All Hezbollah related subjects in this thread

[Rye]

Originally Posted by Vagus Nerve

bottom line:

lebanese forces are patriotic and they allied with israel back then for lebanon sake, never toward power or money

Walid Gumblat is very patriotic person, he is lebanons Baik! he allied with syria back then for lebanon sake, never toward power or money

FM and saad are also very patriotic, they want lebanon safe, and they invest halal money for that reason


HA ppl however are terrorist. their ultimate goal is to occupy biruit. they are williat al faqih people which means they keep arms to kill patriotic ppl. to save iran nuclear project. and save syria's *** from international court.
they would also die to keep their arms because they are brainwashed, they are cool with losing their lives cuz they are stupid.

How lame.....

general slogans rock... they are so moronic... but they rock!

but now that jumblat his kriss crossed on himself and you... and for him HA are now freedom fighters, how do u explain his patriotism?

[Vagus Nerve]

Originally Posted by Rye

general slogans rock... they are so moronic... but they rock!

but now that jumblat his kriss crossed on himself and you... and for him HA are now freedom fighters, how do u explain his patriotism?

dude, couldnt you just feel the sarcasm in my words .....



personally, i just cant figure out what walid baik is up to, i am sure to certain he is not flip flopping. he flips to the stronger side when he expect they are welcoming him. I think he is agenda kind of person, his last flip (al tahalof al rubaai) against HA was clearly on agenda, his enrollment with HA telecom network incident was on agenda. I dont know why he is so approaching the other side, but its clearly he does not just want to flip flop

[ecce homo]

FT interview: Fouad Siniora, Lebanese prime minister
Published: October 16 2008 16:23 | Last updated: October 16 2008 16:23

Fouad Siniora, Lebanon’s prime minister, spoke to Lionel Barber and Roula Khalaf earlier this month at his office in central Beirut

Q: How do you assess the progress of national reconciliation?

A: This is quite important and really arriving at a situation where you accept the opinion of others without necessarily agreeing. It is a way of organising our differences. In fact the most important thing in this country is diversity and during the past, over the past few decades - we have been in this situation for the past three decades - there has been a gradual [hardening of these differences] but it’s becoming more shocking now.

First of all the degree of tolerance has fallen significantly and some are resorting in one way or another to resolving their differences through the use of violence, which is entirely contrary to the very principle of accepting others’ opinions. Because this country is composed of at 18 confessional groups and has been open to accept views from all over the world and you can see in many parts of Beirut many quarters that are cosmopolitan in the real sense of the world, in which you can see people from all four corners of the world with all sorts of opinions. The degree of tolerance was very high.

During the last two decades in particular, there has been a continuous effort to make Lebanon conform to the model of others. For example, imposing constitutional limits on the term of the president, the rotation of power - which is very important as a model of democracy. We have been suffering in matters that are completely alien to our culture and to the Islamic culture. This mentality of dividing the world into two camps – the camp of the good and the camp of the evil. Everybody thinks that they are in the camp of the good and that the other is in the camp of the evil and wants to get rid of them through verbal aggression and sometimes through real violence.

Lebanon is like a laboratory in this part of the world. Some people say: why are you making a fuss about this country? It is only 4m people, 10,000 square km. But anyone who thinks that Lebanon is just these meagre numbers is completely mistaken. Lebanon has much more value and influence and impact in the Arab world than these numbers indicate. Hence it is so important at a time of pressure and suspicion and violence to stand up and say, this is wrong. It is not easy, it is not easy during these times.

Hizbollah did a great job, a really great job. And the whole country was with them practically, until the year 2000 when Lebanon really fought and we made a great deal of sacrifices. Hizbollah did a great job in fighting the Israelis, until they liberated lands in the year 2000. That was the thing that one could really have arranged to find other ways, without really asking Hizbollah to disarm. We could have managed not to subject the country to an additional test and pressures and experiences because of additional invasions that may be made by the Israelis.

Up to the year 2006 we definitely considered Israel as an enemy – we still consider them the enemy – and we have to protect the country against the attacks, the invasions, the attempts that may be made to undermine the Lebanese state.

