What does "Successful" pertain to in this matrix, Souss? Because i wonder how does non-credible evidence still yield "Successful".
It means that the Tribunal has succeeded in convicting substantially all participants in the crime, despite evidence that is not bulletproof.
This would mean that there is a flaw in the process. An example of this would be OJ Simpson's Las Vegas robbery trial, where the prosecution lumped extra charges like kidnapping to increase his prison sentence, when there was no credible evidence (IMO) of kidnapping in the case.
I agree there is a subjective portion for the specific scenarios of flawed evidence & successful tribunal. I would consider it a mitigated success, but a success nonetheless, and can understand why others wouldn't. Pleased to discuss it further.
It means that the Tribunal has succeeded in convicting substantially all participants in the crime, despite evidence that is not bulletproof.
This would mean that there is a flaw in the process. An example of this would be OJ Simpson's Las Vegas robbery trial, where the prosecution lumped extra charges like kidnapping to increase his prison sentence, when there was no credible evidence (IMO) of kidnapping in the case.
I agree there is a subjective portion for the specific scenarios of flawed evidence & successful tribunal. I would consider it a mitigated success, but a success nonetheless, and can understand why others wouldn't. Pleased to discuss it further.
I see, but mitigated success is still success, certainly and at least for the prosecutor. But would you still consider the tribunal as successful, in that case? Not sure i would..
Also, in such particular (semi)success case one must assume that he who is found guilty with some added and less credible evidence is already proved guilty through other more reliable evidence. In a politically driven tribunal, this caliber, i doubt that any less than bullet proof evidence against whoever is found guilty, should be tolerated in order for us to attribute success to the process. No?
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يمكن تكون المحكمة عادلة.. بتمنى هالشي
ولكن هذا لا يعني ان يكون هناك محكمة لإغتيال شخص لبناني شيء طبيعي..
الطبيعي ان المحكمة تكون لبنانية.. مش غلط يكون في مساعدة اجنبية ولكن الغلط ان تكون المحكمة اجنبية بالكامل
هيدا انقاص من سيادة لبنان.. يا سياديوا الكاتورز
Valid points, but the sovereignty issue is problematic. We have quite strong indications that our judicial system would have a lot of trouble objectively handling such cases. But I agree that ideally our courts/judges deal with our cases. Ideally.
At this point, the judge may be fair, but what if he is changed? Who guarantees the fairness of the new judge? What if another Mehlis comes along?
First of all, Mehlis wasn't a judge. I agree that he was not a good choice, and I wonder how he could be a prosecutor, as no half-decent prosecutor anywhere would compromise a case like he did (and is still doing by coming out with statements). From my personal experience, international tribunals and courts work with the highest standards of evidence and the highest caliber of judges. Even the peer review alone will make it very difficult for them to be inept or biased, etc. If another Mehlis comes along, I think it is much more likely that he will be exposed, and that he will have a low chance of convincing the court of whatever he's trying to convince them of.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Convergence
As I said before there are three possibilities. Either the tribunal is fair, or it was trying to market it's credibility, or its now pro Assad for the most part due to some power brokering deal. I disagree that release of the generals hints to it being fair, from my perspective it hints to possibility three more than anything.
I agree that these are all three options. I am more inclined to option 1, obviously, but the other two are surely also options. I didn't quote the rest of your replies to me but I agree with all you said, thanks for taking the time to reply.
And finally, I agree with taifoon that I'm a little confused as to how the tribunal could be judged a success if it convicts based on non-credible evidence. The questions behind the verdict would lead to high costs to the outcome. Not only would international law suffer, but within Lebanon the only possible verdict that I would see as a success is one that is built on credible "bullet-proof" evidence and following a fully transparent and exhaustive legal process. You need to get as many people as possible to trust the outcome of the tribunal, even if there always will be plenty of people who won't accept the outcome no matter what.
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I see, but mitigated success is still success, certainly and at least for the prosecutor. But would you still consider the tribunal as successful, in that case? Not sure i would..
