Nahr El Bared model : Is Disarming the Palestinians Really A Good Idea?

[Convergence]

The year of 2007 witnessed a battle between the Lebanese Army and a militant group of al Qaida styled militant Islamists based at the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared. After the initial spark, a decision was made by the Lebanese Army to completely destroy Fateh el Islam. Even though the group was composed of only couple to several hundred fighters it was well trained, equipped, and heavily embedded within the civilian population (some of whom were related to members of the group) and narrow streets of the camp. Routing the group away from the camp was not feasible because of tactical reasons and the way Fateh el Islam operated.

A scorched earth policy was adopted instead by the Lebanese Army, against a stubborn enemy determined to fight to the death and never surrender. After months of fighting and heavy losses, the army defeated Fateh el Islam and destroyed the entire camp with them, dispersing the camp's 25,000 residents into Tripoli and other areas.

Most Lebanese from all denominations were thrilled that their army victorious over the terrorist group, and for the first time in a long while had demonstrated it's spine and it's readiness to take decisive action. Furthermore, this battle practically signaled the end of the Cairo agreement of 1969, in which the Lebanese army was barred from entering the camps.

While the focus of the Lebanese popular praise was the defeat of the "terrorists" Fateh El Islam, the effects and repercussions of clearing of Nahr El Bared camp had been all but absent from their minds. Of the two events, the latter is arguably much more significant. So why is no one weighting pros and cons of the army's decision in light of the latter issue and only doing so in light of the former?

Looking back in retrospect at the Bared events, we should consider them from the point of view of a camp clearing operation by the Lebanese Army and not only that of a fight with a terrorist group. By examining the pros and cons of such an operation in the Nahr El Bared scenario, we could learn more about the pros and cons of repeating this model to other camps and in how we should generally deal with Palestinians in these sensitive times.

I will summarize my point of view as a start, hoping to trigger a discussion on the subject of the Nahr el Bared. I realize beforehand that many FPMers specifically will not agree with my conclusions. I am an opposition sympathizer, and it is my opinion that the Lebanese fell into a trap and took the bait by opting to clear the refugee camp.

While some in the opposition argue that disarming of the first Palestinian camp is a major achievement and model to be followed and applied on all Palestinians and eventually all armed groups, I beg to differ. And the reason for this is simple : any clear up of the camps serves the naturalization agenda. There are many ways this is so.

- Palestinians in camps are relatively self contained, living more like an isolated bastion with minimal interaction with the rest of Lebanese society. Dispersing them like what happened in Bared is like popping a balloon, you will not be able to contain what is in it afterward.

- It shatters what is called their "social graph" from the dense state it is presently in, this means that they are no longer like a coherent tribe that clings strongly to their collective identity. Result of this is that they will be more demanding to stay in Lebanon and forget more about right of return.

- The reconstruction of the camps happens by means of Western donations, and we know where their agenda lies. The new camp that will house many of the refugees will be built with long-permanent stay in mind.

- Most controversially, the a new camp if built will have it's security enforced by the Lebanese army instead of Palestinian factions. Wherever this model is applied, it places the Lebanese army responsible for the Palestinians and their woes and ultimately aids in their integration into Lebanon as well. If they are finally and after decades integrated security wise, pressure will grow exponentially for other kinds of integration (right to own property, to work in more fields than currently allowed, etc).

I realize that the presence of the camps in their current state is a source of instability for Lebanon, and has many disadvantages. I further realize that the decisive action taken by the Lebanese army in 2007 strengthened our national leverage and sway vis a vis the Palestinians in Lebanon and that is one of the advantages of the operation. However I find it utterly shocking how badly the disadvantages of such an operation is downplayed and ignored, and it is my opinion that the cons outweigh the pros, and thus the status quo is preferable.

There is a trade off between preventing naturalization, and stability issues related to the Palestinians. If you want to do the former (stronger prevention of Palestinian integration), you will increase the latter (more instability) and vise versa... there is no way around this unfortunate dilemma. Being fully aware of this trade off in all it's angles, is the first step for making an informed decision about where on the trade off curve we want to be.