But we consider that Hizbollah’s act in kidnapping two Israel soldiers was a miscalculation because this had consequences. The Israelis did not succeed in defeating Lebanon – I’m being fairly objective. They did not have a victory, we did not have a victory. We managed to stop them from defeating us, but in the final analysis they ended up occupying part of the country and we had to resort to political means to push them back out of the country.

Some think we should not underestimate not being able to score a victory, for Israel is extremely powerful. Israel cannot afford not to score a victory. And that is what you are seeing there – the repercussions of not being able to score a victory. The repercussions resulted in this friction within Lebanese society that should have been handled with greater care in order to maintain the unity of the Lebanese against the Israelis. This is the miscalculation.

Q: Hizbollah makes no secret it is rearming. What is your position on this?

A: This is something that at the end of the day, whether they realise it now or later, this is not the way to find solutions to problems or to take over the country.

One has to understand clearly that the victory that was scored in the year 2000 [when Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon] was the outcome of a number of factors that played together to achieve that victory, which is the real boldness and sacrifices that were made by the resistance and the ability to stand up and do all these heroic things.

Secondly, Lebanese society was really behind the resistance. Like everywhere else in the world, it swims in friendly waters, it doesn’t swim in unfriendly waters. The Lebanese government – one has to always remember the achievement that was made by the late prime minister [Rafiq] Hariri in the April understanding [of 1996, when Israel and Hizbollah undertook to limit their attacks, particularly on civilians and infrastructure].

Effectively, immediately after the incident in which these two soldiers were kidnapped [in 2006], I brought the people of Hizbollah into my office and I had a long discussion with them because what happened was contrary to all the promises that were made to the Lebanese government.

I said, let’s put everything aside, now we have to work together to stand up to the pressures of the invasion. The successes that were made in not allowing the Israelis to score a victory was because of the bravery of Lebanese society.

Q: One member of your government asked what is wrong with having a paramilitary force that is not part of the army.

A: This is something you might be able to have for a short period of time but it is not something that can be worked out for a long period of time, where you have areas that are beyond the control and the government and people who are allowed to do what they want without being subject to the rule of law.

Particularly in a society that is highly diverse and in which there is a certain group that monopolises this aspect of fighting the Israelis, this puts all the other groups outside and this in a diverse society makes the situation much more difficult.

You see, building a state is something that can not wait and it is unacceptable not to have a state. Even if you look at it from a theological point of view, even in Islam, there can’t be any situation in which you don’t have leadership. I recall a saying that was said by my father – two captains in one ship will send the ship sinking.

Q: Is there anything real in the reconciliation? Or is it just lip service?

A: It is not in anyone’s interests to resort to violence or the use of weapons because this will mean destruction. Since May, there has been a covenant among the Lebanese that weapons are not to be used domestically. Somebody broke this covenant. How to deal with it? By going all the way and fighting against your countrymen? This is unacceptable. What was arrived at in the Doha agreement is not to translate a certain dominance through the use of weapons into political achievements and a pledge not to resort to the use of violence. This is something that fits into our thinking and this is in the interests of the country. We have to organise our differences and rely on democratic means and on the voters. The voters will be the judge in the end and one has to respect that. I agreed to the principle of having a reconciliation government, this is something that happens in many democracies, but ultimately, after the elections, I think that whoever gets the majority has to rule. In other words, if those who really believe in that opinion, if they win, they should take the lead.

Q: What if the opposition wins?

A: They should really take the responsibility and take the lead, and definitely bear all the consequences. This is democracy.

Q: Do you think the March 14 [ruling coalition] can win?

A: I strongly believe that the commitment of the majority of the people is in getting back to a situation where the state is in control. If it is a state run by Hizbollah, fine. But somebody is in charge. There is one captain. This situation is unsustainable where there are many captains.

I believe in March 14 and the people who subscribe to what they say it stands for: democracy, openness, tolerance, independence, excellent relations with Syria. I am fully in favour of excellent relations with Syria but on the basis of mutual respect and on an equal basis. Equal partners. Syria is our neighbour and we have a history of thousands of years together, and we will be together for thousands more. Israel is an enemy, Syria is not an enemy. But we cannot and we should not continue to be a satellite state to Syria.

