Quote:
Originally Posted by Salome  If this is true well then the iranians got what they wanted after all...and if those "upper class" dont like it they have the chance to emigrate right? In case they would stay and resist the system, and work on the change, then all credit goes to them. |
There isn't much chance of that happening. I don't think that most people really have a clear idea of how politics work in Iran, and they are looking at what is happening now from the lenses of West media, which is actually quite ridiculous and totally off base in its coverage. I will try to explain:
In Iran, there are a number of camps that make up the political dynamic of the country, and they can be more or less separated into the following categories:
First the conservatives:
The supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei: he has the final say on all major matters in the country, but in reality he is somewhat of a passive leader, who rules through "soft" power, and although constitutionally he is supposed to do whatever he wants, in reality he lacks the political capital to rule the way Khomeini did. However, he does control the Revolutionary Guard and Baseej (civilian militia). The government controls the army and police forces.
The old guard and clerical establishment: This centers around personalities like Ayatollah Jannati, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and other prominent politically active clerics who represent what really is a multi-faceted clerical establishment that ranges from hard line conservative to conservative. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, for example, is a backer of Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad: current president of Iran.
All of these can be grouped into what is called the conservative camp in the country, although this does not make the conservative camp a unified political party or even unified coalition. Ayatollah Khamenei, for example, is not represented by Ahmadinejad, although Ahmadijad is loyal to wilayat al faqih.
Next, the "reformist" camp:
Hashemi Rafsanjani: he is the Iranian equivalent of Lebanon's Rafik Hariri. He is massively wealthy, extremely powerful, has control or sway over many portions of Iran's economic interests, and has many people in government who owe him their positions and are loyal to him. Ironically though, he is part of the old guard and clerical establishment, and he is forced to stay loyal to the waliy al faqih ideology in the political sense, but he aspires to become waliy al faqih himself, which puts him at odds with conservatives and Ayatollah Khamenei, although he does not oppose Khamenei outwardly because opposing the supreme leader is a "red line" politically.
Khatami: Former president of Iran, is one of the faces of the reformist camp.
In reality, the reformist camp itself is not a unified coalition either, and it is actually much more fractured and disorganized than the conservatives are. The runner up in the election, Musavi for example, was relatively unknown until a few weeks ago when the reformist base rallied around him for reasons that I will explain. Musavi himself has no real popular backing, and what is happening right now has absolutely nothing to do with him at all.
The Western media tends to portray the reformist camp as liberal-minded educated Iranians who are friendly towards the West, and want to overthrow the regime. They also like to pretend that regime change is a viable possibility, and that the reformists are the suppressed majority in Iran. However, this couldn't be farther from the truth. The reformist camp is rather a loose coalition of many different political interests, some of which are extreme minorities, and others which are massively powerful.
It does contain some heavyweights such as Khatami, who was considering running in the elections but withdrew for what he claimed was "unifying" the reformist ranks around one candidate, but the reality was that Hashemi Rafsanjani pressured him to withdraw his candidacy. Rafsanjani, who is ironically not a reformist at all, and who is wildly corrupt and actually quite despised by a solid majority of Iranian voters, is basically in control of the real effective powerbases of the reformist camp. Iran's so-called pro-Western liberals are almost non-existent in terms of political power, and represent a very small minority in the country.
In truth, this election wasn't between Ahmadinejad and Musavi. It was between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. For those who payed attention, much of the campaigning and rhetoric in the weeks leading up to the election focused on the spat between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani, who accused the latter on specific charges of corruption. Rafsanjani, who is doing his best to put himself in a position to become waliy al faqih, sees Ahmadinejad as a threat to his prospects of ascention (which are already bleak and Rafsanjani knows this), so he put his weight behind Musavi hoping that he could force Ahmadijenad out of power and install a loyal ally as President. Rafsanjani actually funded most of Musavi's campaign (for example, his daughter donated a whopping $300 million to Musavi).
The reason that Ahmadinejab won an apparent landslide victory isn't really because 2/3 of Iranian voters love him so much. To be sure, Iran's conservative base is significantly larger than the reformist base, and much better organized, but Ahmadinejad owes a non-negligable portion of his victory to many reformists who voted for him, not because they support him, but because they oppose Rafsanjani more than they oppose Ahmadinejad. I know for example, that many of the expatriate Iranians in California, who are liberals generally opposed to the theocracy in Iran (whom I have contacts with) voted for Ahmadinejad and not Musavi because it was clear that Rafsanjani was backing him. All through the election period, for example, Rafsanjani was using Musavi's newspaper to attack Ahmadijenad.
What is happening right now, in terms of the riots and what-not, is not representative of popular anger over the re-election of Ahmadinejad. It is really representative of Rafsanjani making noise over Musavi's loss in the polls. Rafsajani is sending a message, basically reminding Ahmadinejad that he still controls a lot of the strings in Iran, especially since Ahmadinejad seems adamant on exposing Rafsanjani for his widespread corruption. The two are basically political enemies. For this reason, what is happening right now has nothing to do with a popular rising or the prospect of a "revolution" in the offing. Rafsanjani is basically behind it, flexing his muscles, but the reality here is that Rafsanjani cannot take it any farther even if he wanted to - and he doesn't. One thing that Rafsanjani doesn't have control over is the military, whether that be the basij, the Revolutionary guard, army, intelligence services, or police forces. The basij and guard are controlled by Khamenei, and the police and army are controlled by Ahmadinejad's government. Even if he did, however, Rafsanjani has a vented interest in preserving the regime - because he is a part of it, and he aspires to head it as waliy al faqih. He isn't going to back a revolution against it, because it will bring him down before anyone else thanks to his notoriousness for being corrupt - even if there were any real prospects for a revolution, which there aren't. If these kids in the streets continue burning busses and creating a disturbance, Khamenei will eventually call on the basij to hit the streets and shut them down, and that will be the end of it.
14th June 2009
