقيام بعمليات بديلاً عن الجيش الصهيوني - كان لحد قريباً جداً من قيادة الجيش اللبناني، وكان قريباً بالنسبية لنائب رئيس الاستخبارات العسكرية جورج سمعان (متقاعد الآن

اراد الاسرائيليون اعطاء لحد دوراً عسكرياً قتالياً، ولم ينجحوا.. كان سعد حداد شخصية ضعيفة، بينما كان لحد شخصية اقوى، نفذ اوامر اسرائيل الاستخباراتية والعسكرية.. وظل على صلة مع قوى سياسية في المنطقة المسيحية في لبنان

العقيد ميشال عون

جاء ضابط من رفاق عون وطلب ان تلتقي اللجنة مع العقيد ميشال عون الذي يمكن ان يحل مكان سعد حداد في قيادة جيش لبنان الجنوبي، مشيراً الى استعداد عون لهذه المهمة

لم تمانع اللجنة في لقاء عون والتقت بأركانها الثلاثة ياركوني وساغي والشخص المدني الذي يبدو انه هو صاحب القرار.. لمقابلة عون

الضباط الاسرائيليون جاؤوا مدنيين لكن عون فاجأهم بأنه قدم مرتدياً ملابسه العسكرية ورتبة العقيد على كتفه، يرافقه ضابطان بملابسهما العسكرية ايضاً وأدوا التحية، كانت الجلسة للتعارف وتبادل الانخاب وتناول العشاء وأحاديث اجتماعية ونكات. انتهى الاجتماع، وأبدى عون استعداده ان يكون اللقاء الثاني على العشاء في منـزل صديق، فتمت الموافقة فوراً.. لأن الاسرائيليين كانوا في عجلة من امرهم حيث يعيش سعد حداد الرمق الاخير من حياته

اقام صديق عون وليمة كاملة ادهشت الاسرائيليين بكرمها وتنوعها.. وكان عون ايضاً في بدلته العسكرية.. مما ازعج الاسرائيليين الذين كانوا يريدون ان يكون الامر سرياً في بادىء الامر، خاصة وأنهم كانوا في مرحلة الاختيار بين مجموعة من الضباط ويريدون لخياراتهم ان تنجح، دون الخضوع للاستعراضات والاعلام

كان الاسرائيليون شديدي الحرص على الا يعرفهم احد، كانوا يتنقلون بسيارات مختلفة وكلها قديمة وتكاد تكون مهترئة، لم يكن أي منهم يحمل أي قطعة سلاح ولا حتى سكين مطبخ

انه جيش غريب، حتى ان اسرائيل لا تقيم مدرسة حربية، بل هناك دورات عسكرية توضع شروطها ونظمها داخل لوحة اعلانات في الثكنات العسكرية، وكل من يريد اختيار أي سلاح للالتحاق به يقدم طلبه اليه ويتابع دراسته فيه، وهو تحت مراقبة شديدة من المدنيين الذين ينتمون لأجهزة استخبارات، فإذا كان التلميذ في أي دورة ذا نشاط مميز وذكاء واضح ودراسة جدية يدفعونه نحو اعلى الرتب.. حتى ان جنرالاً كان عمره 38 سنة وكان والده يخدم في وحدته العسكرية وهو عقيد في اللواء الذي يقوده ابنه

الضابط عندهم لا يحصل على رتبته إلا عبر عملية عسكرية أو أمنية فيترقى بعدها حتى ان هناك ضابطاً وصل إلى رتبة عقيد وله من العمر 28 سنة، عكس جيوش العالم التي يتم الترفيع فيها حسب سنوات الخدمة فقط.. وحسب دراسته، بينما في إسرائيل حسب نشاطه وعمله

نعود إلى ميشال عون.. عندما دخل على الضباط الإسرائيليين هجم عليهم تودداً وانهال عليهم بالقبلات مما اثار استغرابهم، فمعرفته بهم ومعرفتهم به لم تتعد لقاء يتيماً سابقاً، وهذا هو اللقاء الثاني. فكيف هذه المودة الشديدة؟

بعد تناول العشاء والحلويات.. تحدث الضابط المدني مع عون طالباً منه الانتقال إلى غرفة جانبية للحديث الثنائي، فانفرد الاثنان في لقاء استغرق نحو 30 دقيقة.. وانتهى اللقاءان على اتفاق بعقد مقابلة حاسمة قبل اتخاذ القرار بتكليف عون قيادة قوات جيش لبنان الجنوبي

كان الاتفاق على ان ينطلق عون إلى إسرائيل من القاعدة العسكرية في جونيه (المسبح العسكري)، حيث تأتي طائرة عامودية صهيونية لتحمله إلى الأراضي المحتلة عن طريق البحر، ذهاباً وإياباً، وهذه الطائرة العامودية صغيرة سريعة تكاد تكون مكتومة الصوت

التقرير – المفاجأة

لم تأت طائرة عامودية إلى القاعدة العسكرية في جونيه لحمل ميشال عون.. بل جاء التقرير المفاجأة بأن ميشال عون هو جاسوس سوري هيأته دمشق لزرعه في إسرائيل لاستخدامه في الحصول على معلومات ستتوفر له عندما يصبح قائداً لجيش لبنان الجنوبي، وسيخدمها مثلما خدمها عندما كان ضابطاً في صيدا

اطلع المعنيون الذين رشحوا عون لخلافة سعد حداد على مختصر ملف أحضره الصهاينة إلى جونيه، يكشف ان الاستخبارات السورية استقطبت عون من داخل الجيش اللبناني منذ العام 1975، وكان برتبة نقيب في ثكنة محمد زغيب في صيدا

في صيدا أطلق ميشال عون ثلاث قذائف على مخيم عين الحلوة في وقت لم يصدر أي أمر من القيادة العسكرية في الجنوب، ولا من القيادة المركزية في بيروت (أو اليرزة) بهذه العملية، فنتج عن قذائف عون ان خرجت قوات الصاعقة السورية من المخيم لاحتلال صيدا والاشتباك مع الجيش اللبناني وقتل ضابط لبناني من آل حليحل و16 جندياً لبنانياً، وتحولت عاصمة الجنوب إلى مدينة فدائية حسب وصف صحيفة ((النهار)) يومها

هرب ميشال عون وكان قائد الموقع العميد سيمون سعيد (عم النائب السابق فارس سعيد) ويساعده الضباط سليم الدحداح وأمين القاضي وخليل كنعان وكلهم كانوا ملازمين أول

هرب ميشال عون، فاستدعاه قائد جهاز الاستخبارات جول بستاني للتحقيق، تحت قاعدة في العلم العسكري تقول: ان عدوك هو الذي يطلق عليك النار والذي يطلق من عندك النار دون أوامر