Hope I did not bore you with a lot of text. I would love to hear your opinions on the Nahr el Bared model of action, from the point of view of pros and cons of a camp cleanup operation. Especially interested in the opinion of FPMers who advocate Palestinian disarming across the board.

[elias-aj]

Well, it's a good question you raised.

In my opinion, we can't justify this waiver of sovereignity over the palestinian camps by the lebanese state. Palestinian camps are built on lebanese soil and must be under the control of the lebanese state. I can't accept the fact that palestinian factions / militias rule - even very small - parts of Lebanon.

Within the scope of our will to build a strong state and to implement the principle of sovereignity, this link between palestinian's factions weapons and the tawteen issue must be broken. Those who are using this link are those who want to impose the tawteen by creating threats to our national stability.

We'd be lying to each other if we pretend that the palestinian weapons are a guarantee against the tawteen. The tawteen is a political issue that must be raised on the international level by the lebanese government.

Here lies the problem : if we want the arab and generally the international community to listen to us, we need a strong state and a strong government. A strong interlocutor. To be considered as a strong interlocutor, the lebanese state must be sovereign. Our sovereignity is weakened for now because of our divisions and - among many other reasons - the palestinian weapons.

[Booyakasha]

While the focus of the Lebanese popular praise was the defeat of the "terrorists" Fateh El Islam, ]the effects and repercussions of clearing of Nahr El Bared camp had been all but absent from their minds[/b]. Of the two events, the latter is arguably much more significant.
What did you expect the army to do? Watch those thugs roam free and kill its soldiers?!

Looking back in retrospect at the Bared events, we should consider them from the point of view of a camp clearing operation by the Lebanese Army and not only that of a fight with a terrorist group.
By definition terrorists are there to terrorize people (lebanese AND palestinians). You cannot think about the sake of the people if those terrorists are terrorizing them. Plus when you're destroying the camp to annihilate that group, you're not demolishing the empire state building. Whether we like it or not, palestinian camps are pretty much like slums. The money received by the Gov to rebuild the camp is more than enough to build an even better one.


any clear up of the camps serves the naturalization agenda. There are many ways this is so.
- Palestinians in camps are relatively self contained, living more like an isolated bastion with minimal interaction with the rest of Lebanese society. Dispersing them like what happened in Bared is like popping a balloon, you will not be able to contain what is in it afterward.
If the army is not able to contain it, then there's a flaw in the composition of those camps. You cannot harbor terrorists and criminals and say they are in minimal interaction. The more you delay dealing with this issue the more dangerous it becomes.

- . Result of this is that they will be more demanding to stay in Lebanon and forget more about right of return.
It is not for them to decide whether they WOULD LIKE to go back or not. If they have a country that will welcome them back they are forced to go there unless they have regular resident permits that allow them to stay on Lebanese soil.

- The reconstruction of the camps happens by means of Western donations, and we know where their agenda lies. The new camp that will house many of the refugees will be built with long-permanent stay in mind.
Exactly, so why are you so concerned with the cleansing of the camps from terrorists?

- Most controversially, the a new camp if built will have it's security enforced by the Lebanese army instead of Palestinian factions. Wherever this model is applied, it places the Lebanese army responsible for the Palestinians and their woes and ultimately aids in their integration into Lebanon as well. If they are finally and after decades integrated security wise, pressure will grow exponentially for other kinds of integration (right to own property, to work in more fields than currently allowed, etc).
This will not happen as long as the leaders you elect will be against it. Palestinians are not able to lobby for this cause as it is refuted by Lebanese leaders (unless you're talking about Hariri and co.)

However I find it utterly shocking how badly the disadvantages of such an operation is downplayed and ignored, and it is my opinion that the cons outweigh the pros, and thus the status quo is preferable.
Status quo will lead to more instability, we need action.

There is a trade off between preventing naturalization, and stability issues related to the Palestinians. If you want to do the former (stronger prevention of Palestinian integration), you will increase the latter (more instability) and vise versa...
Let's say, palestinians are granted a state and that they are still armed to the bone. What makes you think that they will accept to go back? You're basically saying: keep their weapons, let them lead their lives in a horrible place with no rights and this way they'll accept to go back home. Well no sir, those willing to stay will stay whether they live in a 3 bedroom apartment or in a dump. They will have the opportunity to go back to a country where they will have freedom to work etc. Those willing to leave will do so, and so without their weapons. I am in favor of forcing them as any illegal immgration service in the world deals with its illegal residents.

