Syria Special Weapons Guide Nuclear Weapons Programs
Syria is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Syria has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA but, like Iran, has not yet signed or even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations and provides the IAEA with the ability to act quickly on any indicators of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and activities. Syria has called for an area free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
Although Syria has long been cited as posing a nuclear proliferation risk, the country seems to have been too strapped for cash to get far. Syria allegedly began a military nuclear program in 1979 and has not provided the IAEA with full information on all its nuclear activities. Syria has claimed that it was interested in nuclear research for medical rather than military purposes, but Israel and the United States have opposed sales of a reactor to Syria on the grounds that it would serve as an important step toward the building of a nuclear weapon.
The United States is concerned about Syria's nuclear R&D [research and development] program and continues to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. Syrian has made efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Cooperation program -- could be applied to a nuclear weapons program.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba as rogue states that support international terrorism and are pursuing the development of mass destruction weapons (WMD). On October 9, 2002, Undersecretary Bolton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]e remain very concerned that nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others, including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise.” The allusion to nuclear programs prompted a complaint from the Syrian Foreign Ministry, which averred that Syria has been calling for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East since 1987.
A
2004 study for the Swedish Defense Ministry" concluded "In regards to nuclear capacity, all available information indicates that Syria today focuses its nuclear ambitions in the civil sector. Syria does not have any military nuclear program ambitions, and the lack of economical and technical resources needed for such a program are vital arguments behind this conclusion."
Research Reactor
Under an IAEA project, first approved in 1984 and completed in 1991, six IAEA missions were sent to Syria to advise the counterparts on site selection. The Agency's assistance on site selection was accelerated during Syria's negotiations with USSR suppliers for a 10 MW reactor, but the negotiations later broke down. After intensive historical, earthquake and geological studies, three potential sites were identified near Damascus and one of them was selected for the Miniature Neutron Source Research [MNSR] Reactor project. A training course on research reactor utilization was organized in Poland for 10 Syrian scientists. All objectives of the project were incorporated into IAEA Project SYR/4/004, under which a miniature neutron source reactor was procured.
The Argentine Council for International Affairs [CARI]
reports that "In May of 1989, the General Director of the Atomic Energy Committee of Syria visited Bariloche, Argentina in order to initiate negotiations for the purchase of a complete atomic center. Syria had already received a Russian bid for a 10 MW reactor, with adequate financing. Nevertheless, in October a bid was submitted for a nuclear center built around a small research reactor of 1 to 3 MW. A year later, in October of 1990, an extended bid was prepared. The proposed nuclear center would be located in Homs; its size would be 150 to 200,000 square feet, and it would have departments of biology, physics, geology, agriculture and auxiliary services... The amount of the contingent contract would exceed US$ 250 million.... By the end of 1991 ... these negotiations, which were quite advanced, were halted... in August of 1995, after the Argentinean President’s visit to Syria, contacts were renewed. The Syrian nuclear organization submitted an order for a 5 to 10 MW research reactor, a waste treatment plant and a radioisotope production plant. A letter of intent to commence within 24 months was signed. INVAP would be the supplier and the contract was to be signed in August of 1997, but this never took place. At the end of 1996, Syria purchased cobalt-therapy equipment, through an international bid, for a price of US$ 300,000."
In 1991, China reported to the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor to Syria. The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria subsequently reduced its nuclear activities.
Under IAEA Project SYR/4/004, completed 25 May 1998, the Agency assisted the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission to purchase and install a Chinese 30 kW miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) at Dayr Al Hajar [Der Al-Hadjar]. The project was funded from the TCF and through a GCS contribution from the counterpart. Extensive expert services and training enabled the counterpart staff to acquire knowledge and expertise in evaluating the seismicity of the reactor site, in licensing research reactors and operators, in preparing and reviewing the Safety Analysis Report, in operating and utilizing the reactor, in developing an irradiation facility and an R&D programme, in establishing radiation protection measures and in carrying out the safety analysis of the MNSR. As a result of the project, "Syria MNSR" has been installed in Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Centre near Damascus and is fully operational. A local capability has been established to use the reactor as a source of neutrons for NAA, for the limited production of short lived radioisotopes and for training staff and students.
In 1997, it was reported that the Russian government was interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Syria. On 23 February 1998, Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In July 1998, the two sides agreed on the time table for the realization of a 25-MW light-water nuclear research center project in Syria with the participation of Russia's Atomstroyeksport and Nikiet. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. According to a London Financial Times report on January 16, 2003, Russian government sources indicated that Russia was negotiating to build a nuclear power plant in Syria, but Syrian officials said they could neither confirm nor deny the report.
