October 13, 1990
“The Story of the Last 48 Hours”
Nadim Freiha
Translated to English by: May Akl
Thursday October 11, early in the morning:
The sun had just risen on Baabda when alarming information began converging from different fronts. Lebanese army observation posts commanders, one after the other, started sending alarming reports: the Syrian army, in an unusual troop movement, was dispatching men and equipment towards the front.
Army intelligence service working behind enemy lines had reportedly cancelled vacation leaves of Syrian soldiers and officers and ordered of rallying at the camps. They watched the tanks slowly leave the Syrian barracks and approach the different fronts. Wrapped in clouds of dust and particles of fuel oil, the Soviet-made tanks headed to Souk El Gharb, Aley, Aïroun, Dahr el Wahch, Monteverde, Kfarchima and the Beirut Southern Suburbs in a deafening racket. All day long, Syrians progressively mounted their troops to front lines separating them from the Lebanese army. Lebanon was about to witness the darkest 48 hours of its history:
At the beginning of the week, the Apostolic Nuncio in Lebanon, Monseigneur Puente, paid a visit to general Aoun to inform him of the Pope’s concern about an imminent Syrian intervention and fear of bloodshed. He urged the General to avoid the battle by taking part in the Taef-emerging government or by stepping down. The General answered he could not resign in order to avoid the unavoidable.
The right to resist an occupying force was the gain of this already lost battle. A right the Lebanese resistance could eventually boast about in any later step before the international authorities in order to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. Without a front battle opposing the two armies, the Syrians would once again pretend facing a “Lebanese Civil War” they came to “solve upon the request of the Lebanese”! Taef would furthermore be imposed by arms instead of being adopted by voting. It lost then all legitimacy for lack of having gained some legality.
However, General Aoun made it clear to his speaker that, from the beginning of the Syrian army engagement in the battle and given the inequality of forces and the Israeli-American green light, he was going to demand a cease-fire and declare his defeat. In fact, it was the only means for Lebanon to keep its right and avoid a large death toll. He would thus gain politically what he would lose militarily.
At the Baabda presidential palace, information concerning a Syrian intervention coincided and became clear. The wife of a former president of the Republic reported her conversation with the British ambassador in Lebanon, “Syrians will intervene with their aviation”.
More importantly, on the table of the Lebanese Army High Commandment in Chief was a copy of the minutes of the Taef-collaboration Cabinet. It gave an account of the formal demand of Syrian-hired man in charge of defense, Albert Mansour; a demand in which he proposed the intervention of the Lebanese army pilots under his and Christian Lebanese militias’ command to bombard their own weapon companions in Baabda. This would suit Syria who wanted to show to the international public opinion an inter-Lebanese conflict rather than a Syrian-Lebanese conflict. This attempt failed on the spot as all pilots refused to execute such an order.
On the military level, Syria had no choice in order to eliminate Aoun but to reveal its intentions and take part in the eviction battle. All other options had failed. Indeed, the battle engaged by interposed militias did not lead to its goals (Souk el Gharb battle opposing the Army and the PSP in August 89 and the war opposing the Army and the Lebanese Forces in February 1990). Neither any other militia nor Lahoud’s army, that was formed hastily and lacked motivation, had the ability to achieve such an important task.
Thursday October 11, around 11.30 am:
Syrian « Sukhoys » flew over free regions at low altitude and pass over Baabda. The appearance of Syrian fighters carried many messages:
- A political message: From now on, it was clear that the United States and Israel had authorized Syria to intervene on the ground. Never before could the Syrian aviation fly over the Lebanese territory without being hunted and brought down by Israeli aviation. The red lines suddenly became green and the tacit understanding between Israelis and Syrians about sharing Lebanon could not be more explicit.
- A military message: Flying over free regions meant locating the spots before an imminent intervention.
From then on, the dices were thrown and everything went wrong!
While military preparations were underway, Syrians, Israelis and American diplomacy undertook subversive actions in order to fool the Lebanese and some Western embassies such as France’s. The latter had huge abilities to mobilize opinions and everyone remembers the arrival of some 40 French deputies to Baabda, among which François Léotard, in order to face the first Syrian threat a day after Hraoui’s ultimatum issued on 26 November 89.
Received by the Taef government, Monseigneur Puente thus declared, “Today, I am more optimistic than ever”. Uri Lubrani, Israeli activities coordinator in Lebanon declared the next day on October 12 that the red lines were still standing. A State Department official who wished to remain anonymous said that day to the AFP about the Syrians: “we certainly do not give them the green light”. As for the Syrians, they remained completely silent about their mobilization. Ghazi Kanaan believed he was fooling General Aoun when he set an appointment with Pierre Raffoul , coordinator of the CBNC (Central Bureau for National Coordination),on Saturday October 13 at 6 in the morning.
However, no one in Baabda could be fooled. Intelligence service reports gave a precise inventory about the equipment and Syrian infantrymen gathered on the front. These forces had been mobilized for an operation that would take place in the next 72 hours and the Syrian aviation would intervene every time the attack faces resistance, reports indicated.