Hope I did not bore you with a lot of text. I would love to hear your opinions on the Nahr el Bared model of action, from the point of view of pros and cons of a camp cleanup operation. Especially interested in the opinion of FPMers who advocate Palestinian disarming across the board.[/quote]
Thanks for your post.

[Danny Z]

The army attacked only when Fat7 el 2islem attacked the army and cut the throats of the sleeping soldiers, it was not the army who started this, and then they demanded that those who did surrender be handed over or face the wrath of the army, they asked the people to leave then attacked the terrorists, so it wasn't unprovoked and it wasn't an "initial spark" it was a serious problem that had to be dealt with. The army inched through the camp as no army ever managed to do before, the Golani brigade was decimated when they tried to inch through south Lebanon, the Russians were obliterated in Grozny and the Americans took fallujah but 4 times! it makes you wonder what they took. This was not an easy operation yes we lost soldiers but you had to move slowly otherwise you might have not been able to take it at all. It wasn't a scorched earth policy as you claim, it was moving slowly and making sure to minimize losses and if in the meantime you destroy the camp well then be it, there was no choice.
All the remaining in the post is useless since the action was brought on the army, not initiated by the army.

[taratattatta]

Originally Posted by Convergence

The year of 2007 witnessed a battle between the Lebanese Army and a militant group of al Qaida styled militant Islamists based at the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El Bared. After the initial spark, a decision was made by the Lebanese Army to completely destroy Fateh el Islam. Even though the group was composed of only couple to several hundred fighters it was well trained, equipped, and heavily embedded within the civilian population (some of whom were related to members of the group) and narrow streets of the camp. Routing the group away from the camp was not feasible because of tactical reasons and the way Fateh el Islam operated.

A scorched earth policy was adopted instead by the Lebanese Army, against a stubborn enemy determined to fight to the death and never surrender. After months of fighting and heavy losses, the army defeated Fateh el Islam and destroyed the entire camp with them, dispersing the camp's 25,000 residents into Tripoli and other areas.

Most Lebanese from all denominations were thrilled that their army victorious over the terrorist group, and for the first time in a long while had demonstrated it's spine and it's readiness to take decisive action. Furthermore, this battle practically signaled the end of the Cairo agreement of 1969, in which the Lebanese army was barred from entering the camps.

While the focus of the Lebanese popular praise was the defeat of the "terrorists" Fateh El Islam, the effects and repercussions of clearing of Nahr El Bared camp had been all but absent from their minds. Of the two events, the latter is arguably much more significant. So why is no one weighting pros and cons of the army's decision in light of the latter issue and only doing so in light of the former?

Looking back in retrospect at the Bared events, we should consider them from the point of view of a camp clearing operation by the Lebanese Army and not only that of a fight with a terrorist group. By examining the pros and cons of such an operation in the Nahr El Bared scenario, we could learn more about the pros and cons of repeating this model to other camps and in how we should generally deal with Palestinians in these sensitive times.

I will summarize my point of view as a start, hoping to trigger a discussion on the subject of the Nahr el Bared. I realize beforehand that many FPMers specifically will not agree with my conclusions. I am an opposition sympathizer, and it is my opinion that the Lebanese fell into a trap and took the bait by opting to clear the refugee camp.

While some in the opposition argue that disarming of the first Palestinian camp is a major achievement and model to be followed and applied on all Palestinians and eventually all armed groups, I beg to differ. And the reason for this is simple : any clear up of the camps serves the naturalization agenda. There are many ways this is so.

- Palestinians in camps are relatively self contained, living more like an isolated bastion with minimal interaction with the rest of Lebanese society. Dispersing them like what happened in Bared is like popping a balloon, you will not be able to contain what is in it afterward.

- It shatters what is called their "social graph" from the dense state it is presently in, this means that they are no longer like a coherent tribe that clings strongly to their collective identity. Result of this is that they will be more demanding to stay in Lebanon and forget more about right of return.