2007 Developments
Syria said its air defences opened fire on Israeli warplanes flying over the northeast of the country in the early hours of Thursday 06 September 2007. Very few facts are known about the alleged incident. On 12 September 2007 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper in
The New York Times reported that "Officials in Washington said that the most likely targets of the raid were weapons caches that Israel’s government believes Iran has been sending the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah through Syria." On 13 September 2007 Glenn Kessler reported in the
Washington Post that " ... a former Israeli official said he had been told that it was an attack against a facility capable of making unconventional weapons."
On 12 September 2007 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper in
The New York Times reported that a "Bush administration official said Israel had recently carried out reconnaissance flights over Syria, taking pictures of possible nuclear installations that Israeli officials believed might have been supplied with material from North Korea. The administration official said Israeli officials believed that North Korea might be unloading some of its nuclear material on Syria. “The Israelis think North Korea is selling to Iran and Syria what little they have left,” the official said. He said it was unclear whether the Israeli strike [on 07 September 2007] had produced any evidence that might validate that belief."
The phrase "what little they have left" is rather difficult to understand.
On 13 September 2007 Glenn Kessler reported in the
Washington Post that "North Korea may be cooperating with Syria on some sort of nuclear facility in Syria, according to new intelligence the United States has gathered over the past six months, sources said. The evidence, said to come primarily from Israel, includes dramatic satellite imagery... The new information, particularly images received in the past 30 days, has been restricted to a few senior officials... "
Upon reflection, the suggested activity -- a uranium enrichment pilot plant -- is precisely the type of facility that would not produce "dramatic satellite imagery". Indeed, it is the absence of an imagery signature that has frustrated the search for North Korea's uranium program. And the "restricted to a few senior officials" part of the narrative might be expanded to include "in the Office of the Vice President, Dick Cheney".
On 14 September 2007 Andrew Semmel, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy told reporters that North Koreans were in Syria and that Damascus may have had contacts with "secret suppliers" to obtain nuclear equipment. Semmel did not directly accuse the North Koreans, but noted that the A.Q. Khan network might be involved with Syria. "There are indicators that they do have something going on there," he said. "We do know that there are a number of foreign technicians that have been in Syria. We do know that there may have been contact between Syria and some secret suppliers for nuclear equipment. Whether anything transpired remains to be seen. ... So good foreign policy, good national security policy, would suggest that we pay very close attention to that," he said. "We're watching very closely. Obviously, the Israelis were watching very closely."
This flurry of reporting came a few days in advance of a regular round of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear problem, which was anticipated to be held in late September 2007. A group of nuclear experts from the United States, Russia, and China arrived in North Korea on 11 September 2007 on a five-day visit to carry out inspections in the country, and draw up recommendations for shutting down all the country's remaining nuclear facilities. On 16 September 2007, when asked about possible nuclear cooperation between Syria and the DPRK, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Fox News Sunday that "If such an activity were taking place, it would be a matter of great concern because the president has put down a very strong marker with the North Koreans about further proliferation efforts. And obviously, any effort by the Syrians to pursue weapons of mass destruction would be a concern for us".
Biological Weapons
Syria has a robust biotechnology infrastructure and is likely It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability. Nearly all assessments of this program point to Syria having difficulty producing biological weapons without significant outside assistance both in expertise and material. A facility near Cerin is the only reported facility suspected as being used for the development of biological agents. Syria has signatory of the Biological Warfare Convention but has not ratified it.
Chemical Weapons
Syria, not a signatory to either the CWC or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has not ratified BWC began developing chemical weapons in 1973 prior to the Yom Kipper war when the Egyptian government reportedly gave Syria artillery shells capable of delivering chemical weapons. Since then Syria has developed a robust chemical weapons program, perhaps one of the most advanced in the Middle East, and a variety of delivery methods. The country is still very depending on outside assistance in procuring important precursor chemicals and equipment.
Apparently, during the early 80’s, a policy decision within the Syrian government, led to the rapid development of non-conventional weapons. It is likely this decision was the result of the realization that Syria could not reach conventional military parity with Israel.
The Arsenal
The Syrian arsenal is said to be comprised mostly of large amounts of Sarin in addition to tabun, mustard gas and is reportedly producing and weaponizing VX. Exact volumes of weapons in the Syrian stockpile are difficult to know. The CIA has estimated Syria to possess several hundred liters of chemical weapons with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually.