كان ميشال عون مكلفاً بهذه العملية من قبل الاستخبارات السورية لتحتل الصاعقة صيدا.. إذ فجأة، وبعد إطلاق عون لقذائفه الثلاث، اندفعت الصاعقة السورية لاحتلال عاصمة الجنوب في تظاهرة استعراضية سورية موجهة ضد حركة فتح بقيادة ياسر عرفات.. دون أن ننسى ان الغطاء السياسي لهذه العملية كان اتفاق حافظ الأسد مع الصهيوني هنري كيسنجر عام 1974 لاحتلال لبنان والامساك برقبة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية.. وكانت دمشق تزرع المبررات.. من احتلال صيدا بسبب قذائف ميشال عون.. إلى قتل الكتائبـي عند كنيسة عين الرمانة لحصول مجزرة البوسطة الشهيرة التي كانت تقل محتفلين بذكرى عملية معالوت (ترشيحا) التي نفذتها الجبهة الشعبية – القيادة العامة بقيادة أحمد جبريل العدو الشرس لرئيس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية وحركة فتح ياسر عرفات

هنا انضم ميشال عون إلى أحمد جبريل وغيره في تقديم المبررات لسوريا لتحتل لبنان خطوة بعد خطوة

المهم

انتهى التحقيق مع ميشال عون بإيقافه مسلكياً لمدة ستة أشهر في إحدى ثكنات الجيش اللبناني حول العاصمة بيروت.. وهذا الملف يفترض انه ما زال موجوداً عند جول بستاني

ميشال عون إلى الردع

بعد واقعة صيدا الشهيرة وانتهاء مدة عقوبة عون المسلكية تم نقل عون إلى أعمال قوات الردع العربية التي كانت دخلت لبنان بغطاء عربي اثر مؤتمري قمة الرياض (السداسية) والقاهرة الشاملة

كان عون في ((الردع)) حيث مكتبه الرئيسي في وزارة الصحة قرب قصر منصور، الذي تحول لعدة سنوات كمقر مؤقت للمجلس النيابي مسؤولاً عن الافراد للمأذونيات والمرضى والخدمات

في ((الردع)) أصبح لعون مهمات مباشرة مع القوات السورية وضباطها، خاصة جماعة الاستخبارات، حيث بدت العلاقة بين عون وهذه الاستخبارات طبيعية، لأن سوريا أدخلت بداية نحو 20 ألف جندي إلى جانب القوات العربية الأخرى (السعودية والإماراتية والليبية والسودانية واليمنية والكويتية)) قبل ان تنسحب كلها وتصبح قوات الردع سورية بنسبة %100

إذن

لم تكن حرب التحرير التي أعلنها عون على القوات السورية المحتلة في 14/3/1989 هي المؤشر الأول على تورطه مع الاستخبارات السورية لتغطية كل اعتداءات النظام السوري على المناطق اللبنانية كافة.. بل ان فتح عون للمعركة مع القوات السورية في ذلك العام كشف بالنتيجة التي دفع لبنان ثمنها، كيف مهد عون لإدخال هذه القوات إلى كل بقعة في لبنان.. وكيف ان عون نشر مدفعيته في كل المواقع المهمة للوطن، جامعات، ثانويات، مصانع، مرفأ، مؤسسات تجارية، كان يقصف منها على القوات السورية ليستدرجها إلى قصف هذه المواقع، فتم تدمير جامعات وثانويات ومصانع ومرفأ ومؤسسات تجارية وخدماتية، فأحرقت خـزانات الوقود في عمارة شلهوب وأحرقت ودمرت المصانع في المكلس.. حتى بلغت خسائر المسيحيين في هذه الحرب 8 مليارات دولار في ذلك العام.. عكس ما كان يحصل سابقاً، حيث كانت الرأسمالية المارونية تدخل المليارات الى لبنان.. لكن عون دفعها لأن تهرّب هذه المليارات الى الخارج

لم يكتف عون بهذا بل انه قال انه حل أزمة السكن في المنطقة الشرقية كما حل ازمة السير، حيث كانت قذائفه وقذائف القوات السورية تدمر البيوت فيهجرها سكانها وتخلو الشوارع من السيارات

ألم يقل مرة إن بيروت دمرت عبر التاريخ 7 مرات ولن يحصل شيء مخيف اذا دمرت مرة ثامنة؟

ماذا يريد عون من السوريين حتى يكون عميلاً لهم منذ هذا الوقت المبكر؟

المقربون منه الكثر الذين كانوا معه وحوله ويعرفون نفسيته المريضة يؤكدون ان هذا الضابط الذي كان شاباً وجند وهو برتبة نقيب عند الاستخبارات السورية بدأ بتلقي 500 ل.ل. يومها اضافة الى راتبه.. اما القول انه رضخ لاغراء المنصب منذ هذا التاريخ فهذا افتراء على التاريخ.. انما دغدغ السوريون عواطفه ككل ضابط ماروني يمكن ان يقع بين ايديهم بعد ان يقرأوا ملفه جيداً، فهو شخص نرجسي، شديد الغرور بنفسه وإمكاناته، وهو عصبي المزاج، كان مرفوضاً في المدرسة الحربية، ودخلها بواسطة النائب الكتلوي ادوار حنين، الذي توسط له عند قائد الجيش اللواء فؤاد شهاب قبل ان يصبح رئيساً للجمهورية، وكان والد عون كتلوياً يكره حزبي الكتائب والوطنيين الاحرار

تم استقطاب عون لوجود دوافع شخصية لديه، مالية وذاتية وخلفية سياسية، وفيما بعد دخل دير الصليب للعلاج من مرض عصبي متمكن منه، مثلما دخله شقيقه بإسم مختلف المصحة العقلية نفسها. وربما تكون حالته العقلية هي المذلة التي امسك بها السوريون كي يستخدموا عون لمصالحهم باكراً وحتى اليوم

كان مطلوباً من عون ان يعلن انه ضد السوريين في كل مناسبة كي يستقطب خصوم سوريا في لبنان، وهم الاكثرية الساحقة من اللبنانيين خاصة عند المسيحيين.. وكان وما زال هناك اعتقاد بأن عون لم يكن ولن يكون قادراً على الخروج عن الارادة السورية لأنه عند مخالفته الارادة السورية سيقتل، وهو يعرف هذا الامر، وإذا خُيِّر المرء بين ان يقتل او ان يظل مرشحاً أبدياً لرئاسة الجمهورية.. فإن أي انسان سيفعل مثلما فعل ميشال عون.. انما بعد ان تورط منذ البداية وسار مع الاستخبارات السورية

هنا يقول احد الذين كانوا الى جانب عون.. ان سوريا يجب ان تقيم تمثالاً من الالماس لعون في ساحة المرجة لأنها لم تكن لتحلم بإحتلال لبنان وخاصة المناطق المسيحية منها لولا مساعدة عون نفسه

الجيش والقوات

نجح عون في جعل فئة من الجيش اللبناني ضد القوات اللبنانية في المناطق المسيحية، حيث كانت اغلبية ضباط الجيش مع القوات، واذا ما حصلت تجاوزات من القوات تثير غضب ضباط الجيش وتستفز الناس التي كانت تكره الميليشيات وتريد الدولة، فإن هذا لا يستدعي قيام حرب بين الاثنين لولا تكليف ميشال عون من قبل الاستخبارات السورية بهذه المهمة التي قضت على الحضور المسيحي الفاعل لمصلحة القوات السورية ومن بعدها لمصلحة حزب الله