- The reconstruction of the camps happens by means of Western donations, and we know where their agenda lies. The new camp that will house many of the refugees will be built with long-permanent stay in mind.

- Most controversially, the a new camp if built will have it's security enforced by the Lebanese army instead of Palestinian factions. Wherever this model is applied, it places the Lebanese army responsible for the Palestinians and their woes and ultimately aids in their integration into Lebanon as well. If they are finally and after decades integrated security wise, pressure will grow exponentially for other kinds of integration (right to own property, to work in more fields than currently allowed, etc).

I realize that the presence of the camps in their current state is a source of instability for Lebanon, and has many disadvantages. I further realize that the decisive action taken by the Lebanese army in 2007 strengthened our national leverage and sway vis a vis the Palestinians in Lebanon and that is one of the advantages of the operation. However I find it utterly shocking how badly the disadvantages of such an operation is downplayed and ignored, and it is my opinion that the cons outweigh the pros, and thus the status quo is preferable.

There is a trade off between preventing naturalization, and stability issues related to the Palestinians. If you want to do the former (stronger prevention of Palestinian integration), you will increase the latter (more instability) and vise versa... there is no way around this unfortunate dilemma. Being fully aware of this trade off in all it's angles, is the first step for making an informed decision about where on the trade off curve we want to be.

Hope I did not bore you with a lot of text. I would love to hear your opinions on the Nahr el Bared model of action, from the point of view of pros and cons of a camp cleanup operation. Especially interested in the opinion of FPMers who advocate Palestinian disarming across the board.

of course it isn't... saret wad7a metel 3youn l shames... kif ba3ed fi 3alam byenekro .... baddon ywatnouwon ... boukra byefte3lo mashkal bi ainl helwe ta yfarefto l palestians in the south area, se3eta bi watnowon w byekesro shwayy men l te2el l shi3e bl manta2a... mesh wled li 3am nel3ab ma3on ... bass wala henne 3am yel3abo ma3 wled..

[Convergence]

Originally Posted by elias-aj

Within the scope of our will to build a strong state and to implement the principle of sovereignity, this link between palestinian's factions weapons and the tawteen issue must be broken.

It would be great if this link is broken. However, it would be naive to pretend this link did not exist. In the absence of a well defined and risk free strategy to break this link, we have to deal with it and take it into account.

Originally Posted by elias-aj

Those who are using this link are those who want to impose the tawteen by creating threats to our national stability.

This link exists for now, if we like it or not. Those who are using this link are making smarter decisions than those who are not because they are taking this factor into consideration.

But you are right, and is my theory that Fateh el Islam served it's purpose perfectly as planned when the Lebanese army was provoked into the Bared battle. The result of which went miles to aid in Palestinian integration. Integration of Palestinians is the twin sister of naturalization.

Originally Posted by elias-aj

We'd be lying to each other if we pretend that the palestinian weapons are a guarantee against the tawteen.

It is not a guarantee of course. However Palestinians policing themselves means they are less integrated and more isolated amongst themselves. Army and ISF taking over security in the camps, means they are more integrated. So keeping Palestinian factions controlling security in the camps while prone to instability, does help a great deal in fighting naturalization by prolonging tolerance for the status quo. We would be lying to ourselves if we pretended that a LA/ISF takeover of security in the camps does not help integrate the Palestinians in the Lebanese system and create pressure of further integration.

When I say naturalization, I mean de facto integration on the ground and over prolonged period of time... I am not taking about some grand deal that will have the parliament meet and say "OK today we will naturalize!". This is very easy to prevent, and is not really a problem. The objective in practically fighting naturalization in the long run is to prevent the integration of Palestinians on every level, save for basic humanitarian concerns.

[Convergence]

Originally Posted by Danny Z

The army attacked only when Fat7 el 2islem attacked the army and cut the throats of the sleeping soldiers, it was not the army who started this, and then they demanded that those who did surrender be handed over or face the wrath of the army, they asked the people to leave then attacked the terrorists, so it wasn't unprovoked and it wasn't an "initial spark" it was a serious problem that had to be dealt with.