These Sunni extremists are a scarecrow. I don’t mean that there are no Salafis [al-Qaeda-linked fundamentalist Sunni Muslims]. There are Salafis. But they are really creating this giant and magnifying it in order to create a perception that there is a need for a policeman. And at the same time, to intimidate. [If] they are coming from Anbar [in Iraq] they are coming from where, through where? They are coming through Syria? They are not coming by parachute. Instead of waiting for them to come in from Lebanon, they would do better to control them when they are coming from Iraq. All the people caught or killed in Nahr al-Bared did not come via legal Lebanese points of entry, they came through these porous points.

Q: Are you ready for security coordination with Syria?

A: On any issue we are fully ready to talk like two mature brothers. Syria is not an enemy it is a sister country, we are ready to co-operate on any matter that is good for both countries with all sincerity and openness. But as two mature brothers.

Q: It is surprising that you say Syria is not an enemy, when there is a suspicion that Syria was responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri?

A: This matter is in the hands of the investigators and there is an international tribunal.

Q: Saad Hariri called for international help over the presence of Syrian troops at the border

A: I don’t think it is possible any more for Syrian troops to enter Lebanon. This is unacceptable domestically, in the Arab world and internationally. I don’t think this is in the mind of the Syrian leadership. This is not the way to co-operate with Lebanon. I am an Arab, I will always behave as an Arab and I will proud of that and convinced of that. I will not undermine that.

Q: Do you see the recent fighting in Tripoli as a Syrian/Saudi confrontation?

A: I do not believe in any way whatsoever that the Saudis would do such a thing. They wouldn’t do it, they wouldn’t know how to do it. In Afghanistan they are not the ones who did it, they just provided money. I don’t think somebody kidnaps a brother and asks for a ransom from the third brother. I strongly believe that the people don’t want [the fighting], neither the Sunnis nor the Alawites.

Q: Who has an interest in creating this situation?

A: You have to conclude that there are certain people who act like a gun for hire.

Q: What about the reports of people buying weapons during the ‘reconciliation’ period and that Hizbollah is rearming?

A: There are some people who might be doing so but I don’t believe this will lead anywhere. The types of weapons that Hizbollah are acquiring are of a different magnitude.

Q: What are the security services doing?

A: This is where we differ from Hizbollah. [Hassan] Nasrallah [Hizbollah leader] said go build your state and when you have finished come and talk to us. We have to build a state together. This is not the way. You can’t have a state if you’re not going to work for it. They want to get all the fruits of the state but not to comply with what the state is really for… we want to have fair play, a democracy, and to work towards having a proper election.

Q: When will Syria open its embassy in Beirut?

A: Very soon. The foreign minister will visit Damascus and we will talk about it. There has not been any agreement to determine a date. We have to take them at their word.

[Dalzi]

Originally Posted by leb-wi-noss

YouTube - Nasrallah Welayet Al Fakih نصرالله عن ولاية ال�قيه

So? With pride of course. We're not going to rely on your "Faqih" Geagea for inspiration lol. This is a Shiaa doctrine, you need one who has more knowledge than you do when it comes to important issues that involve risking lives. Many targets during July's war were not hit because they would cause death to innoscent lives, that was because "ALWALEH ALFAQEEH" said "YOU CAN'T HIT THAT, IT'S NOT ALLOWED "RELIGIOUSLY"". Jahlkon dareb lalmax. And of course you can do jack sh*t about anything. 2a77et. If it weren't for that Waleh kenna masa7nekon mas7.

[TayyaRevolution]

Originally Posted by leb-wi-noss

YouTube - Nasrallah Welayet Al Fakih نصرالله عن ولاية الفقيه

Understand it properly:

Hassan Nasrallah:

"Many people have tried to use their media outlets to distort the truth. They think that by labeling us the "Party of the Rule of the Jurisprudent," they are insulting us. By no means is this true. I declare today – not for the first time – that I am proud to be a member of the Party of the Rule of the Jurisprudent - A jurisprudent who is just, learned, wise, courageous, reliable, and loyal. I say to those people: The Rule of the Jurisprudent tells us that we are its party. Lebanon is a diverse and pluralistic country, and you must defend it."