Between 8 and 10 pm, a general alert was issued. General Aoun warned Dany Chamoun, president of the Lebanese Front, and other members of the Front of the dangerous situation.
Locals of free regions did not take a long time to react and began ringing church bells for mobilization. All night long, locals left their homes to join the Baabda Presidential Palace, the symbol of resistance.
Slowly, they formed a human shield against Syrian tanks. They had the faith, for a few months ago their heroic action alone had stopped at the last minute the Syrian invasion.
Meanwhile, General Aoun and his counselors were busy writing and sending letters to top international officials such as Bush, Gorbatchev, John Paul II and François Mitterrand. Members of the Lebanese Front made contact with foreign diplomacy representatives in Lebanon.
At night, General Aoun mingled with the demonstrators. He explained how each time Syria committed a big crime, it would commit another one much bigger to cover up the first one. He gave many examples such as the assassination of Druze leader Kamal Jumblat and the following massacres in the Chouf. He finished with a premonitory sentence “there are still two crimes Syria did not commit yet, kill me, and invade Baabda”.
Friday October 12, in the morning:
The General and the Lebanese Front held a meeting at around 10 am. Members of the Front reported talks easing the tension coming from different embassies.
That morning, intensive political and diplomatic contacts continued as the crowd camped in front of the presidential palace. Nothing could damage the demonstrators’ spirits, even the intensive bombardment from East-based militias. Syrian planes flew over again that morning.
Friday October 12, in the afternoon:
While General Aoun was speaking to the crowd, gunshots were heard within the confines of the palace. The bullets nearly missed their target and fatally hit Joseph Raad, a guard member.
The crowd attacked the gunman while the General’s bodyguards pushed him to the ground to protect him. At this moment, everyone feared a group of terrorists might be present within the palace. The army fired gunshots in the air to part the crowds and isolate the assassin. Worried about saving the life of the assassin, the General shouts to Chamel Roukoz, an officer who rushes to subdue the gunman “Save him, save him!”.
François Hallal was saved! He later admitted being sent by Abdallah Al Amine, based on the Syrian intelligence orders. The assassin was “recuperated” the next day by the Syrian troops and appeared during a press conference next to Abdallah Al Amine.
The General finished his speech with a confident voice but a sad face. He begged citizens to go back home for their own security. It was time for separation!
However, Aoun’s government did not abandon the negotiations. It was out of question to make it bear the responsibility of breaking unilateral negotiations to justify a military intervention. At around 9 pm, he met for the last time Dr. Pierre Daccache accompanied by intelligence chief Amer Chehab. The General signed a 9-point ultimate compromise that reads as the following:
1- The lifting of the blockade
2- The recognition of Hraoui
3- The resignation of both the government of Aoun and Hoss simultaneously
4- The formation of a credible and representative National Union government negotiated by a common agreement
5- The dissolution of militias, then
6- The unification of the army
7- The abstention from nominating new deputies
8- Holding free legislative elections under international monitoring (under the aegis of the UN for example)
9- The ratification of constitutional reforms
Once signed, the document would be personally delivered by Dr. Daccache to ambassador René Ala who would then give it to Hraoui… who never answered!
The Syrians were not in a hurry to accept a pacific solution to the Taef problem. Aoun recognizing Hraoui did not suit them after all for the whole process should ultimately get the people’s approval (according to the 8th point) before any ratification. General Aoun had once again revealed the true Syrian intentions. Taef, as it was, was nothing but a trap, some kind of a disgusting democratic package to cover the worse form of dictatorship and occupation!
The night of October 12 ended with a meeting between the General and the Lebanese Front. During this meeting, the General received from his officers a document of a rare precision: a copy of the operation order sent by the Syrian headquarters to their officers. It indicated the exact time at when the operation would start. Other night envoys conveyed the same message.
General Aoun finished his meetings and went to bed at midnight. In his mind, he had already well planned the day of October 13. As soon as the Syrian aviation would launch its missiles, he would declare himself beaten and sign a cease-fire. As already indicated to Mgr Puente, he would thus save the right for Lebanese to ask for the departure of occupation troops. The intervention of Syrian aviation being the most important proof of interference and occupation Syria could give at this moment of History. The cease-fire and the transfer of power would avoid bloodshed. It was in this context that the General, and at the great surprise of observers, did not mobilize his reserve troops on the front (elements of the 8th brigade).
As for his own fate, he had already discussed it that same evening with a priest who came to visit him « they can kill me but I will not sign the Taef agreement ».
However, his family posed him problem. Baabda being a military target, he and his counselors tried to convince his wife to leave the Palace. But no reason in the world and no army could convince a woman to leave her husband! The Aoun family stayed behind the father until the end…
Saturday October 13, 6 in the morning:
On the other side of the front, a deserter General stood to attention ready to go into the occupant’s wake to attack his troops. He impatiently waited for the Syrian aviation supposed to arrive at 6 am.