Also, in such particular (semi)success case one must assume that he who is found guilty with some added and less credible evidence is already proved guilty through other more reliable evidence. In a politically driven tribunal, this caliber, i doubt that any less than bullet proof evidence against whoever is found guilty, should be tolerated in order for us to attribute success to the process. No?
The setting up of the Tribunal was certainly political, but there is no evidence to suggest there was political interference afterward. In fact the Tribunal's actions hint towards the opposite (the release of the 4 generals).
I don't expect the Tribunal to convict anyone on the basis of anything other than bulletproof evidence, so these scenarios are hypothetical if you ask me, and there's not much value in debating them, at least until proof of the contrary. But if it convicts someone who is largely suspected of crimes in Lebanon other than Hariri's murder, and has never been held accountable for them, I won't take it to the streets in protest, regardless of the evidence presented, and I don't think you would either. That's all I'm saying.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Positive Balance
And finally, I agree with taifoon that I'm a little confused as to how the tribunal could be judged a success if it convicts based on non-credible evidence. The questions behind the verdict would lead to high costs to the outcome. Not only would international law suffer, but within Lebanon the only possible verdict that I would see as a success is one that is built on credible "bullet-proof" evidence and following a fully transparent and exhaustive legal process. You need to get as many people as possible to trust the outcome of the tribunal, even if there always will be plenty of people who won't accept the outcome no matter what.
Good points PB. Again this scenario is hypothetical (and not the topic of this thread), but for discussion purposes however, while I wouldn't go as far as saying it's not a success, I agree that success may not be the appropriate characterization. I replaced with "inconclusive" where relevant.
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If the tribunal had continued the detention of the 4 generals, then a strong argument could be made that the chance is close to zero. But other than that, I see no valid argument, whether by looking at the current tribunal or other past ones.
I would like to comment on this part only. I do not see how the release of the 4 generals lends the tribunal any sort of credibility.
The tribunal uses Lebanese law, which means the generals can be held for 90 days before being charged (if I am wrong someone please correct me). With pressure mounting to either release them or charge them, the tribunal had no other choice.
And fact of the matter is, the reasons the generals were detained in the first place became obsolete. If they were innocent then why did F14 want to have them behind bars? It is simply because of their functions are influential security and intelligence officers in Lebanon. After the Syrian withdrawal, their detention only served to consolidate the newly forming regime in Lebanon in the hands of the coalition centered around Future movement.
After May 7, Doha, the warming up of Syrian-Western relations, new US administration, and changing regional equation - there was no more reason or leverage to hold them. The costs started to outweigh the benefits. So they got released and we are being sold the story of a fair tribunal. Notice the primary message in Saad Hariri's press conference was: Tribunal is fair, we will abide by whatever the tribunal will say.
As for saying I have no strong justification for thinking the tribunal is biased, I disagree. If you want to look at it's actions so far with no prejudice then you would be right. But I refuse here to look at the matter in the vacuum without any prejudice, in fact I think doing so is being naive. Taking into account what we know of power brokering in international bodies in general, it will take a lot more than an introductory fair decision to draw a conclusion that the trial is probably fair in general. This is especially true when there are other hypothesis that would explain why the generals are released without being out of line from what we know a priori.
Sure we are only speculating, I am discussing what I think is the most likely hypothesis under uncertainty.
I hope I articulated what I meant well enough, and thanks for engaging me. You make several valid points in your post that I agree with.
on a case by case basis :
releasing the generals is fair because they were arrested without
any credible evidence. specially after i read this in New York Times :
Quote:
Lebanese officials had lobbied to have the decision delayed until after the election, but tribunal judicial figures refused, saying they could not take political considerations into account, said a senior court official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the court’s inner workings.
source : NYTimes.com/mideast section
BUT at the same time it's not fair until the International tribunal
does investigate those who falsified testimonies and presented false
info and theories. they were misleading the investigation.
I would like to comment on this part only. I do not see how the release of the 4 generals lends the tribunal any sort of credibility.