[ecce homo]

Saudis resurrect a rival for Hezbollah
By Sami Moubayed

Asia Times Online

DAMASCUS - Word is coming out of south Lebanon that Saudi money under United States urging is being pumped into the Shi'ite community - in vain - to create a bloc among Lebanese Shi'ites against Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

The Saudis are strongly opposed to Hezbollah, claiming that it is an extension of Iranian influence in the Arab world. More recently, the Saudis have began coordinating with former vice president Abdul-Halim Khaddam to break Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon.

In testimony of just how influential Nasrallah is as secretary general of Hezbollah, the Saudis have stunningly failed - despite tremendous efforts and allegations of huge sums of money being spent - at creating a serious anti-Nasrallah team in places controlled by Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Party of speaker Nabih Berri.

This applies to places like al-Dahiya, the Hezbollah stronghold in the suburbs of Beirut, and cities like Baalbak. That is why they have shifted their attention recently to other districts with "Shi'ite pockets" where Hezbollah does not completely reign, like Nab'a, and certain villages in south Lebanon.

Coinciding with this story and probably related to it, are unconfirmed reports saying that Michael Hayden, the head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, went to Beirut for a secret mission, probably aimed at working towards crushing - or at least disarming - Hezbollah.

That coincided with another high-profile visit by US Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman to Beirut, where he met Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora, signing an agreement to grant automatic grenade launchers to the Lebanese army. The visit - Edelman's fourth in one year - raised eyebrows among members of the Hezbollah-led opposition, who were welcoming Michel Aoun, Hezbollah's main Christian ally, who was returning from a five-day visit to Iran.

The Americans are trying - again - to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah, through strengthening "US-Lebanon bilateral defense" relations. Since 2006, the US has committed more than $410 million in military assistance to Lebanon - hoping that these weapons can be used to counterbalance the military might of Hezbollah.

The Saudis and Subhi Tufayli
The Saudis, however, are reportedly funding a rival wing of Hezbollah itself, modeled around Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, one of the party's original founders who has been sitting in the dark since the 1990s.

Tufayli started out as a firm supporter of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, having studied Islam in Najaf (Iraq) during Khomeini's long exile in the holy Iraqi city, before the Islamic revolution of 1979. He returned to Lebanon and helped co-found Hezbollah - with Iranian support - during the Israeli invasion of 1982.

The party broke from Amal, disgruntled at the party's increased secularization and its political rather than military approach, vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation. Men like Tufayli, Abbas Musawi and Nasrallah wanted action, and immediately clashed with Amal and its veteran leader (and now ally) Nabih Berri.

Under Tufayli's leadership, Hezbollah managed to drive Amal from Beirut during the height of the Lebanese civil war in the late 1980s. Under his command rose the young Nasrallah in 1989, leading a commando force against Amal in Iqlim al-Tuffah, and becoming a member of the central command of Hezbollah at the young age of 29.

Tufayli served as the party's spokesman from 1985 to 1989, then became secretary general from 1989 to 1991. Tufayli opposed taking part in national reconciliation talks in Taif, Saudi Arabia, and as a result was expelled (or asked to resign) from Hezbollah under the urging of then Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Nasrallah served as Hezbollah's "ambassador" to Iran in 1989-1992. During this time, Tufayli was replaced by Abbas Musawi as secretary general, who in turn was assassinated in 1992, many suspect by Israel.

Nasrallah replaced him at the job, although the party's hierarchy showed that it should have gone to Sheikh Naim Qasim. Veterans of Hezbollah - headed by Tufayli - were surprised at the change of command, considering Nasrallah as too junior politically and religiously, and too young at 31, to become the Party of God's number-one man.

A hardliner, Tufayli once said that his supporters did not dream of eradicating Israel in the near future, but plans to lead a battle that will last "for centuries". More recently, he has distanced himself from Iran for its firm support for Nasrallah, a man whom he respects but envies tremendously. He can't challenge him, beat him, or replace him as head of Hezbollah or the Lebanese Shi'ite community.

He once said that some of the current members of Hezbollah "are taking the country towards destruction under the slogan of fighting the American policies in the region. If someone wants to change the government, does it not mean leading the whole country to chaos and civil strife?"