كان للقوات اللبنانية سيطرة كبيرة داخل الجيش لأن معظم ضباطه كانوا يؤيدون القوات ولم يكونوا يريدون قتالها، والدليل ان عون بكل من كان معه وأسلحته وتدريباته لم يستطع ان يعمل شيئاً في المناطق المسيحية

لم تشتبك القوات مع الجيش فيما سمي حرب الالغاء.. بل اشتبكت القوات مع ميليشيا جيش عون وهو كان جيشاً واحداً من خمسة جيوش انقسم اليها الجيش اللبناني بسبب الولاءات الطائفية والمذهبية. فكل فئة لحقت بقطيعها المذهبي.. عدا من ذهب الى بيته او في السجون في عهد عون.. ومنهم يوسف الطحان في فوج المغاوير، موريس عبود، جان اسعد (ألزمه الذهاب الى منـزله) فرانسوا زين سجن وعذب، ضابط طيار

استفاد عون من مسألة الاستيداع التي تحصل عندما يترقى ضابط الى رتبة معينة ليحل محل ضابط اعلى منه فيتم إلحاق هذا الضابط بالاستيداع الى ان يجدوا موقعاً يليق برتبته على ألا تتعدى فترة الاستيداع عدة اشهر بتصرف القيادة

أركان عون

طلبوا اغتياله

عام 1989وبعد ان فضحت سياسة وسلوكيات عون وارتباطه بالاستخبارات السورية طلب عدد من أركانه من القوات اللبنانية اغتياله بسبب خطره على المجتمع المسيحي، لكن قائد القوات اللبنانية سمير جعجع رفض الاغتيال وبعض المحيطين بجعجع قالوا لمن طلب من جماعة عون اغتياله: لماذا لا تغتالونه انتم، لماذا تريدون تحميلنا هذه المسؤولية؟

ولم يكن قتل عون صعباً، وهو كان يدعي ان هناك ملالات وقوات عسكرية توجهت الى منـزله فوق انطلياس لاغتياله، وكانت هذه جزءاً من ادعاءاته لأن أمر التخلص منه لم يكن يستدعي لا ملالات ولا قوات عسكرية

خلال حرب عون ضد القوات اجتمع عدد من ضباطه مع قادة من الصاعقة السورية في محطة ابو ديوان في الشرقية للتنسيق والاتفاق على كميات الوقود والذخائر التي يحتاجها عون لاستكمال المعركة واطالة مدتها والوقوف على رجليه لأطول مدة ممكنة.. وكان الهدف كله التمهيد لادخال القوات السورية الى المناطق المسيحية؟

كان المسلمون يريدون استمرار مواجهة المناطق المسيحية للنظام السوري حماية لما تبقى من لبنان مستقلاً.. ولعمل توازن ما في لبنان، لكن عون مكّن هذا النظام من اكمال سيطرته على كل لبنان وتم اخضاع كل لبنان مسلمين ومسيحيين لإرادته

Source

[>Watani<]

Appeasement Politics

Weekly Blitz - Bangladesh Newspaper
Leslie J. Sacks
23/07/2008

Negotiating with terrorists and with authoritarian regimes is often in the news these days. Opinions fly fast and wide about the relative merits of sitting down with this or that unsavory character. Yet we have only to glance at the latest news to receive a litany of reality checks. Robert Mugabe came to power using the gun some 28 years ago. After a brief period of stability and growth, he has set about destroying Zimbabwe, a country that used to be called the "bread basket" of Africa. He has devastated the economy by recklessly expropriating land and has emasculated the opposition by beating, killing or jailing many of his opponents. With increasing violence, Mugabe has stamped his authoritarian rule throughout the country. The West has recently opened its blind eye whilst the U.N., his trading partners (i.e. China), and Africa tread cautiously. For the latter, it appears as though Mugabe's credentials as a freedom fighter warrant unlimited loyalty, as though his decade's long violence and mayhem will one day transition to tolerance and peace. What is that memorable saying about a leopard and its spots? As the one-man run-off presidential election held June 27 makes perfectly clear, Mugabe has reconfirmed his disinterest in democracy, freedom and the will of the people. Never mind that Mugabe's opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai, won the first round ballot. According to Mugabe, "We fought for this country, and a lot of blood was shed.

Negotiating with terrorists and with authoritarian regimes is often in the news these days. Opinions fly fast and wide about the relative merits of sitting down with this or that unsavory character.

Yet we have only to glance at the latest news to receive a litany of reality checks.

Robert Mugabe came to power using the gun some 28 years ago. After a brief period of stability and growth, he has set about destroying Zimbabwe, a country that used to be called the "bread basket" of Africa. He has devastated the economy by recklessly expropriating land and has emasculated the opposition by beating, killing or jailing many of his opponents. With increasing violence, Mugabe has stamped his authoritarian rule throughout the country. The West has recently opened its blind eye whilst the U.N., his trading partners (i.e. China), and Africa tread cautiously. For the latter, it appears as though Mugabe's credentials as a freedom fighter warrant unlimited loyalty, as though his decade's long violence and mayhem will one day transition to tolerance and peace. What is that memorable saying about a leopard and its spots?

As the one-man run-off presidential election held June 27 makes perfectly clear, Mugabe has reconfirmed his disinterest in democracy, freedom and the will of the people. Never mind that Mugabe's opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai, won the first round ballot. According to Mugabe, "We fought for this country, and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give up our country because of a mere X. How can a ballpoint [pen] fight with a gun?"

It seems years of accommodation, understanding and negotiation by the West have only hardened the geriatric Mugabe's determination to forcefully hold onto power, to break the back of any and all opposition. Could not the West have foreseen this outcome; were there not enough signs along the way?

In Lebanon, Hizballah has only tightened its stranglehold on the Lebanese government. Its unqualified veto power gives it total control over policy and change whilst shrewdly sidestepping responsibility, as the minority party, for the government's future mistakes. We have known and still know that Hizballah is an unabashed terrorist group with political, educational, and financial wings.

Just a few weeks ago, in a bloody confrontation with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Hizballah took control of the capital, Beirut. In 2006, they provoked a war with Israel through kidnappings and assorted border provocations. They have a more effective fighting force than the Lebanese army and are reported to have 40,000 rockets aimed at Israel. Furthermore, they are responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist group apart from Al Qaeda. And yet Condoleezza Rice has stated that she welcomes the new power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon as if it was reached democratically and peacefully. Apparently, we in the West now (tacitly) allow violent blackmail on a countrywide basis and support terrorist groups in power. Is there no end to our "pragmatism," is there always a deal with the devil worthy of our imprimatur? Even though we surely know that the "pragmatism" of these militants has been and will remain worthless? Is our fear of confrontation, our dislike of going it alone and our need for peace at any cost so deep that we hope where there is no justification for hope? Do we endlessly put off the day of reckoning (ignoring the cost of our freedom, the ultimate price of our peace) at the expense of oppressed peoples everywhere, at the expense of honesty and truth?