The tribunal uses Lebanese law, which means the generals can be held for 90 days before being charged (if I am wrong someone please correct me). With pressure mounting to either release them or charge them, the tribunal had no other choice.
And fact of the matter is, the reasons the generals were detained in the first place became obsolete. If they were innocent then why did F14 want to have them behind bars? It is simply because of their functions are influential security and intelligence officers in Lebanon. After the Syrian withdrawal, their detention only served to consolidate the newly forming regime in Lebanon in the hands of the coalition centered around Future movement.
After May 7, Doha, the warming up of Syrian-Western relations, new US administration, and changing regional equation - there was no more reason or leverage to hold them. The costs started to outweigh the benefits. So they got released and we are being sold the story of a fair tribunal. Notice the primary message in Saad Hariri's press conference was: Tribunal is fair, we will abide by whatever the tribunal will say.
As for saying I have no strong justification for thinking the tribunal is biased, I disagree. If you want to look at it's actions so far with no prejudice then you would be right. But I refuse here to look at the matter in the vacuum without any prejudice, in fact I think doing so is being naive. Taking into account what we know of power brokering in international bodies in general, it will take a lot more than an introductory fair decision to draw a conclusion that the trial is probably fair in general. This is especially true when there are other hypothesis that would explain why the generals are released without being out of line from what we know a priori.
Sure we are only speculating, I am discussing what I think is the most likely hypothesis under uncertainty.
I hope I articulated what I meant well enough, and thanks for engaging me. You make several valid points in your post that I agree with.
It is anyone's right to think for themselves and question the integrity of any judicial process, and I appreciate your structured approach. However, you haven't gone beyond pre-conceived ideas, or at least haven't provided any support for your questioning.
Is there any evidence of interference of political power in this tribunal or in any of the other UN ones (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, etc.) that has caused it to not incriminate someone despite evidence, or to unjustly convict them? I haven't seen any.
As you said, we are only speculating at this point. Let's revive this thread as the proceedings go forward.
Is there any evidence of interference of political power in this tribunal or in any of the other UN ones (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, etc.) that has caused it to not incriminate someone despite evidence, or to unjustly convict them? I haven't seen any.
The fact that you didn't see such evidence does not prove that the tribunal has no influential political powers working on it. It proves only that you lack access to those pieces of data, if they do exist.
What is evident however and can be referred to with a minimum of certainty, is two facts. One is that, few people are usually initiated on high level political procedures and deals, let alone international ditto. Transparency, at those interaction levels, is usually measured by the amount of tailored info leaked to the media.
And two, is that in our region, the degree of political engagement of the US, including its approval of measures, resolutions or other political moves thereby, is directly related to the existence of the state of Israel and its Geo political interests as two essentials that occupy the highest priority in almost all US move calculations.
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The fact that you didn't see such evidence does not prove that the tribunal has no influential political powers working on it. It proves only that you lack access to those pieces of data, if they do exist.
That is very weak argumentation. To make a comparison, you deal with teenagers almost on a daily basis, as you state elsewhere on the forum. I don't see any evidence that you are a child rapist. Of course that does not prove that you are not a child rapist. It only proves I lack access to the pieces of data that incriminate you as a child rapist, if they do exist.
The burden of proof lies with you to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the tribunal is bogus. Simple presumption of innocence principle.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Taifoon
What is evident however and can be referred to with a minimum of certainty, is two facts. One is that, few people are usually initiated on high level political procedures and deals, let alone international ditto. Transparency, at those interaction levels, is usually measured by the amount of tailored info leaked to the media.
And two, is that in our region, the degree of political engagement of the US, including its approval of measures, resolutions or other political moves thereby, is directly related to the existence of the state of Israel and its Geo political interests as two essentials that occupy the highest priority in almost all US move calculations.
Again, the burden of proof lies with you that these two assertions actually mean that there is tampering with the IT. Beyond that it is only speculation, as I've already mentioned.
30th April 2009