Tufayli vetoed the "politicization" of Hezbollah, claiming that it should neither run for parliament, nor hold government office, and remain committed to what it knows best: guerrilla war with Israel.

In July 1997, he organized a "hunger strike" of his followers in Baalbak, aimed at embarrassing the pro-Hezbollah government of then-prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. He has since called his small power base the Revolution of the Hungry, similar to the "Movement of the Dispossessed" that was created by Hezbollah's godfather, Sheikh Musa Sadr.

Although the Lebanese government tried to arrest him, it has since let him live freely, keeping close tabs on his activities and making sure that he is absent from public life. In 2000, when Nasrallah liberated south Lebanon against Israel, Tufayli was believed to be politically finished, since Hezbollah was at the apex of its career and no Shi'ite with a right mind could challenge the charisma or popularity of Nasrallah.

But on several occasions he came out and spoke against Nasrallah, objecting to the latter's alliance with Iran and claiming that he broke with Hezbollah because of the overt Iranian agenda of its secretary general. Earlier, in his final act of defiance, Tufayli clashed with the Lebanese state when his followers tried to take over a party-run religious school in Baalbak.

The Lebanese army was asked to intervene, when Iranian cover was lifted off Tufayli, back when the armed forces were under command of pro-Syrian General Emille Lahhoud, who became president of the republic from 1998-2007. The army announced that it had mobilized against Tufayli "on charges of forming armed groups, endangering national security and killing soldiers and civilians".

The Lebanese government of Siniora has tried in vain to get rid of Hezbollah, but was unable to do so due to the party's power base and the repeated victories it scored against Israel since 2000. The UN could not disarm Hezbollah, nor could the United States, or Israel in its failed 2006 war on Lebanon.

According to veteran US journalist Seymour Hersh, the Americans and Saudis even worked towards creating an armed Sunni terrorist group to combat Hezbollah - in reference to Fatah al-Islam, inspired by al-Qaeda - which also ended in vain.

Now, all parties are trying to break Nasrallah's kingdom from within, through splinter Shi'ite groups loyal to people like Tufayli and through the money of dissident Syrians. Any person who has seen how popular Nasrallah was in Lebanon in 2000 or 2006 realizes how foolish it would be to try and challenge him by resurrecting figures like Subhi Tufayli.

Nasrallah is one of the most charismatic and popular figures in the Muslim world. Tufayli is a nobody. Nasrallah achieved victory for his party in 2000 and 2006, whereas Tufayli left behind a troubled - almost forgotten - legacy. Nasrallah distributes money to the poor in order to empower the Shi'ites of Lebanon.

Saudi Arabian money is going to Tufayli's pockets, not to ordinary Shi'ites. Saudi Arabia will never be respected or seen as an honest broker in the Shi'ite community because of its ties to militant Sunni groups like al-Qaeda. That is why nobody aided or financed by the Saudis will ever be accepted by Lebanese Shi'ites.

[fidelio]

Well, Tufayli's name describes him well.

[M@rshall]

vagus nerve ya vagus nerve, your name says it all, wlik lech bit dallkoun under the parasympathetic effect, hypnotized to the "red nucleus" by your leaders...yaret bit chaghlo el sympathetic chain chway, w btou3o

regards

[ecce homo]

Le français entre les mains des chiites

Au Liban, les chrétiens sont, historiquement, francophones. Mais c'est sur les chiites, bien plus nombreux, que repose désormais l’avenir du français. Reportage chez les nouveaux francophiles du pays du Cèdre

Video: France 24 | Le français entre les mains des chiites | France 24

[fidelio]

UN Resolution 1701: A View from Israel

By Oded Eran
October 20, 2008

This PolicyWatch is the first in a three-part series examining the situation in Lebanon two years after the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This series coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Marine barracks bombing by Hizballah in Lebanon on October 23, 1983, an attack that continues to inform U.S. policymaking in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East.
In a September 29 interview, outgoing Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert defended UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 -- an agreement that ended the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hizballah -- by asserting that it had quieted Israel's northern border. Although the resolution ended the fighting, it did not end the conflict, and its failure to incorporate specific stipulations and mechanisms to disarm Hizballah makes future violence between the two sides inevitable.