How that fight exactly started is not that relevant to the purpose of this thread. What the results of the fight where, are relevant. Sure Fateh el Islam was destroyed, which members some 200 fighters? Facing this we have an entire camp destroyed and 25,000 dispersed. The dispersion of the camp is by far more important result of the battle than the defeat of Fateh el Islam. So why are we focusing on Fateh el Islam? Don't you get it? Fateh el Islam is a distraction... Maybe the army did exactly what the creators of Fateh el Islam wanted... and we are still cheering the defeat of this puppet group!

Originally Posted by Danny Z

It wasn't a scorched earth policy as you claim, it was moving slowly and making sure to minimize losses and if in the meantime you destroy the camp well then be it, there was no choice.

There was a choice... do not go into a confrontation that will lead into a whole camp destroyed and dispersed. A token action could be done for the death of the soldiers, and the people would have forgot about it in a week. This sort of thing happens all the time. Recently there was ambush for the army in the Bekka, I did not see any camps or towns destroyed head up in search of the criminals.

[taifoon]

That's an interesting observation you make there, thanks for a refreshing angle on the subject.

Originally Posted by Convergence

- Palestinians in camps are relatively self contained, living more like an isolated bastion with minimal interaction with the rest of Lebanese society. Dispersing them like what happened in Bared is like popping a balloon, you will not be able to contain what is in it afterward.

Nahr al Bared's former inhabitants have not been moved and/or integrated into lebanese residential areas. Where do you see that? Ma allah yse3id the Lebanese, all available rooms are already occupied, by Lebanese. What we do know however is that the overwhelming majority of the civilians who fled the camp have found shelters in other palestinian camps.

- It shatters what is called their "social graph" from the dense state it is presently in, this means that they are no longer like a coherent tribe that clings strongly to their collective identity. Result of this is that they will be more demanding to stay in Lebanon and forget more about right of return.

And since i don't think that your first premise, about the refugees being dispersed all over lebanese residential areas, is accurate, the above doesn't apply.

- The reconstruction of the camps happens by means of Western donations, and we know where their agenda lies. The new camp that will house many of the refugees will be built with long-permanent stay in mind.

Without being prepared to delve deeper into the psycho-social effects -on the Palestinian Kadiyya- of improving the refugees' basic life conditions, i spontaneously think that healthier housing or sewage system are relatively neglectable factors when compared to more important aspects that affect daily life, like civil rights, job opportunities and ultimately citizenship acquirement. Fact remains that, since those people have no other place to leave to, they stayed -and still are -where they now are, even when cornered under utter poverty and misery.

- Most controversially, the a new camp if built will have it's security enforced by the Lebanese army instead of Palestinian factions. Wherever this model is applied, it places the Lebanese army responsible for the Palestinians and their woes and ultimately aids in their integration into Lebanon as well. If they are finally and after decades integrated security wise, pressure will grow exponentially for other kinds of integration (right to own property, to work in more fields than currently allowed, etc).

Taking over the security of the camps is a must-happen move from Lebanese security perspective and is worth every single collateral risk that comes with it. And with proper political management of the issue, i don't see why we shouldn't still be standing on the same spot as we are today, in regard to the refugees issue, minus the toothache those camps' security black holes cause us, every once in a while..

[elias-aj]

Just before I answer and about Nahr el Bared events and FEI, the truth is that they were not only 200 but far far more. You have the official figures from which you can conclude that they were more than 200 and unofficial figures which may be frightening. Thing is we'll never know unfortunately...

Originally Posted by Convergence

It would be great if this link is broken. However, it would be naive to pretend this link did not exist. In the absence of a well defined and risk free strategy to break this link, we have to deal with it and take it into account.

This link exists for now, if we like it or not. Those who are using this link are making smarter decisions than those who are not because they are taking this factor into consideration.

We have to start by the beginning. Why did we have armed palestinian factions in Lebanon ? How did this evolve ? What are the outcomes for us ?

If you read well the events, you can't but recognize that the "raison d'être" of those weapons is the "tawteen". First, those weapons were barely used against Israel but rather against lebanese factions. Secondly, those weapons being out of the lebanese state control, were a major factor of sovereignity's loss.

From the beginning, the arab countries knew that the right of return would be hard or impossible to get. Here you get an explanation about why and how they imposed the presence of major armed palestinian factions in Lebanon.