He waited a long time, as he did not understand yet that Lebanon lived from now on according to the Syrian time. There was a one-hour difference between Damascus and Beirut due to the shift to wintertime. He had to wait until 7 for the Syrian aviation to start its operation.
General Aoun was already standing when he heard the Syrian fighters fly over Baabda and bombard the region. In a few moments, Syrian cannons unloaded their salvo of tens of thousands of shells on the free regions. Shells coming from Kessrouan also hailed along with Syrian shells.
At 7.30: All the fronts resisted the Syrian attack. General Aoun contacted the French ambassador, a privileged witness to the events, to inform him that the 9-point rescue plan was already dead. According to plan, he considered himself beaten and asked René Ala to negotiate a cease-fire with relevant authorities. The General asked to meet with an official representative of Lahoud’s army to transfer the power. It was out of question to have one Syrian get through the region.
The Syrians, however, had another plan in mind. Beyond Taef, they wanted to break the Lebanese army and enter to the very heart of the Defense ministry and the presidential palace to help themselves to the whole archives and documents. They would fool René Ala. Hraoui would, for this reason, ask the French ambassador to make sure the General was present at the French embassy at the declaration of the cease-fire. Hraoui thought that the General being present with such a witness (the ambassador) was enough to keep him from any military subterfuge and giving counter-orders.
The ambassador Ala called the General at 8 in the morning and informed him of the new conditions. He had to go to the French embassy. The General hesitated and asked for some time to think. Not having the upper hand, he decided to go to the embassy for the cease-fire even if it meant going back to the palace for the transfer of powers. He rode an armored M113 and headed to the French embassy under intensive bombing.
There he discovered the new conditions of the Hraoui-Lahoud-Mansour team: have the transfer of powers through a press release without having already signed a cease-fire!
General Aoun signed the release and even before its broadcast on the Lebanese radio, between 8.30 and 9, he asked Amer Chehab (intelligence service) and Jean Farah (in charge of operations room) to execute Lahoud’s orders.
At 8.30 in the morning, all fronts still resisted despite the extremely violent attacks. The Syrians had undergone great losses. Burning tanks could be seen from a long distance. Syrian losses were estimated at around 400 to 800 dead.
Although the release was read, Taef authorities returned to the fray and asked the General to read the message himself (instead of the radio broadcaster). The General recorded the power transfer message at 9: he clearly asked the military to obey the command of General Lahoud. It would later be broadcast on the Lebanese radio. General Lahoud declared the cease-fire at 9.30, almost 2 hours after General Aoun’s proposal to cease fire (7.30). Many victims died in the mean time!
As of this moment, General Aoun stopped communicating with anyone. He gave back his radio equipment to the French ambassador. Taef authorities would keep him from going back to the presidential palace for the transfer of power. Meanwhile, generals Abou Jamra and Maalouf arrived at the French embassy. By some miracle, there were no victims. After 2 in the afternoon, General Aoun’s family was evacuated from the Syrian-occupied presidential palace to join the French embassy.
General Aoun, thus, had never gone to the French embassy to seek asylum as Taef authorities repeated. He had gone there based on the demand of the Taef authorities, as the French ambassador confirmed to the October 24, 1990 issue of L’Orient-le-jour.
Furthermore, René Ala had won the approval of the Taef authorities to have a helicopter move the three generals (Aoun, Abou Jamra and Maalouf) that same day to Cyprus where a French-army Falcon Mystère awaited. The plane waited 48 hours on the Cypriot soil before taking off.. empty! General Aoun could not leave his forced residence until a year later on August 29, 1991 through “Hortensia” operation.
Unfortunately, the story did not end at the cease-fire that was never respected. While the Lebanese army waited for General Lahoud’s troops to surrender, Lahoud never came and unexpectedly the Syrian army arrived instead. The Lebanese soldiers were left to face their own fate.
Disregarding the cease-fires and the Geneva conventions, the Syrian army took to the worst ill-treatment and massacres. Between 9.30 and 2pm, more than 120 soldiers and officers and tens of civilians were executed on all fronts such as Bsous (16 executed civilians), Tallet Tamz (4 hanged soldiers), Dahr el Wahch (30 executed soldiers), Beit-Mery/Deir el Kalaa (2 priests, one cook and 10 soldiers executed). These massacres were executed after the soldiers had surrendered. More than 25 soldiers are still reported missing, probably imprisoned in Syrian jails for more than 14 years now.
This is how ended one of the darkest days of Lebanon’s history. However, survivors have kept two promises that day in the memory of those who left this world: keep fighting for Freedom, Sovereignty and Independence because victory belongs to those who fight relentlessly and with determination. The second promise was to keep this page of our History open as long as those responsible for these crimes against humanity are still free and untried. It is the same for crimes committed between 1975 and 1990.
Christian, Muslim and Druze mothers will eventually come to terms with the fact that their children did not die because of their religion but because they were simply Lebanese.
2nd October 2009