Missed Opportunities

UNSCR 1701 was adopted twenty-eight years after Resolutions 425 and 426 established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and delineated the territorial boundaries of its mandate, limiting it to the south of the country. As such, UNSCR 1701 does not allow UNIFIL to fulfill the resolution's mission to assist the Lebanese government in disarming all armed Lebanese groups -- a mission that had already been specified by UNSCR 1559 in 2004 -- and in preventing the "sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government."

When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1701, the international community missed an opportunity to provide UNIFIL the legal sanction to extend its territorial responsibility and functional mandate. As a result, Hizballah has more than doubled its prewar arsenal of long- and short-range missiles and rockets by way of the porous Syrian-Lebanese border. In less than two years, Hizballah has recovered from its losses and depletion of weapons stocks, primarily as a result of the Security Council's inability to adopt a more meaningful resolution.

Skeptics of UN peacekeeping forces argue that even if UNSCR 1701 had mandated the deployment of an international force on the Syrian-Lebanese border, its ability to prevent massive arms smuggling would have been limited. Although this assessment may be accurate, it should not have prevented the UN from adopting tougher language in order to implement UNSCR 1559 in robust fashion, specifically by disbanding Lebanon's militias.

Furthermore, since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hizballah has built a massive military infrastructure, both above and below ground. Among Israel's 2006 war objectives was the destruction of that infrastructure, yet whatever was destroyed during the war has been reconstructed and fortified in the past two years, regardless of UNSCR 1701 and the presence of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army.

The absence of any Hizballah military offensive against Israel since 2006 has been attributed erroneously to UNSCR 1701. In reality, this restraint comes from the policy decision of Hizballah's leaders to focus on the domestic agenda and solidify its political position in Lebanon. Hizballah has also been deterred militarily by the calculation that Israel would respond overwhelmingly to any provocation, striking the Shiite organization and/or its two major patrons, Syria and Iran. Hizballah's desire to avoid a perceived violation of UNSCR 1701 has had only a marginal impact on its restraint.

Hizballah has benefited tremendously from the loopholes in the resolution, fully recovering from the 2006 war and improving its political and military position in Lebanon. Under the lull provided by the ceasefire, the organization has managed to avoid paying a price for triggering the 2006 war and has reasserted itself even more forcefully in Lebanese politics.

Hizballah Undeterred

UNSCR 1701 provided Israel with a reasonable exit from a military dead end, and was a way for the United States and France to reassert influence in Lebanon, at least ostensibly. Yet the increased involvement of Washington and Paris has been of little value, especially as far as Israel is concerned. Even at the time of its adoption, many in the Israeli government viewed UNSCR 1701 with skepticism.

Moreover, Israel now faces a more formidable organization, one that is better supplied and entrenched than it was two years ago. Although Israel's reaction to the kidnapping of two soldiers in 2006 took Hizballah's leadership by surprise and may have increased Israel's regional deterrence, the mixed performance of the IDF during the campaign undercut the shock value, making its impact of limited value and efficacy. Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah's leader and secretary general, continues to issue threatening statements and displays confidence in his organization's ability to weather another Israeli military campaign.

In contrast, many Israelis have a strong sense that an opportunity was missed following the 2006 debacle. Hizballah's buildup over the last two years accentuates Israel's desire to undermine the organization's position in Lebanon. Logic suggests this can only be achieved by a successful military operation followed by a clear diplomatic solution. Such an outcome would close the loopholes of UNSCR 1701 and force the Lebanese government and the international community to take concrete measures to implement UNSCR 1559, which calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all militias inside Lebanon.

Conclusion

Another war with Hizballah appears inevitable, and the Israeli military currently is making preparations to ensure that the next round is decisive. More importantly, however, is the diplomacy that would follow the conflagration. Not only is it important to secure a meaningful UN resolution, it is also critical that the international community implement that resolution.

Oded Eran is a former senior Israeli diplomat and ambassador, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

WINEP

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What this guy says, where he published it, when he published it, who he is, and what his responsibilities are, all of that should be taken seriously into consideration.