In the Middle Ages the church sold "indulgences" to their wealthier sinners who would thereby ensure their key to heaven by greasing the proverbial palm of the local parish. Do we open our myopic eyes a little more and confront the real enemies of our civilization rather than devoting ourselves exclusively, as many in the left are wont to do, to Kyoto and global warming, to whales and moose, to distractions from ensuring our survival?

So now we must negotiate with Iran's President Ahmadinejad, a man who has often stated that he has no interest in Israel's survival, peace with America, or in reaching any accommodation with his internal opposition? Are there no limits to our appeasements, to our self-flagellation, to our ability to fool ourselves?

Many in the world support these anti-Western rogue regimes, terrorist groups, fundamentalists and tin pot dictators. They do so not necessarily because they objectively find an accurate melding of their own views and wishes with those of these bombastic extremists. Rather, they are motivated by a desire to see America cut down to size, its power and dominance reduced, its government (mostly Republican) and its companies (mostly multi-national) humiliated. It's mostly a case of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." So-as revealed by the (often ornate) signs of protestors from San Francisco to Stuttgart to Seoul--Bush and Hitler are two sides of the same coin. Chavez, to whom most would not trust a second hand Prius at the valet, is now a poster boy for a myriad of causes and receives a standing ovation from the UN General Assembly after an anti-American speech so vitriolic it put Geobbels to shame. And Ahmadinejad, whose rants and insipid insights we would normally attribute to the world of insane asylums, becomes worthy of our understanding, our liberal largess and our Third World sympathies. In the interest of "dialogue," the venerable Council of Foreign Relations has Ahmadinejad over to the Upper East Side for a chat; not to be outdone, Columbia University soon invites him across town.

Being anti-American gets one a free pass, it seems, whether in the lofty towers of the United Nations or from the erudite professorships of our most acclaimed universities.

Without America as whipping boy, the elite's most politically correct scapegoat-without Shakespeare's modern day Shylock-most of these terrorist groups and dictatorships would likely dissipate and implode from a paucity of outside support and attention, their raison d'être dissolved, the transparency of their own viciousness and incompetence exposed.

We seem to have a bizarre predilection for tolerating tyrants at home as well, passionately banning mangers in the park at Christmas time, cartoons of Mohammed, and cost effective and practical yet politically incorrect profiling at airports.

We seem to insist on repeating the mistakes of the past as though history can be rewritten by our fanciful optimism and our dangerous penchant for negotiating even when there is nothing left to negotiate.

The West is war weary and confrontation averse. Most of us prefer to sweeten with gifts those who wish us ill, to mollify tyrants with our endless words of conciliation. Is there ultimately no politically viable path between endless war and interminable accommodation?

Leslie J. Sacks is an art dealer and gallerist in Los Angeles. Before that, he founded and operated Les Art International in Johannesburg, South Africa, where he was active in opposing apartheid and in supporting the Johannesburg Jewish community.

Source

[>Watani<]