Precursors
Syria is not able to internally produce many of the necessary precursors to create chemical weapons and is dependent upon importing production equipment. The CIA reports in nearly every declassified acquisition report to the US Congress over the last five years the efforts of Syria to obtain precursor chemicals and equipment from external sources. The chemicals were stockpiled prior to international export controls but those initials supplies have likely long been exhausted. Syria's principle suppliers of CBW production technology were reported to be large chemical brokerage houses in Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria and Germany.
In 2001 the CIA reported that:
- Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.
In early 2002 Syria sought chemical weapons-related precursors from various countries. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently was trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment.
Syria is a major regional producer of phosphates that could conceivably be used for WMD. The country produces 2 million tons of phosphate per year and has an estimated reserve of around 2 billion tons. In October 2002 it was announced that a major “super” phosphate plant was to be constructed near Palmyra with a partnership between Russia and the state-owned General Company for Phosphate and Mines. A similar project is underway with the Indian firm, Dharmasi Morarji Chimicals Ltd.
The US has hoped that the 33-member Australia group would help in restricting imports to Syria and other similar states by coordinating the adoption of stricter export controls.
Syria has used the expansion of its pharmaceuticals industry as a cover for purchases relating to its chemical weapons program. Since 1988, protected from competing imports and without patent protection, the Syrian pharmaceutical industry has expanded rapidly and provides about 85% of the country's needs for products. The volume of the domestic market is expected to grow at a rate of 5-7% per annum, and there is the possibility to expand domestic production to meet the additional 15% of demand being met by imports. The state organization "Saydalaya" has a monopoly on the importation of drugs not produced in Syria and controls arrangements for technical appraisal and price negotiation. Syrian companies, however, may apply for a license to manufacture a drug that is being imported, and if permission is granted, imports of the drug end after six months. There is no active material production in Syria, and all active materials are imported from a wide range of overseas sources (Germany, Switzerland, Russia, Spain, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, USA, Slovakia and Oman, by order of value). Exports are confined to finished products and go to countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The vast size of these markets and the relative ease with which many pharmaceutical chemicals can be manufactured suggest a broad avenue of potential for development. Foreign companies may also outsource secondary production to Syrian companies with high quality production facilities, and some manufacturers have licenses from overseas companies to produce their medicines and market them under the brand name.
Production
Syria is now believed capable of producing several hundred tons of CW agents per year. Syrian production factiliites are notoriously small in comparison to other CBW facilities in other states and are difficult to conclusively identify. Presently there are four suspected sites. One located just north of Damascus, and the second near the industrial city of Homs. The third, in Hama, is believed to be producing VX agents in addition to sarin and tabun, and a forth near Cerin. Several other sites are monitored by intelligence agencies and are listed only as suspect.
Delivery
The CIA has reported continued effort by Syria to develop solid rocket motor technology, likely to be used in Scud C type missiles. These missiles could be used to deliver chemical weapons, and Syria is believed to have these systems deployed. Since 1985 they have begun to manufacture chemical warheads for their ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles may also be equipped with chemical warheads.
In addition, Syria has persistently acquired small amounts of conventional weapons from Russia, the FSU, China, Iran, and possibly North Korea. In recent years Syria has attempted to acquireg Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as well as upgrades for the aircraft, armored weapons, and air defense systems already in its inventory.
Possible Delivery Systems- Four SSM brigades: 1 with FROG, 1 with Scud Bs, 1 with Scud Cs, and 1 with SS-21s.
- "several thousand aerial bombs, filled mostly with sarin," and between 50 to 100 ballistic missile warheads.
- New long range North Korean Scud Cs, with ranges of up to 600 kilometers and possible nerve gas warheads.
- May be converting some long range surface-to-air and naval cruise missiles to use chemical warheads.
- SS-21 launchers and at least 36 SS-21 missiles with 80-100 kilometers range.
- Scud B launchers and Scud B missiles with 310 kilometers range.
- Short range M-1B missiles
- SS-N-3, and SSC-1b cruise missiles.
- Su-24 long range strike fighters.
- MiG-23BM Flogger F fighter ground attack aircraft.
- Su-20 fighter ground attack aircraft.
- Su-22 fighter ground attack aircraft.
- Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.
Testing
In April 2003 US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated that the US had evidence to suggest that Syria had been conducting chemical weapons tests over the prior 12 to 15 months. Specifically in November 1999 it was reported by the Washington Times that Syria had conducted a live chemical weapons bombing test using a MiG-23 jet that dropped a chemical weapons-laden bomb on a practice range in Syria. The bombing was detected by US spy satellites due to the distinct coloration on the impact area. The precise type of chemical used was never disclosed.
