Political History Lesson! - The Orange Room

Ana

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I was looking for a picture that has both SHN & GMA shaking hands over the internet few days so I can tease my LF friend when I came over this article.

I thought it's a very good article that needs to be discussed on a political level..... thoughts?
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Ghassan Charbel
Al-Hayat -
02/11/06

The meeting between General Michel Aoun and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was loaded with symbols. The meeting was held at a church, whose name is well-known to the Lebanese since it stood exactly at the hot frontline during the civil-regional war Lebanon witnessed. Did the two leaders imply that they seek to wipe out the frontlines from the Lebanese present? Or perhaps they chose the meeting midway or at the "boundaries" separating the two sects? The participation of the leader of Hezbollah in a meeting at a church is in itself a message to the supporters of the "Free Patriotic Movement" and their sect. It might be a mere coincidence that the first meeting between the two men was held during the riot festival the capital witnessed. The spark of friction was almost lit up had it not been for the wisdom of those targeted, the Prime Minister, and a number of political and religious leaders. The issue of symbols does not stop there. The meeting was held between a leader who is still engaging in a war of resistance against Israel, in which he lost a son, and a leader who was once in the presidential Palace (Ba'abda ) commanding the Lebanese army artillery and ordering it to fire against locations of the then so-called "Syrian occupation", paying the price of his positions with a long exile. The meeting was held between a man engaged in a strategic alliance with Syria, and a very special ally to Iran, and a man who was trying to knock at the doors of the American Congress to hold Syria accountable and force it to pull out of Lebanon. Finally, it was a meeting between the strongest Shiite leader and the strongest Christian leader, at least now.
The decision to meet and agree was not easy for both men but a shared necessity pushed them to take the decision. Despite its strength and power, Hezbollah found itself during the last year and a half before an increasingly difficult scene: UN resolution 1559, the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian forces with accusations and international and regional pressures. It was also before a parliamentary and public majority questioning the relation between Resistance and the State and the fate of the party's arsenal after the liberation of the Shaba'a farms and the release of the detainees. In order to break through this siege, if this terminology holds true, the choice of agreement with Aoun was more like an opportunity. Conversely, Aoun did not sense that the 4th of March movement was willing to accept the status, he thinks he deserves, since the alliance was seeking an ally and not a leader. It became clear to Michel Aoun that the road to Ba'abda does not pass through the 14th of March. The legislative elections represented an opportunity for Aoun to start the divorce procedures with his colleagues in the "independence intifada." While MP Joublatt's latest positions offered Sayyed Nasrallah's the opportunity to burry the "quartet alliance."
There is no doubt that holding the meeting in an atmosphere of sectarian and religious divides in the region, seeking to move into Lebanon, is a positive and beneficial event. There is also no doubt that the meeting represents a revolution in the balance of powers, especially if each side succeeded in convincing the other's supporters of the validity of the choice and the necessity to make concessions in order to protect it. The matter is much more important than winning a parliamentary seat in the Ba'abda-Aleh constituency and punishing MP Walid Joumblatt and leader Samir Geajea, without forgetting MP Sa'ad Hariri. This agreement will face ensuing tests beginning with the fate of international resolutions and the international investigation in addition to the security situation, the government's performance and the presidential issue. Of course there are also foreign policy issues that might weight like the Iranian nuclear issue and the American-Syrian relations.
President Emile Lahoud has surely gained a chance to catch his breath and Syria surely feels that its status in Lebanon is better after the meeting rather than prior to it. The question, however, is about the situation of the Lebanese state and the willingness of both sides to invest their position in supporting the citizen's rights in security, livelihood and preventing economic collapse. The actual priority is definitely not fighting corruption. Moreover, the weakening of the government is surely not the best way to help the Lebanese go beyond this ordeal. The meeting will be indeed historic if the scenarios of collapse are thwarted, if the path for the Lebanese to meet half way is opened under the auspices of the State and if the foundations for the meeting of the Lebanese and Syrian states half way are also laid down.