بين البديهيات المفترضة
و"البديهيات" المفروضة

المستقبل
بول شاوول
26/08/2008

عندما عُقد مؤتمر الحوار الأول بمشاركة زعماء الطوائف، وكانت نشراته اليومية "مريحة" تنمّ عن روح "أخوية" (أو أرواح سيان) عالية من التفاهم الوطني حول المعضلات "العضوية" والتاريخية التي يشكو منها الوطن، إثر خروج الجيش السوري من لبنان، وإثر نجاح 14 آذار في الانتخابات النيابية، كاد اللبنانيون يصدّقون ويطمئنون و"يضحكون في عبهم" بأن الأمور تسير في الاتجاه الصحيح، وأن الدولة لا بد، بعد هذا التضامن الداخلي، أن تنتصر بمؤسساتها الديموقراطية والسياسية وبدستورها وميثاقها.
تمّ الاتفاق عندها على الأمور التي اعتبرت "بديهية" من القرار 1701 والمحكمة وترسيم الحدود بين لبنان وسوريا، وعدم استخدام "السلاح" الحزبي في الصراعات الداخلية والسلاح الفلسطيني خارج المخيمات! عال! فابشروا! مع هذا، تُوّج المؤتمر بحرب إسرائيلية على لبنان، إثر عملية حزب الله داخل ما يسمى الخط الأزرق، وكان ما كان، وافرنقع القوم، وشُغل اللبنانيون بالعدوان وآثاره المدمرة ثم بإعلان انتصار الحزب وما تلاه من تداعيات تلخصت في سيل من الاتهامات ضد الحكومة و14 آذار ومعظم الشعب اللبناني أقلها التواطؤ مع العدو وأفدحها الخيانة والعمالة... إلخ.
إذاً أول مؤتمر حوار "أثمر" استفراد الحزب بقرار الحرب والسلم وإعلان العصيان المسلح ضد الناس والدولة، والبدء بتنفيذ مخطط انقلابي شامل كان نذير حرب أهلية (ولو مؤجلة)، تُوّج بغزو بيروت واعتداء على المناطق والجبل بسلاح حزبي ارتدادي... وإعلان انتصار آخر نخشى أن يكون كالانتصار على إسرائيل، وسط الحرائق وتهجير الناس والخطف والقصف...
اليوم بعدما انتخب رئيس التوافق ميشال سليمان بالإجماع، وأُلّفت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية، بعد لأي وضغوط من مكوّنات "مؤتمر الدوحة"، جاء دور البيان الوزاري ليجيء بعدها دور مؤتمر وطني آخر (الله يستر!).
واللافت كأن حرب تموز المظفرة أدت (بنتائجها الكارثية) الى تجميد أو إبطال أو تعديل مقررات المؤتمر الأول. ويجيء المؤتمر الثاني العتيد (بإذنه تعالى) ليجمّد (ربما) وليعدل نتائج مؤتمر الدوحة.
ونظن أن مؤتمر الدوحة تمّ على أساس "لا غالب ولا مغلوب" (حتى بوجود أكثرية غالبة ديموقراطياً وشعبياً عبر الانتخابات النيابية!) ولكن على أي أساس سيكون مؤتمر الحوار المزمع عقده: أبديلاً من مقررات الدوحة أم بديلاً من مجلس النواب؟ أبديلاً من الدوحة أم بديلاً من الاستحقاقات الدستورية أم امتداداً لها؟
وقد ألمح العديد من أهل المعارضة أنه إذا تمّ الاتفاق على خطاب القسم، ومقررات الدوحة (وربما قبلها الطائف) وما بينهما المؤتمر الحواري الأول، فلماذا يجب إثارة بعض المواضيع الحساسة التي اتفق عليها بالإجماع؛ وبعضهم اقترح أن "يؤجل بحث بعض هذه الأمور أملاً بالاتفاق على بيان ممهد لا يثير "الحفائظ" ولا "المحافظ" ولا "جبخانات" الأسلحة التي وجهت الى اللبنانيين، ولا الكانتونات، ولا حدود الدولة ولا مساحة سلطتها وسلطانها وحضورها، ولا أي بندقية خارج بنادق الشرعية!
يعني علينا "التسليم" بـ"البديهيات" المفروضة على حساب "البديهيات المفترضة".
وهذا يعني أن كل شيء يبدأ من اللاشيء. وأنّ ما سبق أن اتُفق عليه لم يُتفق عليه، وأن ما لم يُتفق عليه لن يُتفق عليه. فوازير وحيص بيص وضرب كم ولعبة 3 أوراق... أصفار تطلع من أصفار وأشخاص يطلعون من أصفار، ومقررات تطلع من أصفار فإلى أصفار. ونبقى في زمن الأصفار في مهب الأصفار. ونبقى حيث نحن تحت: وكل البيانات والاتفاقات والنيات (النظيفة النظافة المستنظفة) والمصائر فوق تطفو علينا كغيوم من الأوراق والكلمات والخطب والأطياف والأشباح. فالقضايا الجوهرية تبقى في الباطن محظورة، والكلام الفائض يكون بديلاً منها: وعندها، واستطراداً تكون المؤسسات التشريعية والتنفيذية غيوماً تمطر أوراقاً، والمؤتمرات سيولها، ويبقى "الأمر الواقع" تحت رحمة الأمر اليومي الآتي من خارج المؤسسات والدستور وتالياً من خارج البلاد!
قال النائب الصديق سمير فرنجية أخيراً في أحد لقاءاته: "إننا ننتقل من الدفاع عن الدولة الى بناء الدولة". عال! كلام بديهي وصادق من رجل استقلالي ومدني ديموقراطي وأكثري. لكن كيف يمكن الانتقال من مرحلة الدفاع عن الدولة الى مرحلة بنائها إذا كانت الدولة ما زالت خارج بديهيات البعض، وتشكل بالنسبة إليهم تهديداً لسلطتهم ولهيمنتهم (المسلحة) خارج أي اقتناع بوجود الدولة؛ كيف نحاول بناء دولة إذا كان بعضهم لا يعترف لا بحدودها، ولا بوجودها، ولا بسلطتها، ولا بدورها، ولا بكونه جزءاً منها، أو حتى رديفاً لها... بل على العكس: هي جزء منه، ورديف له، وتابع له. فهل نبني شيئاً غير موجود بالنسبة الى أناس "موجودين" لا سيما إذا كانوا يتوجون أنفسهم بانتصارهم "المستقل" عن الدولة والشعب.
فالمسألة في البيان الوزاري ليست بنوداً يتفق عليها، أو تؤجل أو تموّه أو "تؤكل" أو تستوعب. وليست المسألة في اتفاق على هذه النقاط دون سواها، (يستعد ميشال عون للانتصار داخل الحكومة على الحكومة! ميشال عون ما غيرو أمير "الانتصارات الأبدية" فلا تنسوا!). المسألة كأن الوزارة تمثل دولتين "مستقلتين"، ومؤسستين مستقلّتين، وبنيتين مستقلتين: دولة حزب الله ولفيفه من 8 آذار (أوعا تنسو أبو الميش الذي كان يرى أن سلاح حزب الله تقسيمي! ثم لحس زلاعيمه)، ودولة أهل الدستور والسيادة والاستقلال والديموقراطية والقانون. فكيف يمكن. أن نجمع دولتين أو أكثر في وزارة واحدة، ومن ضمن بنود الدولة الواحدة. وهنا تأتي مسألة سلاح حزب الله، لا لأنه سلاح فحسب (وقد استخدم ضد العُزّل واقتحم مناطق وغزا العاصمة بل لأنه مرتبط بدويلة حزبية تعلن نفسها فوق الدولة، ومرتبطة بوصايتين (حتى إشعار آخر) وها هم أهل الدويلات يطالبون من البيان الوزاري بأن يكون "توافقياً" بين دولة لبنان الشرعية، وبينهم كوكلاء دويلات أخرى. ولهذا يتمسك حزب الله بسلاحه وهو يعرف أن مزارع شبعا يمكن أن تحرر بطرق غير حربية أي تفاوضية (كما تجري حالياً بين سوريا وإسرائيل وبين إيران وأميركا..!). ولهذا، يريد جماعة 8 آذار أن يموّهوا "دور" البيان الوزاري، لتمويه قرارات مؤتمر الحوار العتيد، تماماً كما موّهوا قرارات مؤتمر الحوار الأول الى الحرب والسلاح والانقلاب. وتماماً كما موّهوا قرارات الدوحة في انتظار تمويه مؤتمرات "مجهولة" تمهيدية! وهنا اللعبة العبثية (الصبيانية لأنها باتت مكشوفة) اتخاذ قرارات وضحك على الذقون والشوارب واللحى ثم تحال على مرجعيات أخرى، فتتخذ قرارات أخرى لتحال بدورها على اجتماعات أخرى؛ وهكذا دواليك: يتغير كل شيء بالألفاظ والخطب و"التكاذب" (والتصادق) والتمارق، ويبقى كل شيء مكانه: وهذا ما نتوقعه: الخطة الاستراتيجية الدفاعية ستبقى ضمن قرارات حزب الله الذاتية (أي ضمن قرارات الوصايتين) لأنه ليس لحزب الله أي استقلالية سوى في الهوامش والتفاصيل.
فكيف يمكن أن نصدق سواء ورد أو لم يرد في المؤتمر أو في البيان الوزاري بأن سلاح حزب الله/ سيكون في الحفظ والصون/ لمحاربة العدو الإسرائيلي وتحرير مزارع شبعا أو "تغيير العالم"!
كيف نصدق ولو أقسم الجميع (وسبق أن وقعوا: والتوقيع نوع من القسم!) على "الوفاء" بوعودهم وضماناتهم أن هذا السلاح ليس موجوداً ضد الدولة اللبنانية، وضد الكيان اللبناني، وضد التعددية اللبنانية، والديموقراطية اللبنانية والحدود الجغرافية اللبنانية ووحدتها! لن يقنعنا أحد في هذا العالم بأن حزب الله سيخضع لمنطق الدولة اللبنانية ويتخلى عن سلاحه الكانتوني.
حتى وإن ورد في البيان الوزاري ضرورة امتلاك الدولة قرار الحرب والسلم، واحتضان سلاح حزب الله وصولاً الى ترسيم الحدود في شبعا وبين لبنان وسوريا، واحترام القرار 1701 ودعم "المحكمة الدولية"... وعدم استخدام السلاح ضد الناس في الداخل... حتى ولو ورد كل ذلك وبالعربي الفصيح في البيان الوزاري، لا نظن أن يصدق اللبنانيون بأن كل ذلك سيوضع موضع التنفيذ! ألم يسبق أن قيل أن سلاح "المقاومة" لن يُستخدم في الداخل، واستُخدم. وهكذا دواليك. ولكن، بعدما حصل في بيروت والجبل وطرابلس وصنين وجرود كسروان، كيف لأي لبناني أن يتحمّل بعد الآن التباسات في "القرارات"، أو تمويهات في اللعب الإنشائي على الألفاظ، أو "غموضاً" في البيان. ومن يضمن ألا تتكرر مثل تلك الأحداث في المستقبل (هل سُحب المسلحون من بيروت!). ومن يضمن ألا تكون الغزوات المبيّنة التي شُنّت على العاصمة وسواها، إما مجرد "بروات" لغزوات مقبلة أو "مناورات" حربية تستهدف الانتخابات النيابية المقبلة: أي استخدام سلاح المقاومة (الذي تسلّق صنين ليحرره من العدو الصهيوني!) للتأثير في سير العملية الانتخابية، وترعيب الناس وتذعيرهم وترهيبهم. (وهل هذا مستبعد). ومن يضمن ألا يتكرر الاعتداء على الوسائل الإعلامية كما جرى مع جريدة وتلفزيون "المستقبل" لكم الأفواه، وضرب التعددية السياسية والإعلامية. لا شيء! وقد لُدغ اللبنانيون مرات، وقد يلدغون مرات. وهذا ما يعرفه القلقون على مصيرهم ومصير دولتهم وأبنائهم.
وإلى متى سيكون القرار الأول والأخير بأيد من خارج الدولة: كيف يمكن أن يطمئن اللبناني إذا كان مصير بلده برمته في قبضة حزبية أحادية؟ بل الى متى سيبقى اللبناني معتمداً على دولة لا تحميه، وعلى جيش "مُحيّد"، وعلى قوى شرعية يعطلها هذا الحزب أو ذاك المرجع! وإلى متى سنبقى "رهائن" أو ذبائح "نفتدى" أو "نُستشهد" كُرمى لهذه الدولة، أو لتلك الجبهة الخارجية، بل الى متى سيبقى هذا الإحساس المرعب بأن المستقبل مُهدّد باستمرار، وبأن لا أمل يرجى من هذا البلد؛ وإلى متى سيتحمل الناس أوزار حروب الآخرين ليكونوا، فوق ذلك، فرائس للاتهامات والتخوين والتقتيل والبذاءة والسفالة والعنف والعقول الانقلابية الجهنمية!
هذه هي الهواجس التي تُقضّ مضاجع الناس، الذين شبعوا من المؤتمرات والبيانات، والحبر على الورق، والزلاعيم في الهواء، وعلى الشاشات!
هناك دولة واحدة في لبنان. هناك سلاح شرعية واحد.. هناك مقاومة واحدة مقاومة الشعب اللبناني كله الذي لم يبخل يوماً في التضحية للدفاع عن أرضه وسيادته ولم يُعيّن هذا الشعب من ينوب عنه في أي مقاومة، وهناك حكومة واحدة، وحدود واحدة، وجيش واحد، وقرار واحد يصدر عن الشعب وتمثيله، وهناك دستور واحد فوق الجميع: فإذا استمرت استباحة كل ذلك، فلن ينفع شيء، وإذا لم ينفذ كل "القرارات"، فسيكون كل شيء في مرتبة الأصفار، وعلى تخوم المجهول.
فهل كثير على اللبنانيين أن يطالبوا بالبديهيات الطبيعية والمفترضة، ويرفضوا "البديهيات" المفروضة، سواء في هذا المؤتمر، أو في هذا البيان أو هذه الحكومة أو تلك السلطة؟
أكثير على اللبنانيين أن يطالبوا بدولة واحدة وبحكومة شرعية واحدة، وبجيش واحد، وبسيادة على كل أراضيهم، وباستقلال عن كل إرادة برانية! أكثير على اللبنانيين أن يكونوا فعلاً لبنانيين؟