Outside Assitance
Syria is significantly dependent upon outside assistance for all of its WMD programs. There have been reports over the life of the Syria program that Syria has obtained significant assistance from various states, significantly Russia and France.
Russian General Anatoly Kuntsevich was suspected of smuggling VX precursors to nerve gas for research purposes. The materials shipped to Syria were intended for the production of the Soviet/Russian version of the VX nerve agent - code-named Substance 33 or V-gas. Such a deal might have been made in the early '90s or late '80s during a visit to Syria by the then-commander of the Russian Chemical Corps, General Pikalov. French support came in the form of pharmaceutical imports. In the early eighties, French companies provided an significant portion of pharmaceuticals imported by Syria. By the middle of the decade France provided nearly 1 quarter of pharmaceuticals coming into Syria. Certainly some of the imports were legitimate, but many were "dual use" items that could be directed to clandestine programs. In 1992 following French acceptance of the Australia Group, all exports became to be monitored for chemicals and equipment that could be directed to chemical and biological weapons programs.
Missile Programs
As of 2003 Syria had a combined total of several hundred Scud and SS-21 SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles], and is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its Scud missile force. Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel from positions near their peacetime garrisons and portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country. On 13 April 2007, citing Israeli intelligence sources, the Jerusalem Post reported that Syria had deployed 300 short-range (300-km) Scud missiles just north of the Golan Heights demilitarized zone.
Syria obtained Russian Scud-Bs, but it is unclear whether it received Russian Scud-Cs. As of 1992 it was estimated that Syria had 18 Scud-B launchers, as well as 18 of the second-generation Soviet SS-21s, a highly mobile, but shorter-range, missile capable of striking targets in northern Israel. It is widely believed that in late 1991 Syria bought 150 Scud-Cs [an extended-range versions of the Scud-Bs] from North Korea. Syrian Scuds are claimed to have a variety of warheads available, including cluster chemical, unitary VX chemical and unitary high explosive.
As of late 2000 Syria is believed to have 26 Scud launchers and 300-400 Scud Bs and Cs. The Scud B is capable of carrying a 1,000-kg warhead up to 300 kilometres and the Scud Cs a 770-kg warhead up to 500 kilometres, putting virtually all of Israel under the Syrian missile threat. A Syrian Scud-C unit is generally thought to consist of 18 launchers and 50 missiles. Preparations for the first launch take about one-and-a-half hours, but in some cases only three to five minutes will be enough for a second launch. In early 1998 it was reported that Syria had moved two units of Scud-C missiles from the region of Aleppo in the north to the vicinity of the capital, Damascus.
Damascus is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Iranian entities have been most prominent in aiding Syria's recent ballistic missile development.
Scud D 
Syria has apparently developed a longer-range missile -- the Scud D -- with assistance from North Korea. In late September 2000 Syria successfully tested its Korean Scud-D missile with a 360 mile range. The new Scud D, with a range of some 700 kilometers, gives Damascus the option of deploying missiles deeper into Syria to better protect them. In early July 2001 an Israeli radar picked up the launch of the Scud from the Haleb region, in northern Syria, and monitored its path until it landed some 300 kilometers away in the desert of southern Syria. Although the Scud D has a longer range than the Scud-C, if it were simply a Scud derivative it would have a much lighter warhead and be rather less accurate.
On 27 May 2005 Syria test-fired three Scud missiles, the first such Syrian missile tests since 2001. The missiles included one Scud B, with a range of about 300 kilometers, and a pair of Scud D's, with a range of about 700 kilometers. The missiles were launched from
Minakh, north of Aleppo in northern Syria. It appears that the missile launchers would have been driven to this air base from their garrison at
Al Safir south of Allepo. One flew about 400 kilometers to southernmost Syria, near the border with Jordan. One of the missiles disintegrated over Turkish territory, showering missile parts over two villages in the Turkish province of Hatay. This missile had been fired southwest toward the Mediterranean.
Israeli intelligence sources reportedly concluded that Syria successfully test-fired a Scud-D missile in the northeastern part of that country on 28 January 2007. The missile, reportedly 11-meter long with a range of 700 kilometers (440 miles), was built with the aid of North Korean technology. The English-language Jerusalem Post said "A previous test ended in failure when the missile fell apart over Turkish airspace." Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus to seek a longer-range ballistic missile capability such as North Korea's No Dong MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile].
source: Global Security
12th September 2007