Those who are justifying those weapons are making a great work indeed...making us lose our time. More than those weapons, the worst and most important factor is "time". And we're wasting it since 1967 on this issue. May be it's even too late.

Originally Posted by Convergence

But you are right, and is my theory that Fateh el Islam served it's purpose perfectly as planned when the Lebanese army was provoked into the Bared battle. The result of which went miles to aid in Palestinian integration. Integration of Palestinians is the twin sister of naturalization.

Honestly, I don't know if Nahr el Bared events have to be considered through the tawteen issue and / or have been planned in this purpose. It may also be a consequence of something else. The problem with Nahr el Bared is that we'll never know the whole truth.

Originally Posted by Convergence

It is not a guarantee of course. However Palestinians policing themselves means they are less integrated and more isolated amongst themselves. Army and ISF taking over security in the camps, means they are more integrated. So keeping Palestinian factions controlling security in the camps while prone to instability, does help a great deal in fighting naturalization by prolonging tolerance for the status quo. We would be lying to ourselves if we pretended that a LA/ISF takeover of security in the camps does not help integrate the Palestinians in the Lebanese system and create pressure of further integration.

When I say naturalization, I mean de facto integration on the ground and over prolonged period of time... I am not taking about some grand deal that will have the parliament meet and say "OK today we will naturalize!". This is very easy to prevent, and is not really a problem. The objective in practically fighting naturalization in the long run is to prevent the integration of Palestinians on every level, save for basic humanitarian concerns.

Our only chance to solve at least partly this issue is to restore our sovereignity and a strong state able to express the lebanese's will. As long as we're divided and weak, we'll keep wasting our time and the tawteen will be unavoidable. In my opinion, the palestinian weapons are a burden for two reasons :

1°/ because they prevent the lebanese state from exerting its authority ;
2°/ because those weapons may be used again, against lebanese factions, notably in case of a clash between sunnis and chiites for example.

To sum up, the lebanese need to unite for once and to act in accordance with the principles they all supposedly adopted : sovereignity and independence, which means disarming foreign factions and bringing up the palestinian refugees issue on the international level. Today, we still have something to bargain, some room for negotiatons notably with Israel. May be tomorrow it will be too late.

[Convergence]

Originally Posted by taifoon

That's an interesting observation you make there, thanks for a refreshing angle on the subject.

Nahr al Bared's former inhabitants have not been moved and/or integrated into lebanese residential areas. Where do you see that? Ma allah yse3id the Lebanese, all available rooms are already occupied, by Lebanese. What we do know however is that the overwhelming majority of the civilians who fled the camp have found shelters in other palestinian camps.

And since i don't think that your first premise, about the refugees being dispersed all over lebanese residential areas, is accurate, the above doesn't apply.

Without being prepared to delve deeper into the psycho-social effects -on the Palestinian Kadiyya- of improving the refugees' basic life conditions, i spontaneously think that healthier housing or sewage system are relatively neglectable factors when compared to more important aspects that affect daily life, like civil rights, job opportunities and ultimately citizenship acquirement. Fact remains that, since those people have no other place to leave to, they stayed -and still are -where they now are, even when cornered under utter poverty and misery.

Taking over the security of the camps is a must-happen move from Lebanese security perspective and is worth every single collateral risk that comes with it. And with proper political management of the issue, i don't see why we shouldn't still be standing on the same spot as we are today, in regard to the refugees issue, minus the toothache those camps' security black holes cause us, every once in a while..

That's an interesting observation you make there, thanks for a refreshing angle on the subject.

Greetings taifoon, a fresh angle on the subject was my goal from opening this thread. Even if not many agree with my conclusions, perhaps at least this under-discussed topic will get some extra attention. However I am still disappointed at how easily the FPMers who have posted here so far are finding ways to brush off my concerns. I think this is due to a prejudiced outlook on the Palestinian arms issue, as my conclusions collide with their preconceived conviction that the Palestinian camps must be disarmed immediately. (or maybe it is my blue avatar lol, I am not FM so relax )

About the specific part of my post you replied to, I have to admit I wrote it in a hurry and it was not that well polished. I wanted to give preliminary examples on how a camp cleanup operation Nahr el Bared style results in increased Palestinian integration on some level. I thought no one would disagree with this premise. Do you disagree with this premise in general?