Almustaqbal Newspaper - Official Website

[>Watani<]

Les propos « guerriers » de Mohammad Raad suscitent l’indignation du 14 Mars
Le tandem Hezbollah-CPL revient à l’attaque dans un parfait unisson

L'Orient Le Jour
Mahmoud HARB
28/07/2008


«Nous aspirions à un gouvernement d’union nationale. Mais en toute franchise, nous ne réclamons plus l’union nationale, mais simplement un partenariat dans la prise des décisions »…
C’est en ces termes que le chef du bloc parlementaire du Hezbollah, Mohammad Raad, a sonné le glas de l’aberration constitutionnelle et politique, généreusement baptisée par l’accord de Doha « gouvernement d’union nationale ».
Il était certes évident dès le début, dès la parution du décret de formation du second cabinet Siniora, que le nouvel organe exécutif était voué à l’échec, à la paralysie, car, comme l’a relevé le patriarche maronite, « une voiture ne peut être attelée à deux chevaux dont l’un tire vers l’avant et l’autre vers l’arrière ». Néanmoins, un semblant de cohésion, de collaboration était préservé par les différents chefs de file et responsables des deux camps qui s’étaient évertués à maquiller leurs divergences intrinsèques et à refléter une ambiance « positive ». Même Hassan Nasrallah avait mis la main à la pâte, lors de sa dernière allocution, en se disant prêt à prendre « personnellement » part à toute discussion qui puisse aboutir à des résultats permettant de consolider l’union nationale.
Mais le parti de Dieu, par le truchement de son tonitruant député Mohammad Raad, a porté un sérieux coup à la détente globale. En effet, il a dénué de tout sens le débat au sein de la commission de rédaction de la déclaration ministérielle ainsi que le futur dialogue national à Baabda, en soulignant hier qu’« il n’y a pas de Liban sans Résistance ». Mohammad Raad a donc imposé une conclusion péremptoire à toute négociation autour de la stratégie de défense nationale d’autant qu’il a martelé que « la Résistance est un choix inéluctable et toutes les autres options sont vouées à l’échec ».
Le député du parti de Dieu a également versé de l’huile sur le feu et attisé la polémique stérile qui s’était progressivement dissipée avec l’élection du président Sleiman et la formation du nouveau cabinet. Il a en effet fait clairement allusion à l’épisode douloureux de la campagne militaire de son parti contre Beyrouth et la Montagne, en accusant ceux qu’il s’est « abstenu de qualifier de traîtres » de « tenter de faire du bruit autour des armes de la Résistance pour attirer l’attention de ceux qui les ont abandonnés, lorsque leur projet a été vaincu ».
Des propos similaires à ceux de Mohammad Raad ont été tenus simultanément par différents ténors du 8 Mars et notamment les ministres Mohammad Khalifé, Talal Arslane, l’ancien ministre Wi’am Wahhab ainsi que divers responsables du parti de Dieu. Étrangement, ce durcissement public des positions de l’ancienne opposition intervient au lendemain de la déclaration qualifiée d’ « embarrassante » par Walid Joumblatt du vice-président iranien, Reza Aghazadeh, qui avait affirmé jeudi que « si les négociations démarraient avec la communauté internationale sur le nucléaire iranien, des solutions seraient trouvées pour des problèmes comme l’Irak, le Liban et le pétrole ».
Les attaques verbales du 8 Mars contre le 14 Mars seraient-elles liées à la « révélation » du responsable iranien ? L’Iran chercherait-il à provoquer une escalade au Liban dans l’espoir d’astreindre l’Occident à lui accorder des concessions ?
L’on ne saurait le dire. Mais ce qui demeure certain, c’est que la montée au créneau du Hezbollah révèle l’échec des négociations bilatérales menées par Fouad Siniora le week-end écoulé et que les divergences au sein de la commission de rédaction sur le « droit » de la « Résistance » à poursuivre la lutte armée restent entières. Le nœud du problème réside dans le fait que le parti de Dieu exige une « inscription claire » dans la déclaration du « droit de la Résistance à libérer le territoire », alors que la majorité rejette tout retour à la formule avalisée par le précédent gouvernement.
De source informée, on indique que le Hezbollah aurait rejeté trois propositions en la matière, élaborées, non sans l’aval de Nabih Berry, grâce aux contacts conduits par le Premier ministre, Fouad Siniora. Et la commission de rédaction qui s’est réunie hier pour la neuvième fois n’a toujours pas réussi à s’entendre sur la question à propos de laquelle les « désaccords persistent », comme l’a annoncé le ministre de l’Information Tarek Mitri à la presse, depuis le Grand Sérail.
De plus, la tâche de la commission a été compliquée par « les propos guerriers du député Raad qui a tenté d’exercer des pressions et de menacer » l’instance chargée de rédiger la déclaration ministérielle, selon les termes employés par le ministre Nassib Lahoud. Tarek Mitri a également dénoncé de son côté « le retour au langage menaçant de l’avant-Doha ». Et le chef du PSP a pour sa part jugé « inadmissible » le discours du chef du bloc Hezbollah « qui a clairement affirmé que tout refus de l’adoption de la précédente déclaration ministérielle serait un acte de félonie ».

Le dynamitage de Paris III
par le CPL
L’infrastructure militaire du parti de Dieu n’est cependant pas l’unique obstacle auquel se heurte le processus d’élaboration de la déclaration ministérielle. Une source digne de foi a indiqué à L’Orient-Le Jour que le ministre des Télécoms et haut responsable du CPL, Gebran Bassil, a exigé « la suppression pure et simple des accords conclus à Paris III ». « Après de longues discussions, Gebran Bassil a légèrement reculé en revendiquant l’annulation du programme de réformes que le gouvernement s’était engagé à appliquer lors de la conférence Paris III. Ceci reste toutefois complètement inadmissible pour le 14 Mars », a précisé cette source.
Il convient de rappeler que ledit programme a été présenté par le Liban aux pays donateurs et aux instances financières internationales. L’engagement du pays à l’exécuter a constitué une condition sine qua non de l’obtention des aides financières accordées à Paris III. Son abrogation équivaut à la violation par Beyrouth de ses obligations internationales et met dangereusement en péril le versement des dons et prêts qui ont permis au Liban d’éviter de justesse la faillite et de continuer à honorer les paiements dus au titre du remboursement de la dette souveraine. Autrement dit, la reconsidération du programme de réformes nuirait sévèrement à la réputation du Liban sur les marchés financiers, priverait le pays d’une grande partie de la manne de Paris III et le mettrait au bord du défaut de paiement.
Pour la source précitée, l’exigence de Gebran Bassil « est surréaliste et impossible à satisfaire, chose que tout le monde sait ».
Pourquoi le CPL a-t-il donc formulé cette demande ?
Pour plusieurs observateurs, la revendication du ministre aoriste s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une stratégie de négociations adoptée par le Hezbollah et le Courant patriotique libre. Ces derniers chercheraient à imposer à la majorité l’équation suivante : le maintien du programme de Paris III ne se fera qu’en échange de la reconnaissance des « droits de la Résistance ».
Cette attitude répond clairement au schéma qui prévalait sous l’occupation syrienne, lorsque les questions économiques étaient réservées aux responsables officiels de l’équipe « haririenne » alors que le dossier de la sécurité était sous-traité au parti de Dieu et aux officiers syriens et libanais. D’ailleurs, Hassan Nasrallah avait clairement émis son souhait de revenir à ce « partage des pouvoirs » lors de son discours du 26 mai dernier.
Sauf que ce schéma n’avait guère réussi, la preuve étant que l’un de ses piliers a fini par être assassiné, un certain 14 février 2005.

[Qwiw]

It's the same article as before (Al Oufok) by the same person but published in the journal Humanité...
Marie Nassif-Debs est membre du bureau politique du Parti communiste libanais, je ne sais pas ce que ça vaut.

Tribune libre: Tout le monde a gagné sauf le Liban

L'Humanité
29-07-2008

Àla veille de la photo traditionnelle du premier gouvernement formé durant la présidence du général Michel Souleiman, le paysage politique libanais est enveloppé de rose et d’azur… Tout baigne dans l’huile ; et les antagonistes d’hier, qui se lançaient des invectives à longueur de journée et de soirée, se retrouvent comme si de rien n’était et que les problèmes que les uns et les autres avaient posés, à la suite de l’agression israélienne de l’été 2006, avaient trouvé la solution adéquate…

Sur les différentes chaînes de télévision, les images des leaders vociférants et menaçants ont fait place à des embrassades ou, tout simplement, à des accolades amicales accompagnées de larges sourires durant les cérémonies de passation des commandes dans les divers ministères.

Tout le monde a gagné ! Bravo !

Les forces de l’alliance entre la bourgeoisie et les restes du féodalisme politique au pouvoir ont, toutes, eu leur part du nouveau gâteau. Celles de la majorité, mieux connues sous le nom du « 14 mars », et, surtout, celles de l’opposition, dites « formation du 8 mars ». Tout cela dans le cadre du nouvel accord signé, vers la fin du mois de mai, 2008 à Doha et dont les clauses préconisaient, en plus de l’élection du nouveau président de la République, la formation d’un gouvernement d’unité nationale et le retour à la loi électorale de 1960 qui divise le Liban en petites circonscriptions sur des bases confessionnelles pures.

Comment est partagé le nouveau gâteau gouvernemental de la pseudo-unité nationale entre les différentes forces politiques ? Chacun a-t-il eu la part qu’il voulait et la balance a-t-elle bien pesé les parts pour ne pas faire des jaloux dans l’un ou l’autre camp ? La première réponse est affirmative puisque, selon les dires de tous, la majorité (l’alliance du 14 mars) a eu ses seize ministères, tandis que les quatorze autres sont partagés entre l’opposition, qui a eu onze ministres (donc, la possibilité de blocage), et le président, qui n’en a eu que trois.

Commençons, d’abord, par les seize ministres de la majorité, chapeautés par Fouad Sanioura, l’ami des États-Unis, qui n’ont pas lésiné sur les moyens, militaires et politiques, pour le remettre à la tête du nouveau gouvernement et pour lequel ils ont aligné devant la côte libanaise six bâtiments de guerre :

cinq appartiennent à Sanioura, trois se partageant entre les Forces libanaises pro-israéliennes et le parti phalangiste dont elles sont issues, deux au leader socialiste Walid Joumblat, trois reviennent à Saad Hariri et son Mouvement du futur et

les trois restants proviennent de groupuscules faisant partie de l’alliance.

Il y a, ensuite, les ministres de l’alliance du 8 mars, dominés par les cinq ministres cédés de plein gré à Michel Aoun, en plus des trois ministres du mouvement Amal, de l’unique ministre affilié au Hezbollah et de deux autres « amis ».

Enfin, le président de la République a désigné, disent les mauvaises langues, trois ministres qui ne sont pas à lui.