Nahr al Bared's former inhabitants have not been moved and/or integrated into lebanese residential areas. Where do you see that? Ma allah yse3id the Lebanese, all available rooms are already occupied, by Lebanese. What we do know however is that the overwhelming majority of the civilians who fled the camp have found shelters in other palestinian camps.

From what I know, most of the refugees are still residing in temporary/emergency housing facilities set up by UNRWA during the battle. They will move to the new camp when/if it is built. In the mean time, they will diffuse slowly as whoever gets a chance to leave those facilities does so, sometimes to other camps because the living conditions in those facilities is even worse than the camps. Camp residents on the upper financial bracket and could afford to rent apartments have done so, and many in Lebanese residential areas in Tripoli and elsewhere. This group will integrate quickly.


And since i don't think that your first premise, about the refugees being dispersed all over lebanese residential areas, is accurate, the above doesn't apply.

You are exaggerating what I said, I did not say "all over Lebanese residential areas", but they did start dispersing to some degree. The camp is the center of gravity around which the Palestinian tribal cohesion orbits. During the Nakba 1948, Palestinians from the same village or area often moved together to the same camp effectively maintaining their social graph intact. This has more or less held true over the years but will not continue to hold true if we start targeting the camps themselves. The result is certain to be dispersion, and dispersion of any kind that messes with the Palestinian social graph will inevitably lead to increased integration. We are seeing preliminary results of this in Nahr el Bared, and the event is only two years old and the effects have not had enough time to manifest.


Without being prepared to delve deeper into the psycho-social effects -on the Palestinian Kadiyya- of improving the refugees' basic life conditions, i spontaneously think that healthier housing or sewage system are relatively neglectable factors when compared to more important aspects that affect daily life, like civil rights, job opportunities and ultimately citizenship acquirement. Fact remains that, since those people have no other place to leave to, they stayed -and still are -where they now are, even when cornered under utter poverty and misery.


You are brushing aside some factors here instead of tackling their complexities. If you have seen a camp or went into a camp, it is easy to figure how radically improved living conditions will factor highly into the Palestinian psyche. But also it is not only about the humanitarian aspect. The donors for such reconstruction projects will only fund such a project on their own terms and conditions. Those terms and conditions translate into long-permanent stay and better integration being interwoven into the design of the project itself. In contrast, a project funded say by a party who has an interest in preventing integration of Palestinians will have those elements interwoven in the project design. About the civil rights, job opportunities, and prospects of citizenship - these are important factors no doubt and can only be changed through the legal system. However de facto integration on the ground as well as security integration discussed below can create or ease pressure for legal integration as they go hand in hand... so even on this track there is a relation between the two even though it is a weak one.


Taking over the security of the camps is a must-happen move from Lebanese security perspective and is worth every single collateral risk that comes with it. And with proper political management of the issue, i don't see why we shouldn't still be standing on the same spot as we are today, in regard to the refugees issue, minus the toothache those camps' security black holes cause us, every once in a while..

Bear in mind taking over security in all the camps can not happen by diplomacy, it can only happen through Nahr el Bared reruns on other camps. There is a price to pay for all this in terms of Palestinian integration, which is different from the price in terms of lives and risk (it is difficult to guarantee that such a large move will go according to plan but this is another issue altogether which is not the subject of this discussion). Assuming success, proper political management can minimize the integration effect but not eliminate it. Your statement that the gains in terms of stability is worth "every single collateral risk" is a swooping conclusion in my opinion. Based on what you made this assessment? Is it actual detailed studies and plans? Or gut feeling?

You did touch with your statement on what I was saying... this preventing naturalization versus stability trade off. You figured that we had best lean more on the stability side, because the price in terms of integration is will worth the gains in stability. You got my point exactly from this thread, what I was hoping to convey, even if you reached a different conclusion from me. On the other hand, everyone else who posted here (except taratattatta) did not address this crux of my post and implicitly downplayed or disputed this trade off. If anyone feels you are not convinced of this trade off or the importance of factoring it into Lebanese decision making, please post!