Dans cette toile inextricable, nous pouvons déceler les éléments suivants :

1. Les amis des États-Unis sont nombreux, très nombreux. Certains parlent de presque la moitié du gouvernement, sans oublier le premier ministre. La nécessité d’avoir ce nombre relève, dit-on, du fait qu’à la suite de la libération des derniers détenus libanais par Israël, les prochains mois seraient ceux de la préparation de l’entrée libanaise, à la suite de la Syrie, sur la scène des négociations avec Tel-Aviv ; ce qui ne manquera pas de poser la question des armes du Hezbollah et de la résistance en général.

2. Les deux grosses parts accordées à Michel Aoun (Courant patriotique libre, ami du Hezbollah) et Samir Geagea (Forces libanaises) viennent du fait que la bataille électorale la plus acharnée prévue, à partir de l’application de la loi de 1960, se fera dans les rangs des députés « chrétiens ». Ce sont ces députés qui trancheront en ce qui concerne la nouvelle majorité ; d’où la nécessité pour les rassemblements du « 8 mars » et du « 14 mars » de renforcer les chances de leurs alliés chrétiens, en leur accordant des ministères qui peuvent les aider à « rendre des services » aux électeurs afin de gagner les voix nécessaires.

3. Dans cet objectif aussi, deux ministres arméniens furent choisis pour la première fois dans l’histoire politique du Liban et à un moment où l’émigration arménienne vers les États-Unis a atteint son paroxysme. Ce choix, dont l’un est pour la majorité et l’autre pour l’opposition, vise à gagner, de part et d’autre, la majorité des voix arméniennes restantes et qui pourraient faire une différence notoire dans la circonscription du Metn (six députés) et dans deux des trois circonscriptions de Beyrouth (neuf députés).

En attendant les élections (déjà presque toutes faites) dans dix mois et desquelles, une fois de plus, sont éloignées les forces non confessionnelles, la crise reste, quoi qu’on dise, entière. Surtout sur le plan économique et social où la cherté de la vie a atteint des niveaux alarmants.

Les prix s’envolent si rapidement qu’ils ont déjà englouti la hausse (encore théorique) votée par le gouvernement précédent de Fouad Sanioura ; et le nouveau gouvernement, qui ne manquera pas d’avoir la majorité écrasante des voix du parlement, n’a ni le temps ni la volonté de remédier à ce problème grave.

Toute cette situation nous pousse à dire : tout le monde a gagné sauf le Liban !


Par Marie Nassif-Debs, membre du bureau politique du Parti communiste libanais.

[>Watani<]

'Operator? Please dear, get me Palestine, and hurry up please!'

Menassat
Layal ABU RAHAL
01/08/2008

There is a famous Lebanese song by the singer Sabah that goes like this: "Hello, hello, hello, Beirut? Please, dear, get me Beirut, and hurry up please!"

A Palestinian friend, Imad, was humming the tune over the phone when he called from Kuwait this week.

Like Amid, many Palestinians in Lebanon have been putting new words to the old tune in the past few days: "Hello, hello, hello, Palestine? Please dear, get me Palestine, and hurry up please!"

The reason is that the Lebanese government has officially lifted the ban on calls to the 970 country code this week, making it possible for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to call their relatives in historic Palestine for the first time in decades.

"I am thrilled with the news, but I cannot help feeling bad about all the years I spent in Beirut without being able to contact my family and relatives who are still in Palestine," Imad said. "Still, better late than never."

The 970 country code was established in 1993 and was issued to the Palestinian Authority which at the time was in control of both the West Bank and Gaza.

Since then, the Islamic Hamas party has taken control of the Gaza Strip, while President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah party controls the West Bank. But the Hamas-Fatah split has apparently not affected the phone network.

Yesterday, MENASSAT was able for the first time to call its Gaza and West Bank correspondents on their 970 numbers. (The 972 numbers, which are also in use in Gaza and the West Bank, are still off-limits because they belong to the Israeli phone system.)

The Lebanese decision is a radical new development for the roughly 700,000 Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, who for decades have had to rely on alternative methods (international calling cards, call-back systems and the like) to call their relatives in historic Palestine.

The decision was announced on July 29 by Lebanon's new Communications Minister, Jubran Basil. Sources confirmed that both the Ministry and the Palestine Liberation Organization's embassy head in Lebanon, Abbas Zaki, had been working on the deal for some time. According to the ministry, the logistics for lifting the ban were already in place; it was a lack of political will that held up the decision until now.

After the announcement, Palestinians throughout Lebanon rushed to call their relatives in the West Bank and Gaza.

Approved by Hezbollah

Despite the welcome news, political insiders told MENASSAT that the timing behind Basil's announcement was purely political.

Some Lebanese newspapers said the minister consulted with both Lebanon's newly elected president, Michael Sleiman, and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora shortly before his decision was announced.

It was a means of providing "political cover," one source said, while others asserted that Basil would not have taken such a step without first consulting with Lebanon's Shia resistance movement, Hezbollah.

For the same reason, the sources said, this decision could never have been taken under the former Communications Minister, Marwan Hmadeh, who belonged to the pro-Western parliamentary majority.

(Basil is a member of Michel Aoun's FPM party which is allied with Hezbollah. He was appointed as part of a national unity government, which was formed after the Doha peace accord in May. Ironically, the May fighting was set off by a government attempt to investigate Hezbollah's own secret telecommunications network.)

During a press conference this week, Basil sidestepped the political question. "I am not really sure of the reasons why the decision has been delayed for so long," he said.

Now that Lebanon has lifted the ban, Syria is the only remaining country that doesn’t allow phone calls to the 970 country-code.

Hisham Debsy, media adviser for the PLO embassy in Lebanon, told MENASSAT, "There is no security or political justification for keeping the phones lines with Palestine dead. Resuming international calls has been one of the major demands discussed as part of the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue committee, and was it was discussed with Prime Minister Siniora repeatedly."

As to the timing of the decision, Debsy said, "All Palestinian requests take their time when discussed at the Lebanese political table. It seems every issue has to wait for the right circumstances to be solved."

Debsy said this is a humanitarian issue first and foremost. "The 970 code has existed for 15 years, and it used by every other country in the world."

Israel calling

The reactions from Palestinians have generally been positive, and official thanks from the PLO in Lebanon have been sent to the new Lebanese government and Prime Minister Siniora for his role in sponsoring the talks.

But Debsy bristled when asked about the possibility of security breaches in the telecommunications network now that the lines are reopened.

"You have to refer to the Lebanese government for this answer. Israel did not wait for the lines to reopen in order to hack into Lebanese land lines and mobile phones," he said.

Indeed, even if it was impossible to call Israel/Palestine from Lebanon, it has always been possible to call Lebanon from Israel/Palestine.

Israel has recently taken advantage of that situation by bombarding Lebanese phone subscribers with automated voice messages.

In a repeat of a tactic also used during the 2006 war, residents in Beirut and South Lebanon received calls warning them against allowing Hezbollah to become a "state within the state" and promising "harsh retaliation" against any future assault by Hezbollah.

Just like in 2006, the Arabic voice on the other end of the line signed off with the words, "This is a warning from the State of Israel."

Source